Abstract

Jean-Paul Sartre is often portrayed as a philosopher whose ethics would inevitably have subjectivist or relativist outcomes. Yet, even in Sartre’s early works there are several stances that blatantly belie this image, relying rather on an objectivist conception of value that he notably draws from Max Scheler. The aim of this paper is thus to investigate the influence of Scheler’s moral reflection on Sartre, arguing how it can represent an original and fruitful starting point to approach Sartrean ethics. To this aim, we will first report on and discuss some passages from Sartre’s early works where this debt is most noticeable. Then, we will provide an overview of the Schelerean legacy, arguing how it represents for Sartre the very opening of the ethical issue addressable in phenomenological terms, avoiding the dead end of Hume’s and Kant’s more classical positions, while at the same time being consistent with other peculiar themes of Sartrean philosophy, namely existence and historicity.