Concern for vulnerable people is a crucial issue when considering the legalisation of assisted dying (AD), but the meaning and normative significance of vulnerability in this context is under-explored. We examine vulnerability and the protective obligation through the lens of vulnerability theory to improve understanding of vulnerability in the context of AD. By appealing to a more nuanced account of vulnerability, we argue that the current ban on AD in England and Wales is a blunt (...) tool that lacks compassion and fails to recognise the importance of personal autonomy as well as the relationship between vulnerability and autonomy. Recently, some emerging lawful models of AD purport to better protect the vulnerable via prospective legal authorisation. This is also a feature of recent English Assisted Dying bills, with proposals for judicial or quasi-judicial authorisation, and so we consider the potential value of prospective judicial authorisation. Although this approach risks being burdensome for applicants, we suggest that it could, in principle, not only safeguard vulnerable individuals, but also enhance end-of-life autonomy thereby offering support for a restrictive approach to lawful AD. (shrink)

Does the fact that humans are vulnerable, needy and dependent beings play an important role in Kantian ethics? It is sometimes claimed that it cannot and does not. I argue that it can and does. I distinguish between broad (all persons are vulnerable) and narrow (only some persons are vulnerable) senses of vulnerability, and explain the role of vulnerability in both senses in Kantian ethics. The basis of this argument is to show that the core normative focus of (...) Kantian ethics is on the dignity that human beings have in virtue of their capacity for rational agency. This implies that the empirical conditions under which human beings can acquire, sustain, exercise, and develop their rational capacities are of core moral importance in Kantian ethics. This explains why human vulnerabilities, including the vulnerability of human bodies, are important in Kantian ethics, since rational capacities in human agents (and the bodies those rational capacities depend upon) are highly vulnerable in all persons (vulnerability in the broad sense) and especially vulnerable in some sub-groups of persons (vulnerability in the narrow sense). (shrink)

In the limited literature on gender and climate change, two themes predominate – women as vulnerable or virtuous in relation to the environment. Two viewpoints become obvious: women in the South will be affected more by climate change than men in those countries and that men in the North pollute more than women. The debates are structured in specific ways in the North and the South and the discussion in the article focuses largely on examples from Sweden and India. The (...) article traces the lineage of the arguments to the women, environment and development discussions, examining how they recur in new forms in climate debates. Questioning assumptions about women's vulnerability and virtuousness, it highlights how a focus on women's vulnerability or virtuousness can deflect attention from inequalities in decision-making. By reiterating statements about poor women in the South and the pro-environmental women of the North, these assumptions reinforce North–South biases. Generalizations about women's vulnerability and virtuousness can lead to an increase in women's responsibility without corresponding rewards. There is need to contextualise debates on climate change to enable action and to respond effectively to its adverse effects in particular places. (shrink)

Transhumanism is a challenging movement that invites us to rethink what defines humanity, including what we value and regret the most about our existence. Vulnerability is a key concept that require thorough philosophical scrutiny concerning transhumanist proposals. Vulnerability can refer to a universal condition of human life or, rather, to the specific exposure to certain harms due to particular situations. Even if we are all vulnerable in the first sense, there are also different sources and levels of (...) class='Hi'>vulnerability depending on concrete social circumstances. Recently, Michael Hauskeller argued about a fundamental incompatibility between transhumanism and vulnerability. He understands vulnerability as an existential category, linked to woundability and mortality. This idea is akin to ontological vulnerability, but it does not notice some important features of social vulnerability. On the other side, transhumanism is a complex and non-homogeneous movement. Here we distinguish between a strong and a weak version of transhumanism. We will propose that the salience of vulnerability is only diminished in the radical one, while a moderate version can reconcile vulnerability with human enhancement. Thus, vulnerability, a concept that has recently gained much importance as an anthropological category in contemporary ethics, is not necessarily at odds with any transhumanist project. (shrink)

The concept of vulnerability has been subject to numerous different interpretations but accounts are still beset with significant problems as to their adequacy, such as their contentious application or the lack of genuine explanatory role for the concept. The constant failure to provide a compelling conceptual analysis and satisfactory definition leaves the concept open to an eliminativist move whereby we can question whether we need the concept at all. I highlight problems with various kinds of approach and explain why (...) a satisfactory account of vulnerability is unlikely ever to be offered if we wish the concept to play a genuinely explanatory role in bioethical contexts. I outline why an eliminativist position should be taken with regard to this concept in light of these concerns but mitigate some of the severity of this position by arguing that we can still make sense of retaining our widespread use of the term by viewing it as nothing more than a useful pragmatic linguistic device that acts as a marker to draw attention to certain kinds of issue. These issues will be entirely governed by other, better understood ethical concepts and theories. (shrink)

