The possibility that autonomous weapons will be deployed on the battlefields of the future raises the challenge of determining who can be held responsible for how these weapons act. Robert Sparrow has argued that it would be impossible to attribute responsibility for autonomous robots' actions to their creators, their commanders, or the robots themselves. This essay reaches a much different conclusion. It argues that the problem of determining responsibility for autonomous robots can be solved by addressing it within (...) the context of the military chain of command. The military hierarchy is a system of distributing responsibility between decision makers on different levels and constraining autonomy. If autonomous weapons are employed as agents operating within this system, then responsibility for their actions can be attributed to their creators and their civilian and military superiors. (shrink)

A classic objection to autonomous weapon systems (AWS) is that these could create so-called responsibility gaps, where it is unclear who should be held responsible in the event that an AWS were to violate some portion of the law of armed conflict (LOAC). However, those who raise this objection generally do so presenting it as a problem for AWS as a whole class of weapons. Yet there exists a rather wide range of systems that can be counted as “autonomous (...) weapon systems”, and so the objection is too broad. In this article I present a taxonomic approach to the objection, examining a number of systems that would count as AWS under the prevalent definitions provided by the United States Department of Defense and the International Committee of the Red Cross, and I show that for virtually all such systems there is a clear locus of responsibility which presents itself as soon as one focuses on specific systems, rather than general notions of AWS. In developing these points, I also suggest a method for dealing with near-future types of AWS which may be thought to create situations where responsibility gaps can still arise. The main purpose of the arguments is, however, not to show that responsibility gaps do not exist or can be closed where they do exist. Rather, it is to highlight that any arguments surrounding AWS must be made with reference to specific weapon platforms imbued with specific abilities, subject to specific limitations, and deployed to specific times and places for specific purposes. More succinctly, the arguments show that we cannot and should not aim to treat AWS as if all of these shared all morally relevant features, but instead on a case-by-case basis. Thus, we must contend with the realities of weapons development and deployment, and tailor our arguments and conclusions to those realities, and with an eye to what facts obtain for particular systems fulfilling particular combat roles. (shrink)

One of the several reasons given in calls for the prohibition of autonomous weapons systems (AWS) is that they are against human dignity (Asaro, 2012; Docherty, 2014; Heyns, 2017; Ulgen, 2016). However there have been criticisms of the reliance on human dignity in arguments against AWS (Birnbacher, 2016; Pop, 2018; Saxton, 2016). This paper critically examines the relationship between human dignity and autonomous weapons systems. Three main types of objection to AWS are identified; (i) arguments based on technology (...) and the ability of AWS to conform to International Humanitarian Law; (ii) deontological arguments based on the need for human judgement and meaningful human control, including arguments based on human dignity; (iii) consequentialist reasons about their effects on global stability and the likelihood of going to war. An account is provided of the claims made about human dignity and AWS, of the criticisms of these claims, and of the several meanings of ‘dignity’. It is concluded that although there are several ways in which AWS can be said to be against human dignity, they are not unique in this respect. There are other weapons, and other technologies, that also compromise human dignity. Given this, and the ambiguities inherent in the concept, it is wiser to draw on several types of objections in arguments against AWS, and not to rely exclusively on human dignity. (shrink)

Technological progress has brought about the emergence of machines that have the capacity to take human lives without human control. These represent an unprecedented threat to humankind. This paper starts from the example of chemical weapons, now banned worldwide by the Geneva protocol, to illustrate how technological development initially aimed at the benefit of humankind has, ultimately, produced what is now called the “Weaponization of Artificial Intelligence (AI)”. Autonomous Weapon Systems (AWS) fail the so-called discrimination principle, yet, the wider (...) public is largely unaware of this problem. Given that ongoing scientific research on AWS, performed in the military sector, is generally not made available to the public domain, many of the viewpoints on this subject, expressed across different media, invoke common sense rather than scientific evidence. Yet, the implications of a potential weaponization of our work as scientists, especially in the field of AI, are reaching further than some may think. The potential consequences of a deployment of AWS for citizen stakeholders are incommensurable, and it is time to raise awareness in the public domain of the kind of potential threats identified, and to encourage legal policies ensuring that these threats will not materialize. (shrink)

