I argue against the tendency in the philosophy of science literature to link abduction to the inference to the best explanation (IBE), and in particular, to claim that Peireean abduction is a conceptual predecessor to IBE. This is not to discount either abduction or IBE. Rather the purpose of this paper is to clarify the relation between Peireean abduction and IBE in accounting for ampliative inference in science. This paper aims at a proper classification—not justification—of types of scientific reasoning. In (...) particular, I claim that Peireean abduction is an in-depth account of the process of generating explanatory hypotheses, while IBE, at least in Peter Lipton's thorough treatment, is a more encompassing account of the processes both of generating and of evaluating scientific hypotheses. There is then a two-fold problem with the claim that abduction is IBE. On the one hand, it conflates abduction and induction, which are two distinct forms of logical inference, with two distinct aims, as shown by Charles S. Peirce; on the other hand it lacks a clear sense of the full scope of IBE as an account of scientific inference. (shrink)

Traditional institutions are often considered inadequate to govern for the long term as their politicians promote short-term thinking which can harm the future. This book proposes a novel theory of social time perception to address the short-term thinking of traditional institutions which threaten to stifle liberal democracies. The semi-future reconfigures liberal democracies’ franchises, representative instruments, deliberative practices, accountability mechanisms, and policymaking to include in the demos all citizens, regardless of age, and holders of representable objective interests in the future. The (...) result is not only a way to legitimise long-term governance but also to improve the quality of current democracies. (shrink)

This paper advances the thesis that there is a substantive tension between the Non-Reductionist View of the Self, according to which the self is fundamental (irreducible to physical or psychological states or processes) and indivisible (not composed of parts), and the Block Universe Theory, which holds that all events and moments coexist within a four-dimensional reality. The paper develops this thesis by presenting two arguments: the Temporal Zombie Argument and the Epistemic Zombie Argument. The former argument contends that combining the (...) Non-Reductionist View of the Self with the Block Universe Theory entails the existence of philosophical zombies, whereas the latter argument suggests that we could have lived our entire lives among such entities without realising it. If this line of reasoning is correct, non-reductionists cannot coherently adopt the Block Universe Theory as their temporal framework; conversely, block universe theorists cannot endorse the Non-Reductionist View of the Self without facing these problems. (shrink)

This article critiques the broad interpretation of inadequate medical responses to chronic pain reports as instances of testimonial or hermeneutical injustice. While Miranda Fricker's concepts help highlight the neglect of chronic pain sufferers – such as healthcare professionals' failure to take reports seriously (testimonial injustice) or the lack of adequate language to communicate pain experiences (hermeneutical injustice) – we argue that applying these frameworks overlooks important nuances. Specifically, we contend that there is an additional, distinct epistemic failure in how healthcare (...) providers engage with chronic pain complaints: a failure to respond to these reports in adequate ways, beyond merely understanding or believing them. We hypothesize that it has to do with inquisitive inertia (a decision not to investigate further, in the absence of good medical reasons to ground such a decision), and we conceptualize this failure in terms of distributive epistemic injustice, that may persist even in the absence of testimonial or hermeneutical injustices as they are traditionally understood. (shrink)

Intergenerational justice has in recent decades become an increasingly important subfield of political philosophy. However, due to the absence of coexistence and other aspects of the intergenerational context, it is often unclear whether and how many ideals of justice apply. As such, relational egalitarianism – the view that justice requires equal social relationships – may appear particularly implausible in this domain. In this introduction, we explain this issue, motivating its further examination. Finally, we briefly summarize how the papers in this (...) volume take up this challenge and offer insightful developments on both fronts, advancing our understanding of intergenerational justice and relational egalitarianism. (shrink)

Understanding positive emotions' shared and differentiating features can yield valuable insight into the structure of positive emotion space and identify emotion states, or aspects of emotion states, that are most relevant for particular psychological processes and outcomes. We report two studies that examined core relational themes (Study 1) and expressive displays (Study 2) for eight positive emotion constructs—amusement, awe, contentment, gratitude, interest, joy, love, and pride. Across studies, all eight emotions shared one quality: high positive valence. Distinctive core relational theme (...) and expressive display patterns were found for four emotions—amusement, awe, interest, and pride. Gratitude was associated with a distinct core relational theme but not an expressive display. Joy and love were each associated with a distinct expressive display but their core relational themes also characterised pride and gratitude, respectively. Contentment was associated with a distinct expressive display but not a core relational theme. The implications of this work for the study of positive emotion are discussed. (shrink)

