The logic of soku-hi is presented as an articulation of a post-Kantian view of reality that embraces the truths of science with the assumption of the transcendental subject. As such, soku-hi represents the philosophical posture of both the secular Zen of the Kyoto School and the new materialists of contemporary continental philosophy. It describes how material reality is not all even though there is nothing else.

This thesis is the attempt to find a logical model for, and trace the history of, the catuṣkoṭi as it developed in the Indo-Tibetan milieu and spread, via China, to Japan. After an introduction to the history and key-concepts of Buddhist philosophy, I will finish the first chapter with some methodological considerations about the general viability of comparative philosophy. Chapter §2 is devoted to a logical analysis of the catuṣkoṭi. Several attempts to model this fascinating piece of Buddhist philosophy with (...) the tools of classical logic shall be debunked. A paraconsistent alternative will be discussed but eventually dismissed. As a rejoinder, I shall propose a model for the catuṣkoṭi with the help of speech-acts. The remainder of this chapter will look at Chinese and Japanese forms of the catuṣkoṭi which I shall model in a quasi-recursive system. The third and final chapter will look at the Kyoto School's soku-hi dialectics which ties together the different threads of this essay. I will criticise an established, classical model of the soku-hi dialectics and offer an alternative with a second-order paraconsistent semantics. (shrink)

This article aims to bridge quantum physics, human cognition, and Kitarō Nishida's logic of _basho_. The primary claim is that the indeterminacy underlying both quantum and cognitive phenomena is synonymous with Nishida's "absolute nothingness," the ontological basis of the logic. By interpreting Nishida's _soku hi_ dialectic in terms of phenomenal appearances in awareness, Nishida's term "basho" is equated with _this_ place where awareness actualizes, thereby allowing Nishida's three _basho_ to be framed in terms of the degree of subjectivity (...) present within awareness. Connections between the logic of _basho_ and the theory of enactive cognition are set out with emphasis on how cognitive representation can be placed in the human's enactive engagement with reality. As the logic of _basho_ accounts for the dialectical nature of both quantum reality and cognitive reality, the article concludes that his logic can be seen as encompassing physical reality as well as the reality of (non)subjective awareness. (shrink)

1. Ḥāshīyat al-Ṣabbān ʻalá al-Sharḥ al-Ṣaghīr lil-Mullawī ʻalá al-Sullam al-murawnaq -- 2. Taqrīrāt Ḥasan ibn Riḍwān al-Ḥusaynī.

Glosses on a work by Gelenbevî on logic.

al-Shirwānī's glosses on Jurjānī's glosses on al-Urmawī's Maṭāliʻ al-anwār on Arabic logic.

Can contradictions be meaningful? How can one assert 'P soku not-P' or 'P and yet not-P' without sacrificing intelligibility? Expanding on previous attempts, mainly by Dilworth and Heisig, to demystify the soku connective, a formal system is presented here for the logic of soku. Through a formal distinction between internal and external negation, grammatical features of the soku connective are shown to be logically irrelevant, and the principle of non-contradiction is preserved. Disparities with traditional (...) class='Hi'>logic are noted, with a focus on negation rather than 'soku'. The formal examination of the logic of soku is intended to present the logic in a way acceptable to more analytically minded philosophers and thereby enhance East-West and Japanese-Anglo-American interaction and criticism. (shrink)

A Leibnizian semantics proposed by Becker in 1952 for the modal operators has recently been reviewed in Copeland’s paper The Genesis of Possible World Semantics (Copeland in J Philos Logic 31:99–137, 2002 ), with a remark that “neither the binary relation nor the idea of proving completeness was present in Becker’s work”. In light of Frege’s celebrated Sense-Determines-Reference principle, we find, however, that it is Becker’s semantics, rather than Kripke’s semantics, that has captured the true spirit of Frege’s semantic (...) program. Furthermore, for Kripke’s possible world semantics to fit in Frege’s framework of senses , worlds and referents , it will have to be thoroughly reformulated. By introducing the notion of a hi-world into the picture, we manage to keep the key ingredients of Becker’s semantics intact, while at the same time solve a fatal problem that used to shadow Becker’s original semantics—it had not been able to make sense of inhomogeneous modality. The resulting generalized Beckerian semantics provides, in effect, a Beckerian analysis of the Kripkean possible worlds. It reveals the subtle hierarchical internal structure of a Kripkean world that has not been discovered before. (shrink)