Autonomous weapons systems (AWS), sometimes referred to as “killer robots”, are receiving evermore attention, both in public discourse as well as by scholars and policymakers. Much of this interest is connected with emerging ethical and legal problems linked to increasing autonomy in weapons systems, but there is a general underappreciation for the ways in which existing law might impact on these new technologies. In this paper, we argue that as AWS become more sophisticated and increasingly more capable than (...) flesh-and-blood soldiers, it will increasingly be the case that such soldiers are “in the power” of those AWS which fight against them. This implies that such soldiers ought to be considered hors de combat, and not targeted. In arguing for this point, we draw out a broader conclusion regarding hors de combat status, namely that it must be viewed contextually, with close reference to the capabilities of combatants on both sides of any discreet engagement. Given this point, and the fact that AWS may come in many shapes and sizes, and can be made for many different missions, we argue that each particular AWS will likely need its own standard for when enemy soldiers are deemed hors de combat. We conclude by examining how these nuanced views of hors de combat status might impact on meaningful human control of AWS. (shrink)

As the militaries of technologically advanced nations seek to apply increasingly sophisticated AI and automation to weapons technologies, a host of ethical, legal, social, and political questions arise. Central among these is whether it is ethical to delegate the decision to use lethal force to an autonomous system that is not under meaningful human control. Further questions arise as to who or what could or should be held responsible when lethal force is used improperly by such systems. This chapter (...) argues that current autonomous weapons are not legal or moral agents that can be held morally responsible or legally accountable for their choices and actions, and that therefore humans need to maintain control over such weapons systems. (shrink)

Due to advances in military technology, there has been an outpouring of research on what are known as autonomous weapon systems (AWS). However, it is common in this literature for arguments to be made without first making clear exactly what definitions one is employing, with the detrimental effect that authors may speak past one another or even miss the targets of their arguments. In this article I examine the U.S. Department of Defense and International Committee of the Red Cross definitions (...) of AWS, showing that these definitions are far broader than some recognize, and that they therefore classify a much larger set of weapons as AWS. I then show that these broader views of AWS have implications for what moral and legal rules we might argue should be applied to such systems. I conclude by arguing there is a greater need for precision and clarity within AWS debates, in order to ensure that researchers are discussing the same weapon systems (autonomous or otherwise) when they argue for or against particular points. The purpose of this article is not to defend any specific view of AWS, nor to further any general endorsement or objection to such systems, but rather to show the importance of argumentative clarity in this debate. (shrink)

In this report we focus on the definition of autonomous weapons systems (AWS). We provide a comparative analysis of existing official definitions of AWS as provided by States and international organisations, like ICRC and NATO. The analysis highlights that the definitions draw focus on different aspects of AWS and hence lead to different approaches to address the ethical and legal problems of these weapons systems. This approach is detrimental both in terms of fostering an understanding of AWS and (...) in facilitating agreement around conditions of deployment and regulations of their use and, indeed, whether AWS are to be used at all. We draw from the comparative analysis to identify essential aspects of AWS and then offer a definition that provides a value-neutral ground to address the relevant ethical and legal problems. In particular, we identify four key aspects—autonomy; adapting capabilities of AWS; human control; and purpose of use—as the essential factors to define AWS and which are key when considering the related ethical and legal implications. (shrink)

In this article, we focus on the attribution of moral responsibility for the actions of autonomous weapons systems (AWS). To do so, we suggest that the responsibility gap can be closed if human agents can take meaningful moral responsibility for the actions of AWS. This is a moral responsibility attributed to individuals in a justified and fair way and which is accepted by individuals as an assessment of their own moral character. We argue that, given the unpredictability of AWS, (...) meaningful moral responsibly can only be discharged by human agents who are willing to take a moral gambit: they decide to design/develop/deploy AWS despite the uncertainty about the effects an AWS may produce, hoping that unintended and unwanted or unforeseen outcomes may never occurs, but also accepting to be held responsible if such outcomes will occur. We argue that, while a moral gambit is permissible for the use of non-lethal AWS, this is not the case for the actions of lethal autonomous weapon systems. (shrink)

Some proponents of a ban on Autonomous Weapon Systems (AWS) believe adopting these would lower the threshold for war, and is thus morally undesirable. This paper argues against that thesis. First, removing a single constraint on warmaking does not automatically make war more likely. Analysis of the causal input of other more potent restraints shows this holds true for just a fraction of potential conflicts. Secondly, AWS adoption would also impact other restraints on war in ways that are complex and (...) unpredictable. Without a thorough analysis of these other impacts, AWS’ adoption impact on the incidence of war cannot be said to be significant enough to warrant action. Thirdly, war ethics does not aim to reduce the number of wars simpliciter, but to resist, deter, and thus reduce occurrence of unjustified aggression. Consequently lowering the threshold for defensive war, especially for wars of collective defense and/or humanitarian interventions, would be a good outcome, potentially offsetting a possible negative effect on the incidence of aggressive wars. Last but not least, states that already restrain themselves from aggressive warring by sufficiently robust alternative mechanisms cannot be required to eschew AWS adoption for that reason. Taken together, these arguments prove that the impact of AWS introduction on the incidence of war cannot be discerned through a priori philosophical analysis alone. Consequently ‘lower threshold for war’ argument cannot support calls for an AWS ban. (shrink)

