Everyday life is increasingly restructured by algorithms that participate, not only as medium, but also as partners, co-creators, mentors, and figures of authority, in our affective and creative experiences. Their agentic capacity is enabled by big data capitalism as well as through the newly acquired ability to generate meaning (text) and visuals (images, videos, holograms). AI technology engages with aspects of existence that constitute the core of what it means to be human. Promising transcendence of existential givens it induces (...) an illusory sense of safety, as it brings us even closer to a confrontation with constitutive ontological complexities. For instance, AI technology commits to a transcendence of mortality, luring humans to envision the possibility of “digital resurrection” and of acquiring immortality via a merger with machines. Seduced by the seeming omnipotence manufactured for us in the digital world, which molds itself to our wishes, we end up questioning not only our agency and freedom but the very fact of being alive. In addition, in the current epidemic of loneliness, in which inter-human connections are thinning out and our reliance on chatbots for friendship, care, and romance increases, humanity is confronted with the state of fundamental isolation and the desire for intimacy and community. This article meditates on AI technology’s tendency to colonize aspects of life that are at the core of humanity, namely meaning, freedom, death, and intimacy, as well as on the societal risks associated with fundamentally altering our understanding of these matters. (shrink)

This article develops a relational ontology centered on the concept of belonging as the fundamental condition of human existence. Building on the Philosophy of Belonging proposed by Carlos Federico Obregón Díaz, the work integrates philosophy, neuroscience, psychology, and social theory to reinterpret temporality, narrative consciousness, and existential meaning. The paper distinguishes between synchronic time (cyclical, stabilizing) and diachronic time (irreversible, finite) and argues that human existence is best understood not as isolated being-toward-death, but as belonging-in-time. Contrary to classical (...) existentialism,_toggle anguish and finitude as primary ontological categories, the article proposes that existential anxiety emerges mainly from disruptions in affective, social, and existential belonging. The study reconstructs the architecture of belonging through three interconnected pathways: affective belonging (love and attachment), social belonging (institutions, norms, and recognition), and existential belonging (nature, cosmos, spirituality, and meaning). It further develops the ethical and political implications of an ontology of belonging, particularly through the notion of the art of living and the construction of just institutions of belonging. By offering an interdisciplinary and scientifically grounded framework, the article contributes to contemporary debates in philosophical anthropology, existential ontology, recognition theory, and the ethics of relational life, positioning belonging as the ontological foundation of meaningful human existence. (shrink)

Sceptics about substantial disputes in ontology often argue that when two philosophers seem to disagree on a quantified claim, they are actually equivocating on the notion of existence that they are using. When temporal elements play a central role, as in the debate between presentists and eternalists, the hypothesis of an equivocation with respect to existence acquires more plausibility. However, the anti-sceptic can still argue that this hypothesis is unjustified.

This article examines the evolution of the concept of existence in modern visual representation and reasoning, highlighting important milestones. In the late eighteenth century, during the so-called golden age of visual reasoning, nominalism reigned supreme and there was limited scope for existential import or individuals in logic diagrams. By the late nineteenth century, a form of realism had taken hold, whose existential commitments continue to dominate many areas in logic and visual reasoning to this day. Physical, metaphysical, epistemological, and (...) linguistic positions underlie both nominalist and realist views. Since the paradigmatic works on visual reasoning in the 1990s, formal diagram systems have been developed that revive either the nominalist or realist perspectives. Unlike in the nineteenth century, these are not motivated by philosophical views. Nevertheless, they may still have an impact on many areas of philosophy and science outside logic. (shrink)

This essay explores how L iu Zhi 劉智, a Qing 清 dynasty Chinese Muslim thinker who used the language of Neo-Confucianism to write Islamic philosophy, navigated the fundamental incommensurability between the ontological frameworks of these two traditions. After a brief comparative account of the role of key terms like existence (wujūd) and substance (_shi_ 實) in Islamic and Confucian thought, this essay goes on to analyze modality and the function of principle (_li_ 理) in L iu Zhi’s work, particularly (...) his Chinese translation of the Sūfī text _Lawāʾiḥ_ by Jāmī, to argue that his thinking has inherited certain key formulations from the Neo-Confucian tradition. As a result, he resists the essence-existence distinction in favour of positing the metaphysical as a set of moral and physical laws governing interactions in complex states of affairs. (shrink)

Perspectivity, i.e., the fact that human beings are bound to their point of view in their knowledge and action, is a prominent motif in modern thought. This study puts forth two proposals. First, it argues that perspectivity is not limited to our perception and knowledge but extends to and is grounded in the ways we live (or exist). Second, the study draws on the fact that Patočka's account of existence emphasizes its inner multiplicity and suggests that this multiplicity can (...) be understood as a plurality of points of view. In conclusion, some objections to this reading of Patočka that frames perspectivity as a fundamental feature of his concept of existence are discussed. (shrink)

