Rescuing Inclusive Legal Positivism from the Charge of Inconsistency

Abstract

Scott Shapiro, an exclusive legal positivist, argues that inclusive legal positivism is inconsistent with the view that legal norms must conceptually provide reasons for agents of a legal system to act in specified ways. I defend inclusive legal positivism from Shapiro's charge of inconsistency.

Categories

Keywords

Reprint years

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

  • Only published works are available at libraries.

My notes

Similar books and articles

Inclusive legal positivism, legal interpretation, and value-judgments.Vittorio Villa - 2009 - Ratio Juris 22 (1):110-127.
Competing Legal Positivisms, Methodology and Distinctive Visions of Law.Brian H. Bix - 2024 - In Thomas Bustamante, Saulo de Matos & André L. S. Coelho, Law, Morality and Judicial Reasoning: Essays on W.J. Waluchow's Jurisprudence and Constitutional Theory. Cham, Switzerland: Springer. pp. 93-105.
The Inner Logic of Exclusivism (and Inclusivism): Shapiro's Shadowing.Mark Mcbride - 2019 - Ratio Juris 32 (3):363-389.
Charter Challenges: A Test Case For Theories of Law.Wilfrid J. Waluchow - 1991 - Osgoode Hall Law Journal 29 (1):183-214.
Inclusive Legal Positivism and the Fallibility of Officials.Kenneth M. Ehrenberg - 2024 - In Thomas Bustamante, Saulo de Matos & André L. S. Coelho, Law, Morality and Judicial Reasoning: Essays on W.J. Waluchow's Jurisprudence and Constitutional Theory. Cham, Switzerland: Springer. pp. 23-40.
The Model of Plans and the Prospects for Positivism.Scott Hershovitz - 2014 - Ethics 125 (1):152-181.
Some Reflections on the Ideal Dimension of Law and on the Legal Philosophy of John Finnis.Robert Alexy - 2013 - American Journal of Jurisprudence 58 (2):97-110.
Scott J Shapiro between Positivism and Non-Positivism.Robert Alexy - 2016 - Jurisprudence 7 (2):299-306.
The origins of inclusive legal positivism.W. J. Waluchow - 2021 - In Torben Spaak, The Cambridge Companion to Legal Positivism. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
Bringing Hart and Raz to the Table: Coleman's Compatibility Thesis.Kenneth Einar Himma - 2001 - Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 21 (4):609-627.

Analytics

Added to PP
2022-07-03

Downloads
41 (#1,355,376)

6 months
1 (#2,184,524)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

The Concept of Law.Hla Hart - 2012 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press UK. Edited by Joseph Raz & Penelope A. Bulloch.
Internal and External Reasons.Bernard Williams - 1979 - In Ross Harrison, Rational action: studies in philosophy and social science. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 17–28.
Two concepts of rules.John Rawls - 1955 - Philosophical Review 64 (1):3-32.
Authority, Law and Morality.Joseph Raz - 1985 - The Monist 68 (3):295-324.
What practical reasoning must be if we act for our own reasons.Sarah Buss - 1999 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (4):399 – 421.

View all 10 references / Add more references