Digressions in argumentative discussion are a kind of failure of relevance. Examination of what actual cases look like reveals several properties of argumentative relevance: (1) The informational relevance of propositions to the truth value of a conclusion should be distinguished from the pragmatic relevance of argumentative acts to the task of resolving a disagreement. (2) Pragmatic irrelevance is a collaborative phenomenon. It does not just short-circuit reasoning; it encourages a failure to take up the demands of an argumentative task. (3) (...) Pragmatic irrelevance can occur not simply by the absence of a connection between what is said and some standpoint in dispute, but also by the presence of a connection between what is said and a competing use of the information. (4) Pragmatic relevance must be accomplished through communicative action. (shrink)

Near the end of his examination of whether perception can be knowledge, Socrates gives a long digression about the ‘man of the law courts’ and the ‘philosopher’. Interpreters have mostly judged that this digression plays no role in the dialogue’s main argument. I will argue that, on the contrary, it supplies an important step in the refutation of Protagoras’ thesis of the relativism of opinions.

Early modern scholastic and Aristotelian philosophy is now a growing area of study. However, little attention has been paid to the structure and form of late Aristotelian texts, partly because they have often been seen as baroque and excessively intricate in construction. This article examines the role of structural and stylistic issues in the De anima commentary of the Jesuit author Hieronymus Dandinus, focusing particularly on the techniques he used to integrate knowledge from other disciplines and expand the familiar commentary (...) format. It argues that taking these issues seriously has important implications for our understanding of the dynamics of reading Aristotle in the early modern period. (shrink)

In this article, it is argued that Ammianus’ first Roman digression (14.6) should be interpreted as elucidating the political and philosophical mindset of the surrounding narrative to which it is tightly connected. This argumentative scope of the digression is activated through intra- and inter-textual references and allusions, especially to earlier Roman historiography. The latter orientate the reader to situate the often trivial behaviors discussed in the digression within a broader philosophical and historical framework, and to associate them (...) with specific practices of Gallus and Constantius in the account immediately preceding and following the digression. Through these narrative devices, Ammianus affirms the mutual interaction between the mores of the principes in the main account and those of the nobiles and the lower classes in the digression. Through this case study it is thus demonstrated that the placement and content of digressions are much more carefully chosen than usually supposed, while also highlighting the important role of intra- and intertextuality in connecting the digression with the main narrative. (shrink)

I examine the function and argument of the Digression (172c–177c) in Plato’s _Theaetetus_. The Digression refutes the ‘semi-Protagorean’ thesis that justice and piety and sensible qualities are perceiver-relative but that we can objectively calculate ‘being and benefit’; or rather, refutes the conjunction of this thesis with the claim that the semi-Protagorean orator or legislative advisor is wise and happy. Avoiding question-begging arguments from Forms, a providential cosmos, or the tripartite soul, Plato argues that objective measurement, even if its (...) object is a value-free universe, has normative implications: by revealing the errors of scale underlying the polis’ conventional values, it makes it impossible for the philosopher to live happily if he assimilates himself to the polis. I offer explanations of Plato’s adaptation of Pindar in his description of the philosopher’s flight through the cosmos to ‘geometrize’ and ‘astronomize,’ and of Plato’s critique of those who claim descent from Heracles. (shrink)

RESUMEN La filosofia de Sócrates posee un carácter muy peculiar debido a la ausencia de doctrinas bien establecidas y a la inseparable vinculación entre vida y pensamiento. Por este motivo, el filosofar socrático debe entenderse unido a sus andanzas callejeras y a la revisión constante de cualquier planteamiento. Partiendo de esta hipótesis, el artículo pretende mostrar tanto la originalidad del pensamiento socrático y su concepción de la filosofía como la enorme influencia que ejerce en los textos de Platón, que emplean (...) de manera sutil esos extravíos y divagaciones con el propósito de enriquecer la conversación, de dotar de profundidad a las argumentaciones y de obligar al lector a recorrer ese mismo camino sinuoso que es el de la reflexión filosófica. Con ello, ambos pensadores muestran que la filosofía no es tanto un saber sino una actividad. ABSTRACT Socrates' philosophy has a very peculiar character due to the absence of well-established doctrines and the unbreakable bond between life and thought. For this reason, Socratic philosophy must be understood along with his street wanderings and the constant revision of any intellectual approach. Starting from this hypothesis, this paper aims to show both the originality of Socratic thought and his notion of philosophy, as well as the enormous influence he exerts on Plato, who subtly employs these wanderings and digressions in his texts to enrich the dialogue, providing depth to the arguments, and forcing the reader to travel that same winding road that is philosophical thought. Thus, both thinkers show that philosophy is not so much a kind of knowledge as it is an activity. (shrink)