I read Stefan Collini’s What are Universities For? last week with very mixed feelings. In the past, I’ve much admired his polemical essays on the REF, “impact”, the Browne Report, etc. in the London Review of Books and elsewhere: they speak to my heart. If you don’t know those essays, you can get some of their flavour from his latest article in the Guardian yesterday. But I found the book a disappointment. Perhaps the trouble is that Collini is too decent, (...) too high-minded, has too unrealistically exalted a view about what actually happens in universities which is too coloured by attitudes appropriate to the traditional humanities. And he is optimistic to the point of fantasy if he thinks that people are so susceptible to “the romance of ideas and the power of beauty” that they will want, or can be brought to want, lots and lots of universities in order to promote the ideas (as if they would suppose that the task of “conserving, understanding, extending and handing on to subsequent generations the intellectual, scientific, and artistic heritage of mankind” was clearly ill-served when there were only forty universities in England, as opposed to a hundred and whatever). (shrink)

The problem of God's subordination to laws of logic and mathematics in jewish philosophy and theology.

In paragraphs 107-108 of his Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein remarks, “The preconceived idea of crystalline purity can only be removed by turning our whole examination round. (One might say: the axis of reference of our examination must be rotated, but about the fixed point of our real need.)” This paper attempts to illuminate his notion of this “real need” which is shared by that work and by his earlier Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus by comparing these works with some of the writings of Tolstoy (...) and Schopenhauer with which he was familiar. I do this not to discredit either of his writings as works on logic but to show in what manner they are, indeed, works on logic. (shrink)

Commentary on Quwaysinī's commentary on Akhḍarī's work titled the Sullam al-muawraq on logic.

The historical researches of Louis Couturat saved the logical work of Leibniz from the oblivion of neglect and forgetfulness. They revealed that Leibniz developed in succession several versions of a “logical calculus” (calculus ratiocinatororcalculus universalis). In consequence of Couturat's investigations it has become well known that Leibniz's development of these logical calculi adumbrated the notion of a logistic system; and for these foreshadowings of the logistic treatment of formal logic Leibniz is rightly regarded as the father of symbolic (...) class='Hi'>logic.It is clear from what has been said that it is scarcely possible to overestimate the debt which the contemporary student of Leibniz's logic owes to Couturat. This gratitude must, however, be accompanied by the realization that Couturat's own theory of logic is gravely defective. Couturat was persuaded that the extensional point of view in logic is the only one which is correct, an opinion now quite antiquated, and shared by no one. This prejudice of Couturat's marred his exposition of Leibniz's logic. It led him to battle with windmills: he viewed the logic of Leibniz as rife with shortcomings stemming from an intensional approach.The task of this paper is a re-examination of Leibniz's logic. It will consider without prejudgment how Leibniz conceived of the major formal systems he developed aslogicalcalculi – that is, these systems will be studied with a view to the interpretation or interpretations which Leibniz himself intends for them. The aim is to undo some of the damage which Couturat's preconception has done to the just understanding of Leibniz's logic and to the proper evaluation of his contribution. (shrink)