Emotion regulation is one of the major foci of study in the fields of emotion and emotional development. This article proposes that to properly study emotion regulation, one must consider not only an intrapersonal view of emotion, but a relational one as well. Defining properties of intrapersonal and relational approaches are spelled out, and implications drawn for how emotion regulation is conceptualized, how studies are designed, how findings are interpreted, and how generalizations are drawn. Most research to date has been (...) conducted from an intrapersonal perspective, and the shortcomings of this approach for understanding emotion regulation are highlighted. The article emphasizes major conceptual and methodological steps required for a fuller description of the process of emotion regulation. (shrink)

In representative democracies, the absence of responsiveness by elected officials to the interests of the represented often generates problems of legitimacy, accountability and effectiveness. However, responsiveness also tends to narrow the time horizons of democratic decision-making and promote short-termism. This paper advances the notion that responsiveness to interests involving distant time horizons is possible by reconfiguring the franchise in a time-sensitive and future-oriented way. It is divided into two parts. The first pinpoints a few inconsistencies in the available proposals for (...) making responsiveness and the long term compatible (e.g., promoting youth turnout, narrowing the franchise to robust epistemic fitness, establishing future-oriented institutions). The second advances the creation of temporal electoral circles operating alongside territorial electoral circles in order to prompt responsiveness to multitemporal interests. The conclusion asserts that this kind of franchise design is the best available option for introducing temporal aspects into the character of democratic representation. (shrink)

This book seeks to arrive at a better understanding of the relationships between the objective and subjective aspects of time. It discusses the existence of fluent time, a controversial concept in many areas, from philosophy to physics. Fluent time is understood as directional time with a past, a present and a future. We experience fluent time in our lives and we adopt a temporal perspective in our ways of knowing and acting. Nevertheless, the existence of fluent time has been debated (...) for both philosophical and scientific reasons, thus creating a rift between the subjective and objective aspects of time. Starting from the basic notion of points of view, or perspectives, this book explores the relationships between objective or external time, as it has been conceptualized by science, and subjective or internal time, which is involved in our lived experiences. It establishes a general framework encompassing the nature, structure and mode of existence of points of view, in which the objective and subjective aspects of time can be integrated. The book mainly addresses researchers and postgraduates in philosophy and logic. Additionally, it offers inspiration for physicists and computer scientists involved in the modeling and simulation of complex behaviors for which the representation of internal time should be considered together with the notion of objective, external time. (shrink)

A theory of intergenerational justice consists in the study of the moral and political status of the relations between present and past or future people, more specifically, of the obligations and entitlements they can potentially generate. The challenges that justify talking about responsibilities between generations are myriad. And the disputes they prompt can focus on the past just as much as on the present, even though the fact that the human species has reached a state of technological progress that enables (...) it to have an irredeemable impact on the planet and perhaps even endanger future human existence tends to make concerns about the future more pressing. Debates on intergenerational justice are twofold. The first revolves around the issue of whether claims of justice across generations whose members' lifetimes do not necessarily overlap could be justified. And the second revolves around the specific conception of justice in play, that is, around the nature of the standard that must be applied as well as around the identification of the contents of the duties that present generations supposedly have vis-à-vis past or future generations. This survey article depicts the conceptual and argumentative framework in which these debates are set. It aims to outline certain of the main features shared by the most influential contemporary theories of intergenerational justice, and the problems inherent in them. It concludes by suggesting that, even though the idea of succeeding generations is merely an abstraction, there are specific empirical states of affairs that require different theoretical responses to intergenerational justice. (shrink)

The recent alleged doping case of the figure skater Kamila Valieva at the Winter Olympic Games in Beijing 2022 dramatically raised the issue of the protection of minors in anti-doping policy. We firstly present the literature on doping in relation to minors. Secondly, we present WADA’s Protected Person (PP) concept and its implications. Thirdly, we analyse the WADA Code’s purpose and the vulnerability of minors under the Code, and fourthly, we identify the real threats from which minors should be protected (...) by analysing the ineffective PP concept, and showing how it cannot be a real protection. We explain how preventing one threat can generate another, thus converting minor athletes from victims into suspects. We conclude by stressing the necessity for further research, and we indicate our future research direction, towards the development of a much wider concept of protection, and its application into sporting contexts. (shrink)

The book forms a balanced structure in which the three conceptual pillars of Spinoza's natural law theory (individuality, natural laws, and power) are first analyzed from the viewpoint of his ontology and then from the viewpoint of his...

In the Discourses on Livy, Machiavelli maintains that the people is often superior epistemically to princes. This forms the outlines of an argument from popular epistemocracy. However, in light of his theory of humours, how can governance belong to the most epistemically capable if they are driven solely by a negative desire? How can the best decisions regarding domination be made by those who only have a desire to not dominate? This paper develops the thesis that the people’s negative humours (...) can be consistent with the claim that it has the best epistemic capacities to rule insofar as such capacities are understood only negatively, based on the people’s competencies to assess error and identify mistakes in collective decision-making. The argument is divided into three sections. The first unpacks the problem by clarifying how multiplicity in Machiavelli has more robust epistemic value and, consequentially, more political value in certain circumstances. The second explains the negative dimension of epistemic capacity and how Machiavelli attributes it to the people by highlighting two epistemically crucial characteristics: multiplicity and diversity. The third lists the people’s three forms of negative governance displayed in the Discourses: intra-institutional opposition, institutional participation (in litigation, the selection of magistrates, and lawmaking), and extra-institutional contestation. In the end, it should be clear that Machiavelli qualifies as an epistemocrat with democratic tendencies insofar as the people fulfils the role of a ‘negative legislator’. (shrink)

Epistemic impairment has been the decisive yardstick when excluding infants from political agency. One of the suggestions to bypass the epistemic requirement of political agency and to encourage the inclusion of infants in representative democracies is to resort to proxies or surrogates who share or advocate interests which may be coincidental with their interests. However, this solution is far from desirable, given that it privileges the political agency of parents, guardians and trustees over other adult citizens. This article offers an (...) alternative to this conceptual frame of reference by making a case for the political agency of infants. Firstly, it maintains that political agency can be understood in terms of the several facets involved in political representation. Secondly, it claims that the all-affected principle can be reformulated as an ‘infant-affected-interests principle’ in light of which infants are members of the class of the represented. Thirdly, it explores the ways through which this political agency can occur without having to resort to alternative conceptions of representation. The conclusion ascertains that infant enfranchisement is highly undesirable and that there are more viable forms to promote infant political agency, such as virtual representation, infant-beneficial principles of political action and ombudspersons for infants. (shrink)

First, to what level of quality can medical ethics a spire, if it ignores callous discrimination in medrcal practice against large populations of the innocent poor? Second, how effective can such theories be in addressing the critical issues of medical and clinical ethics if they are unable to contribute to the closing of the gap of sociomedical disparity?Marcio Fabri dos Anjos, Medical Ethics in the Developing World: A Liberation Theology Perspective.

This paper aims at answering some of the objections to the NIP’s criticism of the idea of rights of future persons. Those objections usually adopt different perspectives depending on how they understand differently the nature of the correlativity between rights and duties – some adopt a present-rights-of-future-persons view, others a future-rights-of-future-persons view, others a transitive present-rights-of-present-persons view, and others still an eternalist view of rights and persons. The paper will try to show that only a non-transitive present-rights-of-present-persons view can survive (...) the challenges posed by the notion of correlativity inherent in the NIP, and thus preserve rights language when discussing the future. This view is proved also more suitable for the legal and political realms, where policies and law-making are usually more concerned with present addressees and short term effects. (shrink)

To date, emotion research has primarily focused on the experience and display of the emoter. However, of equal, if not more, importance is how such displays impact and guide the behavior of an observer. We incorporate a functionalist framework of emotion to examine the development of differential responding to discrete emotion, theorize on what may facilitate its development, and hypothesize the functions that may underlie such behavioral responses. Although our review is focused primarily on development, the theoretical and methodological ideas (...) laid out are relevant for researchers of emotion at all ages. (shrink)

European Journal of Political Theory, Volume 21, Issue 2, Page 368-389, April 2022. Epistemic impairment has been the decisive yardstick when excluding infants from political agency. One of the suggestions to bypass the epistemic requirement of political agency and to encourage the inclusion of infants in representative democracies is to resort to proxies or surrogates who share or advocate interests which may be coincidental with their interests. However, this solution is far from desirable, given that it privileges the political agency (...) of parents, guardians and trustees over other adult citizens. This article offers an alternative to this conceptual frame of reference by making a case for the political agency of infants. Firstly, it maintains that political agency can be understood in terms of the several facets involved in political representation. Secondly, it claims that the all-affected principle can be reformulated as an ‘infant-affected-interests principle’ in light of which infants are members of the class of the represented. Thirdly, it explores the ways through which this political agency can occur without having to resort to alternative conceptions of representation. The conclusion ascertains that infant enfranchisement is highly undesirable and that there are more viable forms to promote infant political agency, such as virtual representation, infant-beneficial principles of political action and ombudspersons for infants. (shrink)

Una respuesta al debate metafilosófico sobre si hay o no unos criterios regulativos en filosofía cómo área de investigación lo ofrece la denominada filosofía sintética. Dentro de esta posición se propone una forma de abordar toda la filosofía y teorizar en base a diferentes criterios propuestos, que suelen ser generalmente: la claridad semántica, la coherencia interna, la coherencia externa con las ciencias y la fecundidad teórica con otros campos de estudio. Estos criterios de corte naturalista a su vez se ofrecen (...) como debatibles y ampliables a otros criterios. Se razonará la necesidad de demarcar la filosofía, y, poniendo el foco en su metodología, se argumentarán los previos criterios con tal de fomentar la filosofía sintética como marco general de trabajo filosófico riguroso. Esto excluye de la disciplina tanto aquello que no sea filosófico como aquello que intente emular la filosofía sin serlo en verdad, la pseudofilosofía. (shrink)

Moral reasoning typically informs environmental decision-making by measuring the possible outcomes of policies or actions in light of a preferred ethical theory. This method is subject to many problems. Environmental pragmatism tries to overcome them, but it suffers also from some pitfalls. This paper proposes a new method of environmental pragmatism that avoids the problems of both the traditional method of environmental moral reasoning and of the general versions of environmental pragmatism. We call it ‘justificatory moral pluralism’ – it develops (...) the intuition that normative ethical theories need not be mutually exclusive. This leaves room for important forms of pluralist environmental ethics that do not require a once-and-for-all prior commitment to an ethical theory when deciding about policies or courses of action related to the protection of the environment. Justificatory moral pluralism offers a viable solution to the recurrent conflicts between efficient environmental decisions and the need for moral reasoning. (shrink)

This paper intersects the literature on the democratic boundary problem with the literature on the constructivist turn in political representation to show that the boundary problem broadly construed involves a distinction between ‘the problem of inclusion’ (into pre-existing demoi and their decision-making procedures) and ‘the problem of constituting the demos’ (which involves criteria for partaking in constituent power). This distinction is consistently neglected by democratic theorists. However, it has serious implications for representative democracies because the standard answers to the boundary (...) problem – the all-affected-interests principle, the all-subjected principle, and the substantive-demos principle – do not apply to the problem of constituting the demos. A new principle aimed at the latter problem is here proposed: the constructivist-representative principle. In the end, it should be clear that ascertaining who should be entitled to participate in which democratic decision requires the adoption of different principles depending on the specific demos in question and on the type of decision-making procedure involved (e.g., constitution-making-or-changing, lawmaking, policymaking, etc.). (shrink)

This paper develops a future-oriented and person-centred normative argument based on expectancies that is immune to most of the problems identified in the rights of future persons. The argument unfolds in four parts. The first draws on the notion of expectancies present in inheritance law and maintains that it is possible to formulate a rule of prospective beneficiaries that correlates with entitlements and legitimate claims without necessarily acquiring the status of rights. The second extends expectancies to future persons and concludes (...) that the latter can be considered present holders of such currently binding entitlements. The third section raises the question of whether democracies are bound to a principle of fidelity towards expectancies in such a way that outweighs current people’s rights in cases of conflicts. The response does not prove particularly future-beneficial in such cases. However, section four clarifies why expectancies still carry a crucial moral weight in democracies, one that is not sufficiently established by depersonalised forms of future-oriented ethics. (shrink)

The world appears to be in a constant state of flux, with objects changing and events unfolding over time. I refer to this characterisation as the Manifest Dynamic World. I have argued elsewhere that the Manifest Dynamic World involves two fundamentally distinct kinds of dynamism that cannot be reduced to one another: the dynamic character of change and the dynamic character of time. The former concerns the dynamic aspect of objects changing and moving, while the latter concerns the sense of (...) events changing their temporal position. If I am correct, we should adopt what I call the Independence Approach, according to which each distinct kind of dynamism presented in the Manifest Dynamic World must be explained on its own terms, thereby avoiding the conflation of two fundamentally different phenomena. I argue that the block universe contains genuinely dynamic processes, which in turn account for the dynamic character of change. By contrast, I suggest that the dynamic character of time is a false belief generated by our cognitive system. Thus, the Manifest Dynamic World consists of veridical dynamic experiences of objects changing and moving, jointly with a false belief, generated by our cognitive system, that events change their temporal position. (shrink)

Political scientists often regard responsiveness as a measure of democratic representation. However, responsiveness is particularly difficult with regard to the young. Populations are ageing quickly, old-age dependency ratios are increasing, the young vote less than other age groups, and younger citizens feel they have no political clout. This paper proposes a series of instruments designed to justify the increased consideration of younger citizens’ interests in a manner consistent with the standard view of representation as responsiveness. It is divided into three (...) sections. The first describes the current taxonomy of responsiveness, which differs depending on the agents, objects and viewpoints. A broader notion of responsiveness implies that it is multidimensional and that responsiveness in one dimension does not necessarily entail responsiveness in other dimensions. Despite this context, the young seem to have a representation deficit in all known dimensions of responsiveness. The second section challenges the very framework of political representation as it is tied to responsiveness, drawing on the recent constructivist trend in political representation. This section shows that criticisms of responsiveness prove insufficient to dismiss its importance from democratic forms of representation. The third section proposes three reforms that are likely to increase responsiveness on different dimensions based on age: the establishment of temporal electoral circles, the creation of mandatory youth-focused measurement indexes, and a normative strategy for promoting age-group responsiveness, consisting of attentiveness by representatives of the represented’s time-related objective interests. (shrink)

Veremos como no Fedro de Platão há inicialmente dois tipos de desejos, um deles seria o desejo epithymía e o outro seria o desejo hímeros, sendo o último um desejo nobre, retratado exclusivamente na palinódia de Sócrates. Faremos um estudo do campo semântico associado a cada um desses desejos dentro das três recitações iniciais do diálogo, discernindo a natureza de cada um deles, sua potencialidade, direção e desdobramentos. O diálogo evidencia a enunciação controlada desses desejos na trama conceitual platônica, quando (...) Fedro chama a atenção de Sócrates para esse aspecto notável do uso das palavras (tois onómasin, Phdr. 234c7) na recitação de Lísias, assim como Sócrates no fim da palinódia reafirma o vocabulário (tois onómasin, Phdr. 257a5) poético a que foi submetido. Nesse trajeto surge uma leitura fisiológica, discernindo a estática, os movimentos, as direções dos desejos e amizades descritas, assim como suas qualidades e quantidades. (shrink)

: C.S. Peirce defines mathematics in two ways: first as "the science which draws necessary conclusions," and second as "the study of what is true of hypothetical states of things" (CP 4.227–244). Given the dual definition, Peirce notes, a question arises: Should we exclude the work of poietic hypothesis-making from the domain of pure mathematical reasoning? (CP 4.238). This paper examines Peirce's answer to the question. Some commentators hold that for Peirce the framing of mathematical hypotheses requires poietic genius but (...) is not scientific work. I propose, to the contrary, that although Peirce occasionally seems to exclude the poietic creation of hypotheses altogether from pure mathematical reasoning, Peirce's position is rather that the creation of mathematical hypotheses is poietic, but it is not merely poietic, and accordingly, that hypothesis-framing is part of mathematical reasoning that involves an element of poiesis but is not merely poietic either. Scientific considerations also inhere in the process of hypothesis-making, without excluding the poietic element. In the end, I propose that hypothesis-making in mathematics stands between artistic and scientific poietic creativity with respect to imaginative freedom from logical and actual constraints upon reasoning. (shrink)

This short article provides an introduction to the special issue “Gosseries on Intergenerational Justice,” so as to guide interested readers. In the first half of the article, we provide a short introduction to Axel Gosseries’s book _What Is Intergenerational Justice?_ where we distill the essence of each chapter. In the second half, we succinctly summarize the main points in each of the special issue’s contributions (to which Gosseries responds in the “reply to critics” article that concludes the special issue).