The concept of vulnerability is widely used in research ethics to signal attention to participants who require special protections in research. However, this concept is vague and under‐theorized. There is also growing concern that the dominant categorical approach to vulnerability (as exemplified by research ethics regulations and guidelines delineating vulnerable groups) is ethically problematic because of its assumptions about groups of people and is, in fact, not very guiding. An agreed‐upon strategy is to move from categorical towards analytical (...) approaches (focused on analyzing types and sources of vulnerability) to vulnerability. Beyond this agreement, however, scholars have been advancing competing accounts of vulnerability without consensus about its appropriate operationalization in research ethics. Based on previous debates, we propose that a comprehensive account of vulnerability for research ethics must include four components: definition, normative justifications, application, and implications. Concluding that no existing accounts integrate these components in a functional (i.e., practically applicable) manner, we propose an integrative and functional account of vulnerability inspired by pragmatist theory and enriched by bioethics literature. Using an example of research on deep brain stimulation for treatment‐resistant depression, we illustrate how the integrative‐functional account can guide the analysis of vulnerability in research within a pragmatist, evidence‐based approach to research ethics. While ultimately there are concerns to be addressed in existing research ethics guidelines on vulnerability, the integrative‐functional account can serve as an analytic tool to help researchers, research ethics boards, and other relevant actors fill in the gaps in the current landscape of research ethics governance. (shrink)

All people are vulnerable to having their self-concepts shaped by others. This article investigates that vulnerability using a theory of narrative self-constitution. According to narrative self-constitution, people depend on others to develop and maintain skills of self-narration and they are vulnerable to having the content of their self-narratives co-authored by others. This theoretical framework highlights how vulnerability to co-authoring is essential to developing a self-narrative and, thus, the possibility of autonomy. However, this vulnerability equally entails that co-authors (...) can undermine autonomy by contributing disvalued content to the agent’s self-narrative and undermining her authorial skills. I illustrate these processes with the first-hand reports of several women who survived sexual abuse as children. Their narratives of survival and healing reveal the challenges involved in developing the skills required to manage vulnerability to co-authoring and how others can help in this process. Finally, I discuss some of the implications of co-authoring for the healthcare professional and the therapeutic relationship. (shrink)

Children's vulnerability gives rise to duties of justice towards children and determines when authority over them is legitimately exercised. I argue for two claims. First, children's general vulnerability to objectionable dependency on their caregivers entails that they have a right not to be subject to monopolies of care, and therefore determines the structure of legitimate authority over them. Second, children's vulnerability to the loss of some special goods of childhood determines the content of legitimate authority over them. (...) My interest is in the so-far little-discussed goods of engaging in world discovery, artistic creation, philosophical pursuits and experimentation with one's self. I call these ‘special goods of childhood’ because individuals, in general, only have full access to them during childhood and they make a distinctive and weighty contribution to wellbeing. Therefore, they are part of the metric of justice towards children. The overall conclusion is that we ought to make good institutional care part of every child's upbringing. (shrink)

In this article, I challenge prevailing assumptions in modern slavery research by addressing an uncomfortable question: Under what conditions do systems of exploitation become self-reinforcing through the constrained choices available to those subjected to them? I extend the concept of unfree agency to show how survival-driven actions can unintentionally stabilise exploitative arrangements. Drawing on vulnerability theory, Sen’s account of unfreedoms, and debates on labour agency and moral complicity, I develop a framework linking structural vulnerability, constrained choices, normalisation, unwitting (...) reproduction, and the persistence of exploitation. The article contributes to modern slavery scholarship by connecting micro-level coping practices to the macro-level reproduction of exploitation, and to business ethics debates by refining how consent and responsibility should be understood under coercion. I call for a liberation ethics perspective that evaluates business and policy responses according to whether they expand the substantive freedoms and capabilities of those with the least agency. (shrink)

This paper investigates the possibility of understanding the rudimentary elements of clinical sensitivity by investigating the works of Edmund Husserl and Emmanuel Levinas on sensibility. Husserl's theory of intentionality offers significant reflections on the role of pre-reflective and affective intuition as a condition for intentionality and reflective consciousness. These early works of Husserl, in particular his works on the constitution of phenomenological time and subjective time-consciousness, prove to be an important basis for Levinas’ works on an ethics of alterity and (...) infinite responsibility for the other person. In fact, it is difficult to understand the core of Levinasian ethics, of vulnerability as proximity, of ethical sensitivity as passivity and a suffering for the suffering of another, without understanding the influence from Husserl's work. Crucially, the paper will, on the basis of Levinasian ethics, establish an understanding of sensibility as vulnerability and receptivity that is fundamental also for understanding significant intuitions in clinical nursing. Clinical sensitivity and carefulness in nursing are shaped by the concrete and also bodily expressions of vulnerabilities in a receptivity that is pre-reflective and pre-ontological. (shrink)

This essay is a reflection on our lived experience of being human, or of some prominent aspects of being human, in light of rising demands to use already existing and soon to be developed technologies to fundamentally change what we are. The aspects the essay focuses on are, first, our existential vulnerability and, second, our desire to live a life that, in some way or another, matters and is in that sense meaningful.

We examine an article of Paul Ricoeur on autonomy and vulnerability. Ricoeur presents the two notions in the field of justice as intricately woven into each other. He analyzes their interdependence on three levels of human agency. Ricoeur’s exposition has a focus on judicial judgment. After presenting Ricoeur’s argument and an analysis of his main points, the author argues that Ricoeur’s reflection lines up with some essential intentions of care ethics. Ricoeur’s contribution to care ethics is given in a (...) delicate balance of autonomy and its vulnerability. (shrink)