The study aims to offer a rational explanation for the appearance of the so-called ‘digression’ in Plato’s Theaetetus and in so doing raises the question of whether it is indeed a digression. The starting point of the inquiry is the argumentative structure of the digression itself, which in the course of the inquiry will be made apparent, internally, through references to the Theaetetus itself and, externally, through references to similar passages in other dialogues of Plato. In a (...) first step the theoretical content of the passage is analysed in detail under four aspects (the polis, epistemology, metaphysics, ethics). This analysis is followed by the speculative application of what has been established, by pursuing the question of what function the ‘digression’ fulfils in the Theaetetus. The study reaches the conclusion that it has four distinct functions: the digression is an ethical dimension of the concept of knowledge, a component of the critique of the homo mensura dictum, the performative expression of philosophical process and – most importantly – an indirect link to the Platonic system. (shrink)

The digression of Plato’s Theaetetus (172c2–177c2) is as celebrated as it is controversial. A particularly knotty question has been what status we should ascribe to the ideal of philosophy it presents, an ideal centered on the conception that true virtue consists in assimilating oneself as much as possible to god. For the ideal may seem difficult to reconcile with a Socratic conception of philosophy, and several scholars have accordingly suggested that it should be read as ironic and directed only (...) at the dramatic character Theodorus. When interpreted with due attention to its dramatic context, however, the digression reveals that the ideal of godlikeness, while being directed at Theodorus, is essentially Socratic. The function of the passage is to introduce a contemplative aspect of the life of philosophy into the dialogue that contrasts radically with the political-practical orientation characteristic of Protagoras, an aspect Socrates is able to isolate as such precisely because he is conversing with the mathematician Theodorus. (shrink)

The Theaetetus is about the definition of knowledge, but also about the young Theaetetus acquiring knowledge and sophia. By defining knowledge he gives an account of his personal vocation. According to the Protagorean interpretation of his first definition, any object of knowledge is at least co-determined by the subject who grasps it. There is no proper distinction between subject and object, no right or wrong epistemic approach or perspective on any object. The digression presents Theaetetus with a comparison of (...) this Protagorean sophia and true sophia which is the aim of the philosopher. It shows Theaetetus and the reader what a life that has either kind of sophia as its end amounts to. It also shows him that true sophia does involve a proper perspective toward its objects, that Theaetetus has to be careful which perspective he chooses, that he can improve upon his perspective, and that not everyone will approve of his choice of perspective and of the ensuing activities. The Thracian servant is an example for someone who does not approve, since she doesn’t know about perspectives. This is brought out in the anecdote, which presents the servant’s point of view. It is only the servant’s assumption that Thales fell into the well while observing stars. In fact, Thales wanted to observe zenith stars and deliberately chose a point of view, namely the bottom of a well, which allowed him to focus his field of vision on a well-defined section of the sky. Theaetetus must come to understand that the servant is missing the point of Thales’ actions. It must become clear to him that epistemic and moral success requires a careful choice of one’s perspective – and that this choice matters despite all adverse reaction he may have to face because of it. (shrink)

David Hume’s views on the subject of free will are among the most influential contributions to this long-disputed topic. Throughout the twentieth century, and into this century, Hume has been widely regarded as having presented the classic defense of the compatibilist position, the view that freedom and responsibility are consistent with determinism. Most of Hume’s core arguments on this issue are found in the Sections entitled “Of liberty and necessity,” first presented in Book 2 of A Treatise of Human Nature (...) (1739) and then in his An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding (1748). Although the general position in both these works is much the same, there are some significant points of difference relating to the way in which the core position is presented and also in the specific range of arguments covered. The focus of my concerns in this essay will not, however, lie with the relationship between the Treatise and the first Enquiry versions of “Of liberty and necessity.” My discussion will center on the contrast between two alternative interpretations of Hume’s views on this subject, with particular reference to the version presented in the Treatise. It will be my particular concern to explain and defend the naturalistic as against the classical compatibilist account and to explain the general significance of the naturalistic account for the contemporary debate. (shrink)