Weapons have long been the focus of ethical discourse since a long time. In 1096 Pope Urban II prohibited the use of crossbows introduced from China in 1096 and Pope Innocent II repeating the prohibition in 1139 both without any real effect. New weapons have long been regarded as inhuman and unfair such as the machine gun in 1884 (despite the damage such a weapon could do the inventor argued it would prevent human suffering), nuclear weapons in (...) 1945 (giving rise to international action to prevent their use), and biological and chemical weapons. (shrink)

While Autonomous Weapons Systems have obvious military advantages, there are prima facie moral objections to using them. By way of general reply to these objections, I point out similarities between the structure of law and morality on the one hand and of automata on the other. I argue that these, plus the fact that automata can be designed to lack the biases and other failings of humans, require us to automate the formulation, administration, and enforcement of law as much (...) as possible, including the elements of law and morality that are operated by combatants in war. I suggest that, ethically speaking, deploying a legally competent robot in some legally regulated realm is not much different from deploying a more or less well-armed, vulnerable, obedient, or morally discerning soldier or general into battle, a police officer onto patrol, or a lawyer or judge into a trial. All feature automaticity in the sense of deputation to an agent we do not then directly control. Such relations are well understood and well-regulated in morality and law; so there is not much challenging philosophically in having robots be some of these agents — excepting the implications of the limits of robot technology at a given time for responsible deputation. I then consider this proposal in light of the differences between two conceptions of law. These are distinguished by whether each conception sees law as unambiguous rules inherently uncontroversial in each application; and I consider the prospects for robotizing law on each. Likewise for the prospects of robotizing moral theorizing and moral decision-making. Finally I identify certain elements of law and morality, noted by the philosopher Immanuel Kant, which robots can participate in only upon being able to set ends and emotionally invest in their attainment. One conclusion is that while affectless autonomous devices might be fit to rule us, they would not be fit to vote with us. For voting is a process for summing felt preferences, and affectless devices would have none to weigh into the sum. Since they don't care which outcomes obtain, they don't get to vote on which ones to bring about. (shrink)

There has recently been increasing interest in the possibility and ethics of lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS), which would combine sophisticated AI with machinery capable of deadly force. One objection to LAWS is that their use will create a troubling responsibility gap, where no human agent can properly be held accountable for the outcomes that they create. While some authors have attempted to show that individual agents can, in fact, be responsible for the behaviour of LAWS in various circumstances, (...) this will not be possible in all cases. This article argues, however, that by assigning responsibilities to group agents operating within the military‐industrial complex, as well as the military‐industrial complex as a whole, we may be able to close the responsibility gap, or at least reduce its costs. Insofar as the potential for responsibility gaps poses an ethical barrier to the development and deployment of LAWS, this argument, if sound, may show their use to be morally permissible in a greater range of cases. (shrink)

_Starve and Immolate_ tells the story of leftist political prisoners in Turkey who waged a deadly struggle against the introduction of high security prisons by forging their lives into weapons. Weaving together contemporary and critical political theory with political ethnography, Banu Bargu analyzes the death fast struggle as an exemplary though not exceptional instance of self-destructive practices that are a consequence of, retort to, and refusal of the increasingly biopolitical forms of sovereign power deployed around the globe. Bargu chronicles (...) the experiences, rituals, values, beliefs, ideological self-representations, and contentions of the protestors who fought cellular confinement against the background of the history of Turkish democracy and the treatment of dissent in a country where prisons have become sites of political confrontation. A critical response to Michel Foucault's _Discipline and Punish_, _Starve and Immolate_ centers on new forms of struggle that arise from the asymmetric antagonism between the state and its contestants in the contemporary prison. Bargu ultimately positions the weaponization of life as a bleak, violent, and ambivalent form of insurgent politics that seeks to wrench the power of life and death away from the modern state on corporeal grounds and in increasingly theologized forms. Drawing attention to the existential commitment, sacrificial morality, and militant martyrdom that transforms these struggles into a complex amalgam of resistance, Bargu explores the global ramifications of human weapons' practices of resistance, their possibilities and limitations. (shrink)