People in extraordinary situations are vulnerable. As research participants, they are additionally threatened by abuse or exploitation and the possibility of harm through research. To protect people against these threats, informed consent as an instrument of self-determination has been introduced. Self-determination requires autonomous persons, who voluntarily make decisions based on their values and morals. However, in nursing research, this requirement cannot always be met. Advanced age, chronic illness, co-morbidity and frailty are reasons for dependencies. These in turn lead to limited (...) abilities or opportunities for decision-making and self-determination. Exclusion of vulnerable people from research projects would disadvantage them by not covering their needs, which would violate the ethical principles of justice and beneficence. Commonly, vulnerability is attributed to social groups. The consequence for individuals, attributed as belonging to such a vulnerable group, is that the principles of respect for autonomy, justice and beneficence are subordinated to the principle of non-maleficence, understood as avoiding the risk to cause more harm than good. In addition, group-specific attribution could lead to stigmatizing because labelling a person as deviation from a norm violates integrity. For clinical nursing research, the question arises how the protection of vulnerable people could be granted without compromising ethical principles. The concept of relational ethics provides a possible approach. It defines vulnerability as the relation between a person’s health status and the extent to which this person is dependent on the researcher and the research context. Vulnerability is not attributed solely to a person but to a situation, meaning the person is viewed in context. By combining vulnerability as a context-related and situational concept with existing approaches of informed consent, the different ethical principles can be balanced and preserved at every step of the research process. (shrink)

The duty to provide care is foundational to the nursing profession and the work of nurses. Unfortunately, violence against nurses at the hands of recipients of care is increasingly common. While employers, labor unions, and professional associations decry the phenomenon, the decision to withdraw care, even from someone who is violent or abusive, is never easy. The scant guidance that exists suggests that the duty to care continues until the risk of harm to the nurse is unreasonable, however, “reasonableness” remains (...) undefined in the literature. In this paper, I suggest that reasonable risk, and the resulting strength of the duty to provide care in situations where violence is present, hinge on the vulnerability of both nurse and recipient of care. For the recipient, vulnerability increases with the level of dependency and incapacity. For the nurse, vulnerability is related to the risk and implications of injury. The complex interplay of contextual vulnerabilities determines whether the risk a nurse faces at the hands of a violent patient is reasonable or unreasonable. This examination will enhance our understanding of professional responsibilities and can help to clarify the strengths and limitations of the nurse's duty to care. (shrink)

There is a consensus that the effects of medical brain drain, especially in the Sub-Saharan African countries, ought to be perceived as more than a simple misfortune. Temporary restrictions on the emigration of health workers from the region is one of the already existing policy measures to tackle the issue—while such a restrictive measure brings about the need for quite a justificatory work. A recent normative contribution to the debate by Gillian Brock provides a fruitful starting point. In the first (...) step of her defence of emigration restrictions, Brock provides three reasons why skilled workers themselves would hold responsibilities to assist with respect to vital needs of their compatriots. These are fair reciprocity, duty to support vital institutions, and attending to the unintended harmful consequences of one’s actions. While the first two are explained and also largely discussed in the literature, the third requires an explication on how and on which basis skilled workers would have a responsibility as such. In this article, I offer a vulnerability approach with its dependency aspect that may account for why the health workers in underserved contexts would have a responsibility to attend to the unintended side effects of their actions that may lead to a vital risk of harm for the population. I discuss HIV/AIDS care in Zimbabwe as a case in point in order to show that local health workers may have responsibilities to assist the population who are vulnerable to their mobility. (shrink)

The ethics of care has contributed to modifying a dominant conception of ethics and changed the way we conceive vulnerability. It has introduced ethical stakes into politics, weakening, through its critique of theories of justice, the seemingly obvious link between an ethics of justice and political liberalism. However, care corresponds to a quite ordinary reality: the fact that people look after one another, take care of one another and thus are responsible. The aim of this paper is to connect (...) the ethics of care to the idea of the vulnerability of the human as it is developed in the moral philosophy inspired by Wittgenstein. (shrink)

This paper investigates the possibility of understanding the rudimentary elements of clinical sensitivity by investigating the works of Edmund Husserl and Emmanuel Levinas on sensibility. Husserl's theory of intentionality offers significant reflections on the role of pre‐reflective and affective intuition as a condition for intentionality and reflective consciousness. These early works of Husserl, in particular his works on the constitution of phenomenological time and subjective time‐consciousness, prove to be an important basis for Levinas’ works on an ethics of alterity and (...) infinite responsibility for the other person. In fact, it is difficult to understand the core of Levinasian ethics, of vulnerability as proximity, of ethical sensitivity as passivity and a suffering for the suffering of another, without understanding the influence from Husserl's work. Crucially, the paper will, on the basis of Levinasian ethics, establish an understanding of sensibility as vulnerability and receptivity that is fundamental also for understanding significant intuitions in clinical nursing. Clinical sensitivity and carefulness in nursing are shaped by the concrete and also bodily expressions of vulnerabilities in a receptivity that is pre‐reflective and pre‐ontological. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis paper reconsiders Heather Battaly’s argument that empathy is not a virtue. Like Battaly, I argue that empathy is a disposition that includes elements of virtue acquisition, but is not in itself a virtue in the Aristotelian sense. Unlike Battaly, however, I propose a distinction between care and respect. Drawing on Darwall’s view of recognition respect as well as on phenomenologically inspired views of empathy, I argue that respect can be regarded as the moral feeling that is distinctive of empathy. (...) In my view, the feeling of respect towards another’s situated experience grants epistemic dignity, which is the recognition of the intrinsic significance of subjective experience. By way of conclusion, I suggest that the relation between empathy and respect can be relevant for an account of vulnerability that is not opposed to autonomy. (shrink)

