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Reply to Eaton and Pickavance
Philosophical Studies 173 (12):3231-3233 (2016)
Abstract
David Eaton and Timothy Pickavance argued that interest-relative invariantism has a surprising and interesting consequence. They take this consequence to be so implausible that it refutes interest-relative invariantism. But in fact it is a consequence that any theory of knowledge that has the resources to explain familiar puzzles must have.Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
Defeaters as Indicators of Ignorance.Clayton Litlejohn & Julien Dutant - 2021 - In Jessica Brown & Mona Simion, Reasons, Justification, and Defeat. Oxford Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 223–246.
References found in this work
Evidence against pragmatic encroachment.Daniel Eaton & Timothy Pickavance - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (12):3135-3143.
Probability and scepticism.Brian Weatherson - 2013 - In Dylan Dodd & Elia Zardini, Scepticism and Perceptual Justification. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 71-86.
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