Abstract:This article theorizes the disruptive epistemic work performed by microcosms in recent eco-fiction. Contemporary fiction often explores large-scale ecological disruption through smaller organisms and environments, enabling readers to perceive the Earth through analogy, allegory and metaphor. Within and against this scale-free reading, I argue that the microcosm has become a fracturing trope that troubles relations between scales. Drawing on fiction by T. C. Boyle, A. S. Byatt, Amitav Ghosh, Ali Smith, and Karen Tei Yamashita, I read the microcosm as a (...) critical tool of Anthropocene awareness, because it foregrounds and questions scalar collapse–the epistemic projection of one scale onto another. (shrink)

The idea that democracy is a government of the people, by the people, for the people entails that there is no government by the people if inclusion is taken out of the equation. This poses a significant challenge to the capacity democracies have to govern beyond the temporal scope of the current demos, as members of the people in the past and the future are today voiceless and biteless. This chapter offers a solution to this difficulty by emphasizing that democratic (...) governance is multitemporal insofar as the ‘of-by-for’ tryptic involves different timescapes: ‘of the people’ refers to a cross-temporal dimension of the collective political body that outlasts its individual members; ‘by the people’ refers to the practice of self-determination, which is mostly presentist; and ‘for the people’ refers to all those individuals who are likely to be affected by a democratic decision, and is mostly future-oriented. (shrink)

A recent trend in futures studies has called for strengthening the inclusion of future generations in constitutional law. This is problematic from a practical and a normative viewpoint. This paper introduces a future-oriented theory of democratic constitutionalism that overcomes originalism (which privileges the past) and living constitutionalism (which privileges the present) without resorting to the explicit constitutional protection of the yet unborn. It is divided into five sections. The first challenges the notion that the constitutional entrenchment of the non-overlapping future (...) is the best means of implementing long time horizons in democratic legal systems. The second maintains that constitutions are substantive normative expressions of the ultimate justification of authority. The third demonstrates that the substantive dimension of constitutions is cross-temporal and includes what I call ‘the objective interests in the future’ of all members of the people. The fourth connects such objective interests with rights to political participation. The final section focuses on the cross-temporal role of constitutional adjudication. Because rights to political participation include objective interests in the future and necessarily hold the status of constitutional rights in any legitimate democratic constitution, constitutional adjudication must guarantee their enforcement over government action. (shrink)

This paper critically engages with André Abath’s Knowing What Things Are: An Inquiry-Based Approach (2022), which develops an erotetic account of knowledge about what things are. According to Abath, to know what X is, one must know propositions that serve as appropriate answers to the question “What is X?” within a given inquiry context. While this view successfully accommodates variations in epistemic demands across contexts, I argue that it overlooks the role of deal-breaker propositions - false claims that fundamentally undermine (...) knowledge ascription, even when surrounded by otherwise accurate information. By introducing the notion of relative essences, I propose an amendment to Abath’s account that accounts for the epistemic weight of these propositions. This refinement strengthens the erotetic view by addressing cases where misleading assertions obstruct knowledge transmission. (shrink)

Morality can be adaptive or maladaptive. From this fact come polarizing disputes on the meta-ethical status of moral adaptation. The realist tracking account of morality claims that it is possible to track objective moral truths and that these truths correspond to moral rules that are adaptive. In contrast, evolutionary anti-realism rejects the existence of moral objectivity and thus asserts that adaptive moral rules cannot represent objective moral truths, since those truths do not exist. This article develops a novel evolutionary view (...) of natural law to defend the realist tracking account. It argues that we can identify objective moral truths through cultural group selection and that adaptive moral rules are likely to reflect such truths. (shrink)