Vulnerability and politics are among the relevant and key topics of discussion in the Ethiopian healthcare context. Attempts by the formal bioethics structure in Ethiopia to deliberate on ethical issues relating to vulnerability and politics in healthcare have been limited, even though the informal analysis of bioethical issues has been present in traditional Ethiopian communities. This is reflected in religion, social values, and local moral underpinnings. Thus, the aim of this paper is to discuss the bioethical implications of (...) vulnerability and politics for healthcare in Ethiopia and to suggest possible ways forward. First, we will briefly introduce what has been done to develop bioethics as a field in Ethiopia and what gaps remain concerning its implementation in healthcare practice. This will give a context for our second and main task – analyzing the healthcare challenges in relation to vulnerability and politics and discussing their bioethical implications. In doing so, and since these two concepts are intrinsically broad, we demarcate their scope by focusing on specific issues such as poverty, gender, health governance, and armed conflicts. Lastly, we provide suggestions for the ways forward. (shrink)

Edith Stein and Gerda Walther explain how community comes to be and how it is structured, but they do not develop significant accounts of how communities disintegrate or die, albeit they make passing allusions to how this may happen. I argue that what makes communities vulnerable to their possible demise, following both Stein’s and Walther’s social ontology, is the breakdown of the sense of the communal bond, that is, the failure of the community members’ ability to make sense of their (...) relationship to one another. Just as sense-making and sense-building can help give birth and meaning to communities, sense disintegration and the dying of the sense of a community bespeak a vulnerability that lies at the very core of all communities. In addition to the vulnerability of sense-making, I argue that the lived-body and habit also pose important challenges to the very possibility of community. (shrink)

This article traces the development of Pamela Sue Anderson’s thought about the nature of forgiveness through six papers that she wrote, published between 2001 and 2017. Throughout the period she was in conversation with Paul S. Fiddes on the theme, some of which appears explicitly in her published work, and the article aims to re-create and renew the conversation. Successively in her papers, Anderson presents forgiveness as a struggle with justice (alternatively, the place for the struggle of love with justice), (...) associates it with promise and yearning in making a new future, regards it as “unselfing,” affirms that it exceeds distributive justice, portrays it as an object of hope, finds difficulties in locating it in the practice of Restorative Justice, and finally relates it to vulnerability. Throughout she urges that forgiveness must not undermine the self-worth and the righteous anger of the abused, especially women, so that time and space must be given for a process of cognitive and emotional transformation to happen. While an increasing mutual convergence develops between her view of a “process” and Fiddes’s more theological view of a “journey of forgiveness” (involving divine empathy with humanity), the conversation remains unfinished. (shrink)

Subpart B of 45 Code of Federal Regulations Part 46 (CFR) identifies the criteria according to which research involving pregnant women, human fetuses, and neonates can be conducted ethically in the United States. As such, pregnant women and fetuses fall into a category requiring “additional protections,” often referred to as “vulnerable populations.” The CFR does not define vulnerability, but merely gives examples of vulnerable groups by pointing to different categories of potential research subjects needing additional protections. In this paper, (...) I assess critically the role of this categorization of pregnant women involved in research as “vulnerable,” both as separate entities and in combination with the fetuses they carry. In particular, I do three things: (1) demonstrate that pregnant women qua pregnancy are either not “vulnerable” according to any meaningful definition of that term or that such vulnerability is irrelevant to her status as a research participant; (2) argue that while a fetus may be vulnerable in terms of dependency, this categorization does not equate to the vulnerability of the pregnant woman; and (3) suggest that any vulnerability that appends to women is precisely the result of federal regulations and dubious public perceptions about pregnant women. I conclude by demonstrating how this erroneous characterization of pregnant women as “vulnerable” and its associated protections have not only impeded vital research for pregnant women and their fetuses, but have also negatively affected the inclusion of all women in clinical research. (shrink)

In the literature on medical ethics, it is generally admitted that vulnerable persons or groups deserve special attention, care or protection. One can define vulnerable persons as those having a greater likelihood of being wronged – that is, of being denied adequate satisfaction of certain legitimate claims. The conjunction of these two points entails what we call the Special Protection Thesis. It asserts that persons with a greater likelihood of being denied adequate satisfaction of their legitimate claims deserve special attention, (...) care or protection. Such a thesis remains vague, however, as long as we do not know what legitimate claims are. This article aims at dispelling this vagueness by exploring what claims we have in relation to health care – thus fleshing out a claim-based conception of vulnerability. We argue that the Special Protection Thesis must be enriched as follows: If individual or group X has a greater likelihood of being denied adequate satisfaction of some of their legitimate claims to physical integrity, autonomy, freedom, social provision, impartial quality of government, social bases of self-respect or communal belonging, then X deserves special attention, care or protection. With this improved understanding of vulnerability, vulnerability talk in healthcare ethics can escape vagueness and serve as an adequate basis for practice. (shrink)

