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On being justified in ones head
In Rationality and the Good. New York, US: Oxford University Press. pp. 106--122 (2007)
Abstract
Audi explains what he means by ‘normative’ in the case of belief: cognitive (epistemic) normativity is a matter of what ought to be believed, where the force of the “ought” is in part to attribute liability to criticism and negative (disapproving) attitudes toward the person(s) in questionAuthor's Profile
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Citations of this work
The legend of the justified true belief analysis.Julien Dutant - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):95-145.
Williamson on Gettier Cases and Epistemic Logic.Stewart Cohen & Juan Comesaña - 2013 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 56 (1):15-29.
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