This chapter argues that autonomous weapons pose no moral special problem. By posing no special problem, it is meant that producing and using autonomous weapons is wrong under the same conditions that the use of non-autonomous weapons or no weapons is wrong. That is, the use does not raise a distinct moral issue. Producing or using autonomous weapons does not necessarily infringe on someone’s moral right. Hence, producing or using autonomous weapons is not necessarily (...) wrong. The central argument here is that autonomous-weapon use does not necessarily infringe attackers’ rights. This is because unjust attackers forfeit their rights. If unjust attackers forfeit their rights, then autonomous weapons do not necessarily infringe on the attackers’ rights. The secondary argument is that the use of such weapons does not infringe on defenders’ or third-parties’ rights. (shrink)

The present debate over the creation and potential deployment of lethal autonomous weapons, or ‘killer robots’, is garnering more and more attention. Much of the argument revolves around whether such machines would be able to uphold the principle of noncombatant immunity. However, much of the present debate fails to take into consideration the practical realties of contemporary armed conflict, particularly generating military objectives and the adherence to a targeting process. This paper argues that we must look to the targeting (...) process if we are to gain a fuller picture of the consequences of creating or fielding lethal autonomous robots. This paper argues that once we look to how militaries actually create military objectives, and thus identify potential targets, we face an additional problem: the Strategic Robot Problem. The ability to create targeting lists using military doctrine and targeting processes is inherently strategic, and handing this capability over to a machine undermines existing comman.. (shrink)

Kenneth Waltz argued that more states should have nuclear weapons. This remains a controversial position in international relations theory, while in philosophy of technology, it is largely unknown. This is regrettable, because Waltz offers interesting arguments for why nuclear weapons have a positive influence on the world. In short, he implies that nuclear weapons contain morally desirable values. Because of this, Waltz should be a more prominent voice in philosophy of technology, especially in the debate on the (...) values embedded in technological artifacts. Waltz offers a convincing account for why nuclear weapons are not value-neutral, and I argue that his works imply a strong version of this position: that nuclear weapons co-act together with humans. The paper will outline and defend this position. However, I note that Waltz’s analysis is narrowly focused on international relations. For him, nuclear weapons are good because they foster peace. Philosophy of technology should expand on this thesis. To integrate Waltz into the field, scholars should interrogate the benefits and drawbacks of nuclear weapons based on a variety of values – including, but not limited to, those that Waltz proposes. Value neutrality thesis; nuclear weapons: international relations; history of ideas; ethics of technology. (shrink)

The development of autonomous weapons systems (AWSs), which would make decisions on the battlefield without direct input from humans, has the potential to dramatically change the nature of war. Due to the revolutionary potential of these technologies, it is essential to discuss their moral implications. While the academic literature often highlights their morally problematic nature, with some proposing outright banning them, this paper highlights an important benefit of AWSs: protecting the lives, as well as the mental and physical health (...) of soldiers. If militaries can avoid sending humans into dangerous situations or relieve drone operators from tasks that lead to lifelong trauma, this obviously appears morally desirable – especially in a world where many soldiers are still drafted against their will. Nonetheless, there are many arguments against AWSs. However, we show that although AWSs are potentially dangerous, criticisms apply equally to human soldiers and weapons steered by them. The combination of both claims makes a strong case against a ban on AWSs where it is possible. Instead, researchers should focus on mitigating their drawbacks and refining their benefits. (shrink)

The debate over the attribution of personhood to non-human entities is of an increasing concern to both academia and institutions. The intelligence, autonomy and efficiency exhibited by modern AI systems, raise pressing questions regarding the moral responsibility issues their use entails. In our paper we focus our discussion on autonomous war machines, as their actions touch upon issues of life and death and their design, production and use cause philosophical controversies. Prompted by the classic position of Daniel Dennett, defending the (...) possibility that autonomous intelligent systems are responsible for their actions, we consider a) the argument of cognitive and / or functional equivalence of humans and machines, b) the argument of autonomy as such and c) the argument of excessive efficiency of the actions of intelligent machines. Our investigation upholds a skeptical stance towards the issue of recognition of moral personhood, while illuminating aspects such as the difference between cognition and intelligence, the necessary and sufficient conditions that imply moral responsibility and the differences between the ontological and the epistemological examination of the above problems. Finally, the contradiction between the demand for clear and solid decision-making criteria and the endless nature of a philosophical analysis that strives to be consistent is emphasized. (shrink)

