Abstract

Like many recent works in legal theory, especially those focusing on the apparently conflicting schools of legal positivism and natural law, Waluchow’s Inclusive Legal Positivism begins by admitting a degree of perplexity about the field; indeed, he suggests that the field has fallen into “chaos”. Disturbingly, those working within legal theory appear most uncertain about what the tasks of their field are. Legal philosophers often seem to suspect strongly that at least their colleagues in the field are confused about those tasks. As a result, many recent books in legal theory are in large part exercises in legal metatheory, devoting many pages to attempts to define the purposes and goals of the field. Waluchow follows this trend and begins by expressing a desire to clarify the issues that separate those trying to give an account of the nature of law. His ultimate goal is to defend a version of legal positivism, inclusive legal positivism, that he thinks is at least implicit in H. L. A. Hart’s work.