Patient-and-family-centered care (PFCC) is critical in end-of-life (EOL) settings. PFCC serves to develop and implement patient care plans within the context of unique family situations. Key components of PFCC include collaboration and communication among patients, family members and healthcare professionals (HCP). Ethical challenges arise when the burdens (e.g., economic, psychosocial, physical) of family members and significant others do not align with patients’ wishes. This study aims to describe the concept of vulnerability and the ethical challenges faced by HCPs in (...) these circumstances. Further, it assesses the contribution of clinical ethics consultation (CEC) in assisting HCPs to face these difficult ethical conundrums. Two clinical cases are analyzed using the Circle Method of CEC. The first regards the difficulty faced by the doctor in justifying treatments previously agreed upon between the patient and his/her friends. The second regards the patient’s concern about being a burden on their family. Family burdens in EOL settings challenge PFCC in that patient autonomy may be disregarded. This compromises shared decision-making between the patient, family and HCPs as a core component of PFCC. In their ability to promote a collaborative approach, CECs may assist in the successful implementation of PFCC. (shrink)

Images of vulnerability have populated the philosophical landscape from Hobbes to Hegel, Levinas to Foucault, often designating a sense of corporeal susceptibility to injury, or of being threatened or wounded and therefore have been predominantly associated with violence, finitude, or mortality. More recently, feminist theorists such as Judith Butler and Adriana Cavarero have begun to rethink corporeal vulnerability as a critical or ethical category, one based on our primary interdependence and intercorporeality. However, many contemporary theorists continue to associate (...) vulnerability with violence and finitude rather than providing an account of the normative theory that might underpin vulnerability as a critical category. In this article, I explore an alternative notion of vulnerability in relation to both a theory of power and a normative account that draws on recognition theory. My aim in this article is twofold: first, to examine the complexity of vulnerability and how it relates to forms of recognition; second, to outline how the notion of vulnerability can operate as the basis for critiquing objectionable forms of vulnerability. This is to consider vulnerability not only as an ethical or ontological question but as a political one, and shifts arguments about its abuse and entanglement with power and violence to the public political sphere. (shrink)

In a series of reflections published in the wake of the Covid-19 crisis, Giorgio Agamben expresses a number of concerns related to the way the pandemic has altered the very fabric of our societies, potentially changing it forever. While maintaining a certain scepticism towards the threat represented by the virus itself, Agamben claims that the response to the contagion shows how easy it is for authorities to limit individual freedoms in the name of public health, and how readily they are (...) willing to put such limitations in place. At the same time, the pandemic shows how easy it is for individuals to accept this situation as the new normal, and how readily they are willing to give up their freedoms and relationships. In this paper I offer a brief overview of Agamben’s worries, focussing on two issues in particular: the loss of individual freedom of movement and association, and the moral and political implications of social distancing. I then approach these issues from a different angle, making use of relational theory to propose an alternative framework which relies on the notion of vulnerability. While agreeing with Agamben that there is reason to worry about the state seizing the opportunity to exercise unchecked power over its citizens, I argue that we should pay attention to the ways in which social distancing measures can be grounded in solidarity and respect for the autonomy of vulnerable individuals. (shrink)

Vulnerability and resistance have often been seen as opposites, with the assumption that vulnerability requires protection and the strengthening of paternalistic power at the expense of collective resistance. Focusing on political movements and cultural practices in different global locations, including Turkey, Palestine, France, and the former Yugoslavia, the contributors to_ Vulnerability in Resistance_ articulate an understanding of the role of vulnerability in practices of resistance. They consider how vulnerability is constructed, invoked, and mobilized within neoliberal (...) discourse, the politics of war, resistance to authoritarian and securitarian power, in LGBTQI struggles, and in the resistance to occupation and colonial violence. The essays offer a feminist account of political agency by exploring occupy movements and street politics, informal groups at checkpoints and barricades, practices of self-defense, hunger strikes, transgressive enactments of solidarity and mourning, infrastructural mobilizations, and aesthetic and erotic interventions into public space that mobilize memory and expose forms of power. Pointing to possible strategies for a feminist politics of transversal engagements and suggesting a politics of bodily resistance that does not disavow forms of vulnerability, the contributors develop a new conception of embodiment and sociality within fields of contemporary power. Contributors. Meltem Ahiska, Athena Athanasiou, Sarah Bracke, Judith Butler, Elsa Dorlin, Basak Ertür, Zeynep Gambetti, Rema Hammami, Marianne Hirsch, Elena Loizidou, Leticia Sabsay, Nükhet Sirman, Elena Tzelepis. (shrink)

Vulnerability does not mean much for our contemporary morality. It is antithetical to our emphasis on individualism and rationality; it requires that we attend to the body and to our feelings. Yet only by recognizing the depth and breadth of our vulnerability can we affirm our humanity.

This volume breaks new ground by investigating the ethics of vulnerability. Drawing on various ethical traditions, the contributors explore the nature of vulnerability, the responsibilities owed to the vulnerable, and by whom.

The recent introduction of the concepts of tenderness, vulnerability, and parental care in the field of moral emotions has brought us closer to an understanding of the underlying mechanisms, but has not yet resulted in a systematic evolutionary and proximate analysis. Applying such an analysis, the present article proposes a hypothetical care mechanism that produces different motivational states or moral emotions (e.g., tenderness, sympathy, guilt, moral anger) in response to individuals perceived as vulnerable. The mechanism consists of a care (...) system automatically triggered by vulnerability cues, a system for defense and aggression, and a process of causally attributing changes in the vulnerable object’s well-being. The mechanism may also be useful in explaining moral responses in domains other than harm prevention. (shrink)

Vulnerability does not mean much for our contemporary morality. It is antithetical to our emphasis on individualism and rationality; it requires that we attend to the body and to our feelings. Yet only by recognizing the depth and breadth of our vulnerability can we affirm our humanity.