Predictions about autonomous weapon systems are typically thought to channel fears that drove all the myths about intelligence embodied in matter. One of these is the idea that the technology can get out of control and ultimately lead to horrifi c consequences, as is the case in Mary Shelley’s classic Frankenstein. Given this, predictions about AWS are sometimes dismissed as science-fiction fear-mongering. This paper considers several analogies between AWS and other weapon systems and ultimately offers an argument that nuclear (...) class='Hi'>weapons and their effect on the development of modern asymmetrical warfare are the best analogy to the introduction of AWS. The fi nal section focuses on this analogy and offers speculations about the likely consequences of AWS being hacked. These speculations tacitly draw on myths and tropes about technology and AI from popular fi ction, such as Frankenstein, to project a convincing model of the risks and benefi ts of AWS deployment. (shrink)

A popular idea about conspiracy theorists is that they are purveyors of misinformation. However, this idea fails to appreciate the fact that there are different species of conspiracy theorists, each with different pro-relations to conspiracy theories. Some are theorists who posit conspiracies as the best explanation of one or more event. They are traditional conspiracy theorists. Despite their explanatory aims, their theories can be broadcasted and shared, leading people to believe them on the basis of testimony alone. There are conspiracy (...) theorists who do research, engaged in evidential inquiry, and those who just trust those who do. Others are not theorists at all but people who use conspiracy theories as tools to facilitate doubt in the service of their prudential goals. They are conspiracy doubt-mongers. Still others are related to certain conspiracy claims the way some religious believers are to certain religious claims. They are conspiracy worldviewers. I argue that conspiracy doubt-mongers are the primary purveyors of misinformation. Conspiracy doubt-mongering weaponizes conspiracy theories for problematic prudential ends, approximating radical skeptical doubt. I also argue that generalism about conspiracy theory belief remains problematic even after we take account of the different species of conspiracy theorist and the purpose of their conspiracy theorizing. [Draft for Misinformation and Other Epistemic Pathologies, M. Popa-Wyatt (ed.) Cambridge University Press]. (shrink)

One well-known argument that it is morally impermissible to deploy strongly autonomous weapon systems in war comes from Duncan Purves, Ryan Jenkins, and Bradley Strawser. They argue that even if strongly autonomous weapon systems, once sufficiently technologically developed, are able to make moral decisions that are just as good as humans, deploying them in war is still morally impermissible because strongly autonomous weapon systems cannot act for the right reasons in deciding matters of life and death. In this short paper, (...) however, I argue that we have very good reason to think that Purves, Jenkins, and Strawser’s in principle argument against deploying strongly autonomous weapon systems in war is unsound. (shrink)

Although most styles of military ethics are hybrids that draw on multiple ethical theories, they are usually based primarily on the model of Aristotelian virtue ethics. Virtue ethics is well-suited for regulating the conduct of soldiers who have to make quick decisions on the battlefield, but its applicability to military personnel is threatened by the growing use of unmanned weapon systems. These weapons disrupt virtue ethics’ institutional and cultural basis by changing what it means to display virtue and transforming (...) the roles soldiers perform and the nature of the military profession itself. I argue that in light of these challenges to virtue ethics, at least as it is traditionally understood within the armed forces, soldiers operating unmanned weapons require a more heavily rule-based approach to military ethics. (shrink)

Militairy technology is developing at a rapid pace and we are seeing a growing number of weapons with increasing levels of autonomy being developed and deployed. This raises various legal, ethical, and security concerns. The absence of clear international rules setting limits and governing the use of autonomous weapons is extremely concerning. There is an urgent need for the international community to work together towards a treaty not only to safeguard ethical and legal norms, but also for our (...) shared security. This article explains why a treaty on autonomous weapons is needed and achievable. It goes into what a treaty could consist of to establish an international norm and set rules and limits on autonomy in weapon systems. (shrink)

To many, the idea of autonomous weapons systems (AWS) killing human beings is grotesque. Yet critics have had difficulty explaining why it should make a significant moral difference if a human combatant is killed by an AWS as opposed to being killed by a human combatant. The purpose of this paper is to explore the roots of various deontological concerns with AWS and to consider whether these concerns are distinct from any concerns that also apply to long-distance, human-guided weaponry. (...) We suggest that at least one major driver of the intuitive moral aversion to lethal AWS is that their use disrespects their human targets by violating the martial contract between human combatants. On our understanding of this doctrine, service personnel cede a right not to be directly targeted with lethal violence to other human agents alone. Artificial agents, of which AWS are one example, cannot understand the value of human life. A human combatant cannot transfer his privileges of targeting enemy combatants to a robot. Therefore, the human duty-holder who deploys AWS breaches the martial contract between human combatants and disrespects the targeted combatants. We consider whether this novel deontological objection to AWS forms the foundation of several other popular yet imperfect deontological objections to AWS. (shrink)

Using Wang Enyang’s Yogācāra as a window, I analyze a modern recasting of Buddhist intersubjectivity as the foundation of an irrealist social ontology. Specifically, I investigate Wang’s use of adhipati (activating and amplifying influence; Chinese zengshang li, 增上力), a central Yogācāra doctrine that lays out the karmic mechanism of how different mental continuums could directly influence one another without presuming an “objective” outside. As I show, Wang superscribed onto adhipati a surprising social function—transformative nonviolence—when he struggles to make sense of (...) intersubjective responsibility in events of murder and massacre. Joining the emerging studies of intersubjectivity in Buddhist traditions, I show that studying modern Yogācāra opens a new path to reconsider the premises of some Anglo-European debates, such as the realist versus idealist social ontologies, the ontological primacy of the individual versus the social, and the relationship between justice and nonviolence. (shrink)

In this article, I analyze weaponized subordination, wherein men strategically use their perceived subordinate masculine status to legitimate their degradation of women. I draw on a qualitative analysis of 9,062 comments made on a popular involuntary celibate discussion board. Incels are an online community of men who define themselves by their inability to participate in heterosexual sex/relationships. Incel forums are characterized by self-loathing, anger, and misogyny, with several incels having committed murders. I first detail the type of subordination incels argue (...) they experience—a social bias in favor of attractive people they call lookism. Next, I explain how incels perceive themselves as permanently subordinated “failed men.” I then demonstrate how incels weaponize their subordination, using their perceived subordinate status to justify their misogyny. Findings are discussed in relation to hybrid masculinity and conceptualizations of subordinate masculinities. (shrink)

Unlike human soldiers, autonomous weapons systems are unaffected by psychological factors that would cause them to act outside the chain of command. This is a compelling moral justification for their development and eventual deployment in war. To achieve this level of sophistication, the software that runs AWS will have to first solve two problems: the frame problem and the representation problem. Solutions to these problems will inevitably involve complex software. Complex software will create security risks and will make AWS (...) critically vulnerable to hacking. I claim that the political and tactical consequences of hacked AWS far outweigh the purported advantages of AWS not being affected by psychological factors and always following orders. Therefore, one of the moral justifications for the deployment of AWS is undermined. (shrink)

Rapid actions to persons holding weapons were simulated using desktop virtual reality. Subjects responded to simulated (a) criminals, by pointing the computerÕs mouse at them and left-clicking (simulated shooting), (b) fellow police officers, by pressing the spacebar (safety signal), and (c) citizens, by inaction. In one of two tasks Black males holding guns were police officers while White males holding guns were criminals. In the other, Whites with guns were police and Blacks with guns were criminals. In both tasks (...) Blacks or Whites holding harmless objects were citizens. Signal detection analyses revealed two race effects that led to Blacks being incorrectly shot at more than Whites: a perceptual sensitivity effect (when held by Blacks guns were less distinguishable from harmless objects) and a response bias effect (objects held by Blacks were more likely to be treated as guns). Ó 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved. (shrink)

In this article, we focus on the scholarly and policy debate on autonomous weapon systems and particularly on the objections to the use of these weapons which rest on jus ad bellum principles of proportionality and last resort. Both objections rest on the idea that AWS may increase the incidence of war by reducing the costs for going to war or by providing a propagandistic value. We argue that whilst these objections offer pressing concerns in their own right, they (...) suffer from important limitations: they overlook the difficulties of calculating ad bellum proportionality; confuse the concept of proportionality of effects with the precision of weapon systems; disregard the ever-changing nature of war and of its ethical implications; mistake the moral obligation imposed by the principle of last resort with the impact that AWS may have on political decision to resort to war. Our analysis does not entail that AWS are acceptable or justifiable, but it shows that ad bellum principles are not the best set of ethical principles for tackling the ethical problems raised by AWS; and that developing adequate understanding of the transformations that the use of AWS poses to the nature of war itself is a necessary, preliminary requirement to any ethical analysis of the use of these weapons. (shrink)

Jacob Hale Russell and Dennis Patterson, who both teach at Rutgers Law School, argue in The Weaponization of Expertise that an unhealthy conflation of academic expertise and elite power in the Unit...

The concept of noncombatant immunity prohibits the intentional targeting of noncombatants. The availability of nonlethal weapons (NLW) may weaken this prohibition, especially since using NLWs against noncombatants may, in some cases, actually save the noncombatants' lives. Given the advancement of NLWs, I argue that their probable appearance on the battlefield demands close scrutiny due to the moral problems associated with their use. In this paper, I examine four distinct cases and determine whether the use of NLWs is morally permissible. (...) While it seems that the reduced harm caused by NLWs makes their use more acceptable, adhering to noncombatant immunity requires more than not killing noncombatants. It also requires that military forces treat noncombatants a certain way. In the cases I present, to use NLWs against noncombatants treats them as combatants and coerces them to do something against their will. While a consequentialist foundation for noncombatant immunity may permit this action, a rights-based concept of noncombatant immunity does not. I contend that only a rights-based concept of noncombatant immunity is viable, and that the availability of NLWs should not significantly alter the prohibitions prescribed by noncombatant immunity. (shrink)

As technology progresses and autonomous weapons increasingly become a reality rather than mere science fiction, an ethical debate has developed surrounding the use of such weapons, which operate with little or no human oversight. Some view the use of autonomous weapons as morally preferable (not to mention strategically advantageous), as they can be used in place of human combatants. Others oppose their use for moral and legal reasons. This chapter analyzes arguments on both sides of the question (...) and discusses challenges to limiting and defining autonomous weapons. The chapter acknowledges that some form of autonomy in weapon systems is here to stay, but seeks to limit potential catastrophes by recommending the adoption of an international agreement to ban fully autonomous weapons—those which cannot be recalled—as a first step toward addressing the issues raised. (shrink)

_Confronts the ethical challenges of warfare carried out by artificial intelligence._ _2021 ___CHOICE___ Outstanding Academic Title _ _Moral Responsibility in Twenty-First-Century Warfare_ explores the complex relationship between just war theory and the ethics of autonomous weapons systems (AWS). One of the challenges facing ethicists of war, particularly just war theorists, is that AWS is an applicative concept that seems, in many ways, to lie beyond the human(ist) scope of the just war theory tradition. The book examines the various ethical (...) gaps between just war theory and the legal and moral status of AWS, addresses the limits of both traditional and revisionist just war theory, and proposes ways of bridging some of these gaps. It adopts a dualistic notion of moral responsibility-or differing, related notions of moral responsibility and legitimate authority-to study the conflicts and contradictions of legitimizing the autonomous weapons that are designed to secure peace and neutralize the effects of violence. Focusing on the changing conditions and dynamics of accountability, responsibility, autonomy, and rights in twenty-first-century warfare, the volume sheds light on the effects of violence and the future ethics of modern warfare. (shrink)

I defend my analysis of Kenneth Waltz’s position against two points of criticism. First, my view that Waltz proposes a “hybrid account” of moral agency applies to fewer phenomena than a human-centered explanation. However, I show that this is by design. Waltz exclusively writes about international relations, which, as a special field of inquiry, requires distinct explanations. Second, even though technological artifacts shape human moral agency, they are not moral agents themselves. I agree with this point, but note that we (...) should not underestimate how drastically the mere existence of nuclear weapons has shaped human moral responsibility. (shrink)

This chapter explores how biologically oriented approaches to narratives relate to more traditional hermeneutic and culturalist readings. As a case study, two ethnological readings of reciprocal exchange in _Beowulf_ are examined from the perspective of altruism theory and costly signaling theory. It is shown how the latter crucially add to hermeneutic understandings of such aspects of the plot as _wyrð_ (“worth”) as an aspect of personal identity and _sibbengedriht_ as a social phenomenon. The relevance of this type of analysis for (...) the wider debate on the disciplinary identity of ethnology is discussed in terms of Tinbergen's “four whys.”. (shrink)

Apologies are an important part of moral life and a method by which someone can satisfy their reparative obligations. At the same time, apologies can be used both as a shield to protect the person apologizing and as a weapon against the person to whom the apology is owed. In this paper we unpack both claims. We defend two principles one should employ to try to avoid such bad outcomes: (1) Apologies must be one-sided and nontransactional, and (2) the wrongdoer (...) must be willing to pay what they owe. We argue that these principles require the wrongdoer’s emotional vulnerability. Furthermore, we argue that the duty to be vulnerable in issuing apologies helps to make sense of why apologizing well is so difficult and why members of privileged groups might be especially prone to apologizing badly. (shrink)

Regulating war has long been a concern of the international community. From the Hague Conventions to the Geneva Conventions and the multiple treaties and related institutions that have emerged in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, efforts to mitigate the horrors of war have focused on regulating weapons, defining combatants, and ensuring access to the battlefield for humanitarians. But regulation and legal codes alone cannot be the end point of an engaged ethical response to new weapons developments. This short (...) essay reviews some of the existing ethical works on lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS), highlighting how rule- and consequence-based accounts fail to provide adequate guidance for how to deal with them. I propose a virtue-based account, which I link up with an Aristotelian framework, for how the international community might better address these weapons systems. (shrink)