The place of the State in Spinoza's ontology has emerged in scholarly literature as one of the most complex issues involving Spinoza's political thought. At issue is whether Spinoza's State is an actual individual with its own conatus. Some consider it a completely real individual, others say that its individuality can only be metaphoric, whilst others point out the conceptual insufficiency of this polarity for explaining the ontological status of political aggregates and try to overcome it through new concepts, such (...) as the multitude, transindividuality, and figuration. In this paper, each of these interpretations is analyzed and dismissed in favour of a new one stating that Spinoza's State is actually a dynamic network of political concepts operating in resemblance of individuality and reflecting the main characteristics of the modern Nation-State. (shrink)

This article analyses ChatGPT from the perspective of virtue epistemology, arguing that, despite certain benefits, the tool is more prone to fostering epistemic vices than cultivating virtues. After outlining the central notions of virtue epistemology, particularly the distinction between intellectual virtues and vices, the paper assesses the epistemic impact of large language models (LLMs) in science and education. While ChatGPT may offer practical advantages such as speed, accessibility, and pedagogical support, it also encourages intellectual passivity, weakens memory, authorship, and critical (...) thinking, and reproduces social biases. These dynamics generate what recent studies describe as “cognitive debt,” a progressive erosion of intellectual autonomy and responsibility. The article highlights that delegating epistemic tasks to ChatGPT often distorts purposes, privileging results over processes essential to intellectual flourishing. It concludes that the widespread and uncritical use of LLMs risks consolidating laziness, epistemic insouciance, and dishonesty, thereby undermining rather than enhancing our capacities as epistemic agents. Keywords: Virtue-based epistemology. ChatGPT. Intellectual vices. (shrink)

This article examines the relation between the dialectical program established in Plato’s Republic and the practice of dialectic in other dialogues, such as the Parmenides and the Theaetetus. The author argues against those scholars who have sustained a sharp distinction between an intuitive conception of knowledge and the discursive practices characteristic of Plato’s concept of dialectic. In his view, Plato has been overinterpreted from the modern perspective of the distinction between intuitive and discursive forms of knowledge. As a consequence, this (...) article also examines the relation between the dialectical practices displayed in the Parmenides and the Theaetetus and the anhypothetical condition that Plato attributes to “the principle of everything” in the Republic. (shrink)

One of the recurrent motifs in political thought is the idea of the social contract, according to which a society, a government, or moral principles depend for their existence on agreements...

L’articolo discute la necessità storica di un’affermazione immanente delle moderne nozioni di dignità umana e di diritti umani. A partire dalla prospettiva antropologica di Supiot, si sosterrà che tali concetti costituiscono proposizioni fondamentali e strutturanti del diritto delle società occidentali, e non sono suscettibili di verifica scientifica. I fondamenti della dignità umana e dei diritti umani hanno origine nella filosofia cristiana medievale, che attribuisce libertà e razionalità all’essere umano non per la sua stessa natura, ma perché creato da Dio a (...) sua immagine e somiglianza. Tuttavia, ciò che caratterizza la filosofia occidentale è lo sforzo di spiegare razionalmente il funzionamento dell’universo. In questo modo, anche le spiegazioni mitologiche della realtà rappresentano un tentativo della ragione stessa di spiegare il reale. Il mito religioso, infatti, è una forma di razionalità che mira a spiegare la realtà. Quando diventa epistemica e acquisisce un discorso scientifico, la ragione ritorna a sé stessa e si rende conto che è essa, e non gli dèi, la misura di tutte le cose. In questo modo, prima o poi, sarebbe stata possibile una giustificazione immanente delle realtà umane che avrebbe consentito concezioni secolarizzate della dignità umana e dei diritti umani. (shrink)

This article presents a detailed reading of a passage about open water swimming in Book V of the Odyssey. It aims to elucidate some of the excellences or virtues so that open water swimming contributes to the enjoyment of amateur or loving sport (deporte amador) and to the swimmer’s integral well-being. In Aristotelian terms, the article argues that, in the case of Odysseus, these excellences include practical wisdom (phronesis), magnanimity (megalopsychia) and self-control (enkrateia), in the dual sense of temperance and (...) mastery. It also highlights other virtues such as courage, patience, adaptability to the environment, and piety in the sense of respect for nature. Finally, it discusses how these excellences are important not only for swimming well in open waters, but also for practicing loving sport (deporte amador) as part of the good life. (shrink)