Universal vulnerability provides an alternative to a rights-based and social contract model for state responsibility by contextualizing the individual and revealing the ways in which we are all inherently and dynamically dependent on society and others throughout the life-course. Beginning from the body as an ontological concept, vulnerability theory shows the fallacy of the current obsession in legal and political theory with rationality, individual liberty, and autonomy as measures for assessing social justice. It compels us to ask different (...) questions and emphasize different principles and values than current liberal legal modes of reasoning about state responsibility. (shrink)

Background: Vulnerability is an important concept in nursing and nursing ethics. Vulnerability and ageing have generally been associated with frailty, which gives a limited view of both vulnerability and ageing. Objective: The aim of this study was to illuminate the meaning of vulnerability to older persons themselves. Research design: A qualitative design based on interpretive description was adopted. The data were collected by interviews that were analysed by qualitative content analysis as interplay between analysis, interpretation and (...) meaning construction. Participants and research context: In total, 14 older persons aged 70–96 years were interviewed, 2 men and 12 women. Some of the participants lived in their own homes, some in service houses and some in nursing homes. Ethical considerations: The ethical principles of informed consent, confidentiality and non-identification were respected. Findings: The core meaning was a deeper sense of vulnerability as you grow old. This was expressed in six themes: Being easily harmed, Becoming an old person, Being an old person in society, Reactions when being violated and hurt, Protection and Vulnerability as strength. Discussion and conclusion: The themes include frailty and threats to the dignity of older persons and also capacity to feel and develop. The results showed that although the frailty perspective dominated, vulnerability also had positive meanings for the older persons. (shrink)

ABSTRACTA concept of empathy as openness to the emotional perspective of another is developed in opposition to a concept of sympathy as agreement with the emotional perspective of another. Empathy involves knowledge of how things are emotionally for the other person, which is not the same thing as knowledge of the other person’s emotions. Being open to another perspective requires the capacity to hold two perspectives in mind simultaneously – one that is one’s own perspective and at the same time (...) the adopted perspective. This is why empathy can be so challenging for someone suffering from some kinds of anxiety. (shrink)

Identifying which subjects are vulnerable, and implementing safeguards to protect them, is widely regarded as essential to clinical research. Commentators have endorsed a number of responses to these challenges and have thereby made significant progress in understanding vulnerability in clinical research. At the same time, this literature points to a central contradiction which calls into question its potential to protect vulnerable subjects in practice. Specifically, analysis suggests that all human subjects are vulnerable and vulnerability in clinical research is (...) comparative and context dependent, in the sense that individuals are vulnerable relative to others and in some contexts only. Yet, if everyone is vulnerable, there seems to be no point in citing the vulnerability of some individuals. Moreover, the conclusion that everyone is vulnerable seems inconsistent with the claims that vulnerability is comparative and context dependent, raising concern over whether it will be possible to develop a comprehensive account of vulnerability that is internally consistent. The solution to this dilemma lies in recognition of the fact that the practical significance of claims regarding vulnerability depends on the context in which they are used. The claims that appear to lead to the central contradiction are in fact accurate conclusions that follow from different uses of the term ‘vulnerability’. The present manuscript describes this ‘pragmatic’ approach to vulnerability in clinical research and considers its implications for ensuring that subjects receive appropriate protection. (shrink)

This paper aims to understand the relationship between ignorance and vulnerability by drawing on recent work on the epistemology of ignorance. After elaborating how we might understand the importance of human vulnerability, I develop the claim that ignorance of vulnerability is produced through the pursuit of an ideal of invulnerability that involves both ethical and epistemological closure. The ignorance of vulnerability that is a prerequisite for such invulnerability is, I contend, a pervasive form of ignorance that (...) underlies and grounds other oppressive forms of ignorance. Thus, undoing such forms of ignorance requires working toward a particular form of vulnerability: epistemic vulnerability. (shrink)

Psychedelic-assisted psychotherapies (PAPs) pose ethical challenges that existing normative frameworks cannot adequately address. This paper argues that the convergence of belief relaxation (the loosening of high-level predictive priors) and context amplification (the heightened influence of environmental cues on experiential content) generates a condition I call transient epistemic vulnerability: a state in which the individual's fundamental orientations toward meaning, value, and reality become structurally open to revision under heightened sensitivity to the normative dimensions of the therapeutic environment. Drawing on Clifford (...) Geertz's analysis of the fusion of ethos and worldview, I argue that psychedelic experiences replicate a mechanism whereby normative commitments come to appear as descriptive features of reality under asymmetric conditions of interpretive power. I critically examine four leading proposals (Letheby, McGovern et al., Bortolotti, Bublitz) and argue that each remains within an epistemic register when the more fundamental challenge is ethical and contextual: the conditions of power, vulnerability, and interpretive authority under which beliefs and existential orientations form. I introduce normative capture to describe the risk that patients' orientations will be shaped by unexamined features of the therapeutic context, and propose structural reflexivity as a middle position between therapeutic passivity and active epistemic guidance. Five normative principles are outlined. (shrink)

It might become possible to build artificial minds with the capacity for experience. This raises a plethora of ethical issues, explored, among others, in the context of whole brain emulations (WBE). In this paper, I will take up the problem of vulnerability – given, for various reasons, less attention in the literature – that the conscious emulations will likely exhibit. Specifically, I will examine the role that vulnerability plays in generating ethical issues that may arise when dealing with (...) WBEs. I will argue that concerns about vulnerability are more matters of institutional design than individual ethics, both when it comes to creating humanlike brain emulations, and when animal-like emulations are concerned. Consequently, the article contains reflection on some institutional measures that can be taken to protect the sims' interests. It concludes that an institutional framework more likely to succeed in this task is competitive and poly-centric, rather than monopolistic and centralized. (shrink)

In this interview, Estelle Ferrarese elaborates on her account of vulnerability and care to highlight its political and social, as opposed to its ethical, dimensions. Drawing on, amongst others, Adorno, Tronto, Castell, and Laugier, she argues that vulnerability and care should not be understood ontologically, as an antropological exposure of the body, but rather socially, as the normative expectations and material conditions under which care work takes place. Situating her approach in anglophone and francophone discussions on vulnerability (...) and precarity, she discusses her approach to normative expectations and how it informs her account of vulnerability of living at the mercy of someone else's agency, as well as the politicization of vulnerability. She also discusses the political implications of her account of vulnerability and care with regard to a range of contemporary issues, such as the Men's Right Movement, the posthuman turn and the Antropocene, and mutual aid and the neoliberalization of the welfare state. (shrink)

The article addresses the implications of Prevent and Channel for epistemic justice. The first section outlines the background of Prevent. It draws upon Moira Gatens and Genevieve Lloyd’s concept of the collective imaginary, alongside Lorraine Code’s concept of epistemologies of mastery, in order to outline some of the images and imaginaries that inform and orient contemporary counter-terrorist preventative initiatives, in particular those affecting education. Of interest here is the way in which vulnerability is conceptualised in Prevent and Channel, in (...) particular the way in which those deemed ‘at risk of radicalisation’ are constituted as vulnerable and requiring intervention. The imaginary underpinning such preventative initiatives is, I argue, a therapeutic/epidemiological one. If attention is paid to the language associated with these interventions, one finds reference to terms such as contagion, immunity, resilience, grooming, virus, susceptibility, therapy, autonomy, vulnerability and risk—a constellation of images/concepts resonant with therapeutic and epidemiological theories and practices. I outline some of the implications of this therapeutic/epidemiological imaginary for epistemic injustice. If people, in this case, students, teachers and parents, feel that their voice will not be given credence, this leads to testimonial injustice. If one group is constituted as a suspect community, this risks hermeneutical injustice for that group—a situation facing Muslims at present. Given the requirements for educators and educational institutions to enact this particular iteration of preventative counter-terrorist legislation, the way in which vulnerability is understood and operationalised has direct bearing upon education and the educational experience of all stakeholders, in particular in relation to the conditions for epistemic justice. (shrink)

Background Transgender youth face multiple ethical and social challenges that significantly impact their mental health, dignity, and overall well-being. These challenges are influenced by social, cultural, and religious norms in a middle eastern country, and little is known about the ethical dimensions of their lived experiences. Research question/aim/objectives This study aimed to explore the ethical challenges and human vulnerability experienced by transgender youth in a middle eastern country, focusing on care, dignity, and social justice. Research design A qualitative study (...) employing conventional content analysis was conducted to capture in-depth insights from participants’ lived experiences. Participants and research context Eighteen transgender youth from the western region of the study setting participated in semi-structured, in-depth interviews. Participants were recruited via purposeful and snowball sampling, and interviews were conducted in private settings, lasting approximately 45 min each. Ethical considerations The ethical approval was obtained from the relevant institutional ethics committee. Confidentiality was ensured, written informed consent was obtained, and participants were free to withdraw at any time without consequences. Findings/results Participants reported pervasive experiences of physical and sexual abuse, social rejection, discrimination in education and employment, stigma, rumination, anxiety about the future, family rejection, poverty, engagement in high-risk behaviours including substance use and criminality, and limited access to psychological, sexual health, and therapeutic counselling. These factors significantly affected their mental health, social integration, and overall quality of life, highlighting ethical concerns regarding care, vulnerability, and social justice. Conclusions Transgender youth in a middle eastern country experience significant ethical and psychosocial challenges that threaten their mental health and well-being. There is an urgent need for culturally sensitive interventions, inclusive policies, and comprehensive counselling services to promote dignity, social justice, and mental health support for transgender individuals. (shrink)

Vulnerability is a concept with fleeting contours as much it is an idea with assured academic success. In the United States, torturable, "mutilatable," and killable bodies are a wide topic of discussion, especially after September 11 and the ensuing bellicosity. In Europe, current reflection on vulnerability has emerged from a thematic of precarity and exclusion; the term evokes lives that are dispensable, evictable, deportable, and the abandoning of individuals to naked forces of the market. But if the theme (...) has had notable fortune, it also continues to come up against considerable reluctance. The political scope of vulnerability is often denied: it seems inevitably to be relegated to the sphere of "good sentiments." This book aims to address this criticism. It shows that by questioning our hegemonic anthropology, by reinventing the categories of freedom, equality, and being-in-common based on the body, by overthrowing the legitimate grammar of political discourse, and by redefining the political subject – the category of vulnerability, far from being conservative or a-political, works to undo the world such as it is. This book was originally published as a special issue of _Critical Horizons. _. (shrink)