Traditionally, scholars have taken homoiôsis theôi in the Theaetetus digression (172c–177c) to require neglect of particulars, but they have noted that although Socrates advocates it, he does not live such a life. To explain the discrepancy, Mahoney and Rue both argue that we need to reinterpret godlikeness to require active engagement in the city. I reject their reinterpretations and I revise the traditional view, arguing that godlikeness is not a single ideal. Instead, I argue, Plato provides several different portraits (...) of godlikeness that together suggest interest in particulars makes the person neither better nor worse as a philosopher. (shrink)

Despite their strong spatial connotations, nearness, remoteness and distance are terms discussed in Martin Heidegger in connection to technology, interpretation, difference and lived time. In this paper, I investigate the nature of nearness, the possibility of its elimination and the meaning of such contingency via Bernard Stiegler's critique. In order to do this, I look into the nature of interpretation as a process of time-synthesis that brings the world near and is conditioned by technology. At the same time, I give (...) special attention to childhood as a unique but telling stage of this process. Furthermore, I look into technologies of nearness, now instantiated as digital technologies, and interpret them as processes that challenge the very notion they appear to promote, that is nearness and difference. Finally, I discuss these technologies in connection to education's possible response and impossible responsibility. Education is discussed as a technology of nearness that forms the child and their interp.. (shrink)

My purpose in this essay is to make some remarks about the Digression of the Theaetetus. I shall argue that one central aim of the Digression is to show that there is a conflict between two ways of life: the life of the philosopher and the life of people get involved in politics. In the first part of this paper I make some considerations on the relationship between the Prologue and the trial of Socrates. In the second part (...) I examine the moral of the Digression from the perspective of Socrates‟ account of Protagoras‟ epistemology. (shrink)

Leiris est-il un allégoricien?Leiris est-il un néoclassique malgré son usage de la digression?Leiris écrit-il dans une langue morte ou dans une langue vivante?

O tema deste artigo é um texto apócrifo de W. G. Sebald, o ensaio "Europäische Peripherien" [Periferias Europeias], baseado em uma palestra proferida em fevereiro de 1992, em Tübingen. Esse ensaio ocupa um lugar especial na obra de Sebald, pois nele o autor se expressa mais resolutamente do que em qualquer outra ocasião sobre questões políticas, no que diz respeito tanto ao processo de unificação europeia quanto aos problemas fundamentais das sociedades ocidentais na transição para o século XXI. A partir (...) de uma leitura mais atenta, chego à conclusão de que esse ensaio, supostamente secundário, revela-se um importante pilar para reconstruir a interpretação profundamente melancólica que Sebald faz da história com base no conceito de uma “história natural da destruição”. Ao mesmo tempo, “Europäische Peripherien” permite reconhecer a importância de Mutation der Menschheit [Mutação da Humanidade], de Pierre Bertaux, como influência fundamental, até então não reconhecida, para o desenvolvimento da obra de Sebald.Palavras-chave: W.G. Sebald. Europa. “História natural da destruição”. Pierre Bertaux. AbstractThis article discusses the essay "Europäische Peripherien", a hitherto overlooked text by W.G. Sebald based on a lecture given in Tübingen in February 1992. The essay occupies a special position in Sebald's oeuvre, as the author positions himself more pronouncedly than anywhere else on political issues, both with regard to the process of European unification and to fundamental challenges of Western societies in the transition to the twenty-first century. In my close reading the supposedly insignificant essay proves to be an important text for a reconstruction of Sebald's deeply melancholic view of history as expressed in the concept of a "natural history of destruction". At the same time, "European Peripheries" allows us to acknowledge the importance of Pierre Bertaux’ Mutation der Menschheit as an undiscovered influence on the development of Sebald's oeuvre.Keywords: W.G. Sebald. Europa. “Natural history of destruction”. Pierre Bertaux. ORCIDhttps://orcid.org/0000-0002-4825-1912. (shrink)

The article examines the reasons for silence in Thomas More, starting from his History of King Richard the III, considering then his actions as speaker of the House of Commons and later as Chancellor, and, finally, his refusal to take the oath to uphold the Acts of Succession and Supremacy. Another relevant subtopic takes a cue from Seneca's assertions about silence (in his Œdipus) to allow the author, after careful reading of a paper published by F. Mitjans on Moreana, to (...) correct an assertion made, in an earlier essay, in regard to the Seneca details in Lockey's copy of Holbein's More family portrait, as well as to present a more analytical assessment of the relevance of Seneca's presence in More's works (only More's two latter works are taken into account here). It turns out that More cites Seneca more often than has been thought, but with certain fairly crucial reservations, which should—at least in part—explain More's apparent reluctance to quote Seneca's name: another case of silence, which needs to be probed. (shrink)