Resumo: O filósofo Bertrand Russell argumentou contra a linha de pensamento, que é geralmente atribuída a Aristóteles, de que a substância é algo que perdura ao longo do tempo. Para Russell, o que há na realidade são séries de particulares estáticos e individualmente distintos ordenados pela relação de sucessão e simultaneidade. Começarei destacando o Paradoxo do Movimento, utilizado por Russell como um dos exemplos para tratar o tempo no viés estático. Zenão de Eléia produz quatro argumentos para sustentar a conclusão (...) paradoxal da inexistência do movimento, são eles: A Dicotomia, Aquiles e a Tartaruga, A Flecha e O Estádio. Além de utilizar o Paradoxo do Movimento, Russell também utiliza a metáfora do projetor para sustentar que as coisas são formadas por uma multiplicidade de particulares estáticos no tempo, ou seja, Russell concorda com Zenão em relação ao tempo estático. Deste modo, na concepção de Russell, há particulares estáticos e em sequência no tempo, igualmente como ocorre com os frames de cada pedaço do rolo de filme. Russell tem a pretensão em anular através da teoria estática do tempo distinções desnecessárias que Aristóteles constrói com os conceitos de substância essenciais e acidentais. (shrink)

El artículo recorta como objeto de estudio el discurso amoroso en la guerrilla de Montoneros a mediados de la década de 1970. Se inscribe en el área de la Historia de las emociones, y emplea como fuente documental a Evita Montonera, prensa oficial del grupo guerrillero entre 1974 y 1979. El texto plantea que la revista moldeó la imagen de un militante capaz de fundir el amor de pareja y el amor familiar con el compromiso político, con el fin de (...) integrar las relaciones sentimentales a las lógicas partidarias. Esta cultura emocional se materializó en varias secciones de la revista, donde se publicaron cartas de guerrilleros y guerrilleras que perdieron a sus parejas en combate, así como notas y testimonios sobre familias montoneras ejemplares. Para la investigación se relevaron los veinticinco números de Evita Montonera, pero el artículo se concentra en el bienio 1975-1976, temporalidad en que las referencias sobre el amor son más recurrentes. El trabajo emplea como metodología principal el análisis del discurso, pero trata de plantear algunas hipótesis sobre la experiencia de los mandatos emocionales entre los militantes. (shrink)

In this work the social intuitionism defended by Jonathan Haidt is explored and compared with the dual reasoning theory (TDR), this theory belongs to a family of proposals that maintain that there is a duality in the field of the mental. On the one hand, social intuitionism has argued that it receives support from TDR, on the other hand, TDR has pointed out similarities with social intuitionism; despite the mutual references mentioned, an analysis of what the precise relationship between these (...) projects could be has not been carried out. This work is an attempt to carry out such analysis, in which it is argued that a) it is not clear that the division of social intuitionism between reasoning, intuition, and emotion is equivalent to that of the defenders of TDR; b) social intuitionism has certain differences both with the default-interventionist version and with the parallel version of the TDR; and, finally, c) it is not evident that social intuitionism is an extension of a TDR to the field of moral judgment. It is necessary to carry out more studies that delve into the different elements of social intuitionism and TDR, in order to understand how human beings make judgments and decisions, either within the scope of morality or outside it. (shrink)

Octavio Paz conceives of authentic philosophical reflection as ‘thinking a la intemperie’. This conception involves his idea that our contemporary historical and philosophical situation is one of intemperie espiritual. Based on the dual sense of the term intemperie for Paz, I propose that ‘thinking a la intemperie’ means: (i) Exposing our beliefs to the weathering effects of our vital, concrete experience; and (ii) apprehending reality in communion with others through poetic experience of the ever-flowing present. That is, authentic philosophical reflection (...) means making our home thinking and living without rigid, stifling ideological systems, in communion with our neighbors and with our places, here and now, in the unity of present place and present time that we create together. This mode of reflection belongs within a broad American tradition of philosophizing and, for Paz, responds to concerns compatible with those of the pragmatists. (shrink)