Mercenaries are the target of moral condemnation far more often than they are subject of moral concern. One attempt at morally condemning mercenaries proceeds by analogy with prostitutes; mercenaries are ?the whores of war?. This analogy is unconvincing as a way of condemning mercenaries. However, careful comparison of mercenarism and prostitution suggests that, like many prostitutes, some mercenaries may be vulnerable individuals. If apt, this comparison imposes a consistency requirement: if one thinks certain prostitutes are appropriate subjects of moral concern (...) in light of their vulnerability, then one must think that mercenaries who are likewise vulnerable are also appropriate subjects of moral concern. In this paper I elucidate the relevant, morally significant sense of ?vulnerability?, and present evidence suggesting that at least some mercenaries are vulnerable in this sense. (shrink)

The author argues that a credible Christian feminism, one that will be compelling to scholars and ordinary Christians, requires engagement with both Sarah Coakley and M. Shawn Copeland on vulnerability and power. To advance that contention, she narrates three crucial moments contributing to the development of feminist theology: the initial feminist claim to power over vulnerability, Coakley's call to vulnerability in prayer, and Copeland's call to a vulnerability that leads to solidarity. She claims that if (...) class='Hi'>vulnerability, after Coakley and Copeland, is understood as openness to transforming encounter with God, self, and others, it can anchor authentic Christian feminism and offer a better account of the moral life relevant to all Christian believers. (shrink)

Political theory and philosophy need to widen their view of the space in which what matters politically takes place, and I suggest that integrating the conditions of sustainability of all affected—that is, all participants in nature's relations—is a necessary first step in this direction. New materialists and posthumanists have challenged how nature and politics have traditionally been construed. While acknowledging the significance of their contributions, I critically examine the ethical and political implications of their ontological project. I focus particularly on (...) how the decentering of human agency that they advocate for raises a set of concerns that need to be addressed in developing an appropriate ecological ethics. I argue that the latter must be attuned to the vulnerability of living beings who participate in relationships that sustain life on earth. This brings me to conclude that qualitative distinctions between the worlds ofbiosandtechneare necessary. This is because we need to think critically about ways of evaluating types of relationships so that we can assess them and establish which are worth nurturing and protecting and which are not. (shrink)

This chapter seeks to extend Okin's powerful account of how the interaction of gender relations in the family with gendered norms of workplaces reinforces women's vulnerability. While Okin's own argument focused on the situation of women in the United States, this chapter argues that the basic structural logic of the gendered cycle of vulnerability also describes relations that condition and constrain the lives of many women in at least some less developed countries.

In this paper I engage with the notion that Covid-19 can be seen as the ‘great equalizer’, in virtue of the widespread sense of uncertainty it has caused and the fact that it has forced us to recognize our shared human fragility. Against the view that Covid-19 is the ‘great equalizer’, I argue that, on the contrary, the pandemic reflects existing vulnerabilities and, in many cases, exacerbates them. I do so by offering first a definition of both ontological and relational (...) vulnerability and discussing some important ethical and political dimensions of vulnerability in conditions of uncertainty. I then claim that understanding vulnerability in both ontological and relational terms allows us to see the differential impact of the pandemic on differently situated individuals. More specifically, I argue that vulnerability in conditions of uncertainty can threaten individuals’ sense of self, and thus their autonomy – both understood in relational terms. I consider what kind of response human vulnerability in times of crisis calls for. In particular, I maintain that a promising way to counteract uncertainty would be to adopt a solidaristic approach to public health, based on an understanding of solidarity as a relational concept. In other words, I argue that it is through solidarity that individuals’ vulnerabilities can be mitigated, and their autonomy promoted, even during the most uncertain times. I finally discuss two objections that could be raised against the solidaristic approach defended in my paper. First, the approach may fail to find the support of individuals who are unwilling to care for others when their own interests are under threat. Second, there might be those who deny that the virus constitutes a serious enough threat to warrant or justify the restrictions on individual freedoms imposed by governments in the name of solidarity. I conclude by arguing that while a commitment to solidarity can be easily undermined by scepticism towards political and other authorities, and by the failures of those authorities themselves, it is paramount that societies strive for it as the best means to preserve individuals’ health, autonomy, and well-being. (shrink)

The paper seeks to analyze children’s bodily vulnerability as grounded in generational order. The thesis is put forward, that the generational order is embodied via body techniques of vulnerability, deployed both by adults and children. In presenting results from research on professional responses to child maltreatment and neglect, three sets of age related body techniques of vulnerability are identified, concerning caregivers, professionals and the children itself.

If care studies is sometimes dismissed as maternal and essentialist, Tronto argues that care is political and her concept of ‘caring with’ or solidarity has broadened out care. Some recent critics like Martha Fineman have favoured instead a vulnerability model which Daniel Engster applies to care studies to look at ontological vulnerability as part of the human condition and consider the obligations of the state to provide adequate provision. This article applies a vulnerability studies lens to care (...) in a comparative reading of fictional works by Delphine de Vigan and Martin Winckler. In an analysis of the undertheorized role of doctors in care studies, I argue that literary studies can advance debates which have hitherto mainly taken place in healthcare and the social sciences and expose failings in institutional care. Medical practices are a reflection of society, and the texts critique the uncaring face of neoliberalism, with Winckler proposing an alternative relational model of patient-centred care. (shrink)