In this study, the rational criticism directed by Ibn Tayymiyya (d. 1338) to the philosophical evidence used to prove the unity of the necessary existent in the book Kitāb al-Is̲h̲ārāt wa al-tanbīhāt, which is accepted as a constitutive text in the history of Islamic philosophy, is examined. Author of the aforementioned book Avicenna (d. 1037) tries to prove the unity of the necessary existent from different ways in his books. Kitāb al-Is̲h̲ārāt wa al-tanbīhāt is a book that includes one of (...) these ways. The evidence that Avicenna uses in that book comprises of two preliminaries. The first preliminary is made up of specifying the relation between the thing that the different perceptible particular entities are common and are different. The second one is based on proving the existence not to be the cause of essence by centering the difference of existence and essence. Ibn Taymiyya, who criticizes philosophers in many ways, criticizes this evidence used by Avicenna in his work Mes’eletün fî tevḥîdi’l-felâsife. Rejecting the logic of Mashshaiyyun as science, Ibn Taymiyya also tried to refute the philosophical and logical rules that philosophers accept and use. In this context, Ibn Taymiyya argues that not only the preliminary presuppositions of the philosopher's argument to prove the unity of the necessary being, but also that the logical principles and rules previously accepted by the philosopher are false. One of the most important issues criticized by the thinker in relation to the subject is the reality of concepts, the existence of universals, how universals are moved to particulars, and the state of quiddity. According to him, concepts are mental and universals do not have a reality in the external world. Again, he thinks that universals like humanity are attributed to particulars as attributes, and therefore, in a way, he denies the universal being universal. Because, according to Ibn Taymiyya, a certain attribute of a being that is particular cannot be universal unlike itself. According to the thinker, the commonality in the concepts that logicians call universal consists only of a linguistic partnership. Undoubtedly, it can be said that Ibn Taymiyya's thought on the issue of concepts is close to nominalistic approach in a way. But he does not directly deny the reality of the concepts. For, according to him, the concepts that are universally formed in the minds are actually realized particularly. That is to say, the universal humanity has been realized particularly in individuals such as Ahmet and Mehmet. In other words, because the humanity in individuals is particular, Ahmet's humanity is different from Mehmet's humanity. For this reason, there can be no real partnership among the examples given. In this context, the unity distinction made by Ibn Taymiyya in understanding his thoughts is helpful. According to him, unity is of two types, real and qualitative. Real unity is the unity that exists in the essence of the individual. The qualitative unity is the unity that exists between the things under the concept of the universal. However, the qualitative unity is not considered as a unity since it does not occur in the external world. In fact, this is what distinguishes Ibn Taymiyya from nominalist thinkers. If we turn back to the evidence of Avicenna, based on the objections that Ibn Taymiyya made to the logic and philosophical principles of Mashshaiyyun in general, we can say that the thinker criticized the precedents of this argument by emphasizing the knowledge that universal concepts are intellectual entities. He emphasizes the examples that Avicenna uses to show the affiliation among the things are only made up of universal notions and alleges them not to have perceptible entity. Thus, he says that there is not a real affiliation among different particular entities that have perceptible existence. As to the second preliminary, Ibn Taymiyya says that this preliminary is also inaccurate for the reason that it is, like the first preliminary, based on the knowledge that the intellectual entities had come true in the physical world. According to him, the essence is made up of intellectual conceptualization. Therefore, it has not physical reality. After criticizing the preliminaries in this manner, Ibn Taymiyya says that the analogy that consists of these preliminaries is also erroneous. Because the analogy that is based on erroneous preliminaries does not give a correct result. (shrink)

