Interest‐Relative Invariantism versus Contextualism

In Knowledge and Practical Interests. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press (2005)
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Abstract

This chapter is devoted to a thorough-going comparison of Interest-Relativism Invariantism and contextualism. It argues that the contextualist is committed to a worse error-theory than the advocate of Interest-Relativism Invariantism. It concludes by arguing that neither contextualism nor Interest-Relative Invariantism helps with the problem of skepticism.

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Jason Stanley
University of Toronto, St. George Campus

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