This chapter discusses the fundamental question of the defense industry’s role and legitimacy for societies. It begins with a parable of a psychopath doing something self-serving that has beneficial moral consequences. Analogously, it is argued, the defense industry profiting by selling weapons that can kill people makes it useful in solving moral problems not solvable by people with ordinary moral scruples. Next, the chapter argues that while the defense industry is a business, it is also implicated in the security (...) of its home nations. In addition, its products can be used for good or evil. Thus, it must navigate conflicting values, with the result that the rules often thought to rightly regulate the industry—codes of business ethics, engineering ethics, procurement ethics, plus laws of the land, and dicta of conscience—need supplementing by general moral reflection. This chapter argues for a principle that tells how to decide when to violate the rules, for a theory of rational choice on which choosing by this principle is rational, and for teaching that theory to defense industry employees to ensure their ethical behavior. (shrink)

This article assesses how autonomy and machine learning impact the existential risk of nuclear war. It situates the problem of cyber security, which proceeds by stealth, within the larger context of nuclear deterrence, which is effective when it functions with transparency and credibility. Cyber vulnerabilities poses new weaknesses to the strategic stability provided by nuclear deterrence. This article offers best practices for the use of computer and information technologies integrated into nuclear weapons systems. Focusing on nuclear command and control, (...) avoiding autonomy and machine learning is recommended as one means to reduce the existential risk of unintended nuclear conflict. (shrink)

Neither non-lethal violence nor psychochemical weapons are new concepts. History provides examples of attempts to use these both to limit the scope of war and to turn mind-altering compounds into weapons. One of these substances has been marijuana. Although previous efforts to find its military applications failed, the idea persists – as indicated by a US patent granted in 2017. As “weaponized cannabis” may again attract the interest of government agencies, the consequences of its potential deployment call for (...) a debate. In an attempt to encourage such a discussion, in the context of the ongoing decriminalization/legalization of marijuana in some countries and US states, the article raises ethical issues pertaining to weaponized cannabinoids. It argues against the militarization of the drug, on the basis that such a development would constitute an ultimate instrumentalization of marijuana and result in a dangerous destabilizing reconstruction of its meaning along the lines of state coercion. (shrink)

The development of new intelligent technologies for military use is already yielding a new stage in the arms race that could have serious implications for peace and security across the globe. Governments, international organizations, civil society, and the scientific community face the challenge of promoting legal, ethical, and moral parameters for the development of Artificial Intelligence for military purposes. This article explores a series of concepts that are relevant to the design and development of autonomous weapons and proposes a (...) series of general (political and ethical) and technical considerations that may lead to effective lines of action in the matter. (shrink)

This book covers the following material: (1) the history of nuclear weapons; (2) the impact of nuclear weapons; (3) theories and strategies of nuclear deterrence; (4) the nuclear weapons establishment; (5) nuclear war and popular culture; and (6) nuclear treaties, alliances and arms control. The content is designed to provide knowledge about the purpose of nuclear weapons, the paradoxes of nuclear deterrence, the vast impact of nuclear weapons including uranium mining and weapons testing, as (...) well as of military Keynesianism, the nuclear taboo, and arms control. The text offers readers many resources to pursue further studies on the topic of the role of nuclear weapons in national security. (shrink)

Lethal Autonomous Weapons (LAWs) have becomes the subject of continuous debate both at national and international levels. Arguments have been proposed both for the development and use of LAWs as well as their prohibition from combat landscapes. Regardless, the development of LAWs continues in numerous nation-states. This paper builds upon previous philosophical arguments for the development and use of LAWs and proposes a design framework that can be used to ethically direct their development. The conclusion is that the philosophical (...) arguments that underpin the adoption of LAWs rather than not, although prima facie insufficient, can be actualized through the proposed Value Sensitive Design (VSD) approach. Hence, what is proposed is a principled design approach that can be used to embed stakeholder values into a design, encourage stakeholder cooperation and coordination and as a result promote social acceptance of LAWs as a preferable future fact of war. (shrink)

The discourse of tragedy has significant value in a military context, reminding us of the temptations of hubris, the prevalence of moral dilemmas, and the inescapable limits of foresight. Today, however, this discourse is drawn upon too heavily. Within the tragicized politics of nuclear and drone violence, foreseeable and solvable problems are reconceptualized as intractable dilemmas, and morally accountable agents are reframed as powerless observers. The tragedy discourse, when wrongly applied by policymakers and the media, indulges the very hubris the (...) tragic recognition is intended to caution against. This article clarifies the limits of “tragedy” in the context of military violence and argues for a renewed focus on political responsibility. (shrink)