The Book and the Sunnah are the two main sources of Sharʿī science. These two sources are based on narration which requires an absolute certainty, and this makes the reports, especially the mutawātir reports, important for Sharʿī sciences. Many people were involved in the transmission process of the Sunnah and the Book; therefore, Islamic scholars remained loyal to the technical concept “mutawātir reports” which is used in logic and is not open to doubt in terms of credibility. This is (...) particularly important for the science of kalām, which deals with matters of faith. On the other hand, in the science of fiqh, which deals with the practices of the Muslim individuals such as worship and procedures rather than the matters of faith, only the reports that the believer will accept, rather than those that everyone will approve, are sufficient. In this context, as per the science of fiqh, it is sufficient to form a dominant opinion, rather than an absolute certainty as in the science of kalām, for acting upon reports. Some factors, such as the acceptance of conjecture sufficient in the matters associated with fiqh and the low number of mutawātir reports on fiqh matters, also affected the fuqahā’s understanding of certain knowledge. In the context of transmission of the Sunnah, fuqahā partially changed the nature of the concept “mutawātir reports” by going beyond the technical understanding of tawatur. The most important change made by the fuqahā in the nature of mutawātir reports was the inclusion of the phenomenon “sened (chain of transmission)”, which is used to ensure credibility to ḥadīt̲h̲s, in the understanding of tawatur. So much so that while the number rather than the qualifications of the people who convey the reports is important for the credibility of the mutawātir reports in the science of logic; in the determination of mutawātir sunnah, the number of the narration channels which consist of just and fair-minded narrators was taken as a basis in line with the hadith “Whoever ascribes to me what I have not said then let him occupy his seat in Hell-fire.” Even some methodologists valued the justness and fair-mindedness of the narrators so much that they included the famous reports in the scope of mutawātir reports, even though the first layer was ahad, due to their trust in the narrators in the later layers. However, in technical sense, for mutawātir reports, the qualifications of the narrators or who they are is not important at all. On the contrary, any person from a different religion, sect or disposition can take a role in the transmission of mutawātir reports. However, there is no place for fasiq narrators, let alone non-Muslims, in fuqahā’s concept of sened-centered mutawātir reports. Spiritual mutawātir is one of the subjects affected the most by this new understanding of tawatur based on isnād (reporting the chain of transmission). Normally, spiritual mutawātir is the agreement of the reports, conveyed in different texts by a large number of people who cannot agree on a lie, on a common meaning. However, fuqahā interpreted spiritual mutawātir as ahad ḥadīt̲h̲s with different chains of sened reaching a certain number and denoting the same meaning. What makes these two reports different is that the number of narrators assures the credibility of reports in the first one whereas the trust in the justness and fair-mindedness of the narrators does in the second. As a matter of fact, it is not possible to talk about such a spiritual mutawātir if the trust in the justness and fair-mindedness of the narrators who convey the ahad reports is damaged. This approach of spiritual mutawātir was used by the mutakallimūn as much as by the fuqahā. However, they used this approach of mutawātir mostly for matters that are evidenced by the Sunnah but not associated with the essentials of religion, such as Shafa'ah (intercession), Hawd al-Kawthar (Pond of Abundance), Ru’yat Allah (seeing Allah), and imams’ being from Quraysh. Thanks to this new concept of tawatur, Islamic scholars included many ḥadīt̲h̲s that are normally out of the scope of the technical definition of mutawātir reports, in the scope of spiritual mutawātir, and thus provided a credibility to more ḥadīt̲h̲s. (shrink)

al-Qism al-awwal. al-Iftirāḍ al-musbaq fī al-lisānīyāt al-ḥadīthah -- al-qism al-thānī. al-Iftirāḍ al-musbaq fī al-turāth al-ʻarabī wa-al-islāmī.

This paper argues firstly that the argument of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit is necessary for the justification of the beginning of his logical project, and secondly that Hegel's attempt to secure the beginning of his Science of Logic by relying upon the argument of the Phenomenology fails. I argue firstly that the position taken up at the beginning of Hegel's Logic is constructed in such a fashion that it relies upon the argument of the Phenomenology to justify it. (...) I then offer some support for the view of the relationship between the two texts defended by Maker in order to see how the two might be thought to be compatible. Finally, in the longest part of the paper, I offer a number of reasons for thinking that attempts to render the two compatible in this fashion fail. I therefore conclude that, as it stands, the beginning of Hegel's Logic is not secured against objection in the way that Hegel wants it to be. (shrink)

Logic; Islam and philosophy; Tunisia; early works to 1800.

Suppose we’re at a horserace, and you turn to me and say, ‘Eclipse is at the finish line!’ But by the time you’ve finished saying this – by the time your utterance is complete – Eclipse is already well past the finish line, and what you’ve said is no longer true. But you did say something true. More generally, we can – and often do – say true things about events that take up less time than our utterances themselves. We (...) can also contradict each other about such events – something that takes even more time. How is all this possible? In the twentieth century, this problem was discussed by Arthur Prior. In the 14th, John Buridan treated an older – probably twelfth-century – version of it. Buridan’s treatment is more successful than Prior’s, which runs into Zeno’s paradox of the arrow. Buridan avoids the paradox, but faces further puzzles for his account of contradiction. In untangling these, we’ll uncover important latent features of his pragmatics and temporal logic – features that are supported by more recent research in linguistics. Ultimately, our considerations here will turn up new insight into the Gricean Cooperative Principle. In a slogan: to contradict is to cooperate. (shrink)

Aristotle's De interpretatione; logic; Islamic philosophy; criticism and interpretation; early works to 1800.

A commentary on al-Yazdī's gloss on al-Taftāzānī's Tahdhīb al-manṭiq wa-al-kalām; logic, Arabic logic; early works to 1800.

Arabic translation Sayyid al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī'l letter on logic translated by the recipient, his son, Ibn al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī.