Why Intuitionistic Relevant Logic Cannot Be a Core Logic

Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 58 (2):241-248 (2017)
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Abstract

At the end of the 1980s, Tennant invented a logical system that he called “intuitionistic relevant logic”. Now he calls this same system “Core logic.” In Section 1, by reference to the rules of natural deduction for $\mathbf{IR}$, I explain why $\mathbf{IR}$ is a relevant logic in a subtle way. Sections 2, 3, and 4 give three reasons to assert that $\mathbf{IR}$ cannot be a core logic.

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Vidal-Rosset Joseph
Université de Lorraine

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References found in this work

[Omnibus Review].Dag Prawitz - 1991 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 56 (3):1094-1096.
Ultimate Normal Forms for Parallelized Natural Deductions.Neil Tennant - 2002 - Logic Journal of the IGPL 10 (3):299-337.
Relevance in Reasoning.Neil Tennant - 2005 - In Stewart Shapiro, Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.

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