This paper proposes a structural and stratified ontology grounded in the distinction between existence and being. Against both classical substance metaphysics and contemporary metaphys- ical deflationism, we argue that reality is not constituted by entities but by fields of actualization structured by constraints. We introduce a framework in which ontological differentiation emerges through dynamic processes of stabilization, without presupposing a metric or object-based sub- stratum. The paper articulates three key levels, pure existence, admissible tension-resolving structures, and individuated configurations, (...) and develops a logic of actualization based on this stratification. Drawing on insights from quantum theory, modal logic, and metaphysical struc- turalism, we show how this model accounts for indeterminacy, emergence, and plural ontological commitments within a unified theoretical architecture. The result is a conservative but non- reductive ontology, compatible with scientific realism and modal structuralism, while avoiding ontological inflation and empirical reification. (shrink)

This article examines Oyowe’s highly distinctive socio-ontological account of ancestral existence. According to Oyowe, ancestors are intentional objects. Ancestors thus constitute a social kind and are ontologically distinct from natural kinds. The article critiques and rejects Oyowe’s distinction between social and natural kinds. The article then goes on to outline a possible alternative approach that draws on quasi-materialist and pan-psychic metaphysics to argue that ancestors exist as a natural kind—more specifically, ancestral existence consists in the this-worldly survival of (...) the mentalistic aspects of a human person’s biological death. Throughout, the article is concerned with the rationality of belief in ancestral existence rather than with their de facto existence as such. (shrink)

In the multi-faceted trajectory of post-Kantian thought, Schelling—both the person and his philosophy—has always been a controversial figure. Popular historical accounts focus on his precocious interventions as part of the ‘Jena set’, initially building on Fichte's philosophy of the ‘I’, but quickly coming to challenge his predecessor's philosophical dominance. In the crucial period of the late 1790s, Schelling's most notable intervention was to develop a philosophy of nature alongside the Kantian and Fichtean theories of transcendental subjectivity, which caught the attention (...) of Goethe and led to his appointment, at the age of twenty-three, as professor of philosophy at the University of Jena. But Schelling's life and philosophical work continued well beyond this well-documented period, culminating in a late system in which he developed key ideas surrounding freedom, existence, modality and the history of human consciousness that all revolved around a distinction between what he called negative and positive philosophy. This distinction, and his insistence on the need for the development of the latter mode of philosophy, came to challenge some of the core assumptions of the largely rationalist German idealist project and it remains, to this day, perhaps the most powerful alternative to the Hegelian system that rose to dominance already within Schelling's own lifetime, but also well beyond it. (shrink)

This article examines Oyowe’s highly distinctive socio-ontological account of ancestral existence. According to Oyowe, ancestors are intentional objects. Ancestors thus constitute a social kind and are ontologically distinct from natural kinds. The article critiques and rejects Oyowe’s distinction between social and natural kinds. The article then goes on to outline a possible alternative approach that draws on quasi-materialist and pan-psychic metaphysics to argue that ancestors exist as a natural kind—more specifically, ancestral existence consists in the this-worldly survival of (...) the mentalistic aspects of a human person’s biological death. Throughout, the article is concerned with the rationality of belief in ancestral existence rather than with their de facto existence as such. (shrink)

Jan Narveson has articulated a deeply held, widely shared intuition regarding what moral law has to say about bringing additional people into existence: while we are “in favour of making people happy,” we are “neutral about making happy people.” Various formulations of the Narvesonian intuition (closely related to the person-affecting intuition or restriction) have been widely criticized. This present paper outlines an off-the-beaten-path alternate construction of the intuition—the existence condition—and argues that that particular construction has the resources to (...) avoid some of those criticisms. But still other considerably more widely recognized alternate constructions have been offered as well. Thus John Broome outlines what he calls the neutrality intuition. While Broome finds the underlying intuition “strongly attractive,” he nonetheless argues that the neutrality intuition itself leads us quickly into inconsistency. Wlodek Rabinowicz disagrees. On his view, Broome’s inconsistency argument shows, not that the neutrality intuition is false, but rather that it doesn’t follow, from the fact that the outcome, or possible future or world, that includes the additional person is neither better nor worse than the (otherwise similar) world that excludes that person, that the one world is exactly as good as the other. The better view, according to Rabinowicz, is that, on occasion, and specifically when the coming into existence of additional people is at stake, the one world is incommensurate with the other. What is called the principle of trichotomy is, in other words, false. Difficulties arise, however, when we try to reject that seemingly compelling conceptual principle. This present paper concludes with the argument that the availability of the existence condition—which, together with certain other uncontroversial moral principles and a handful of conceptual principles, forms the existential approach—shows that we can maintain the most intuitive parts of neutrality intuition while avoiding both Broome’s inconsistency worry and Rabinowicz’s commitment to incommensurability. Incommensurability may be correct on other grounds—but not, this present paper argues, on the grounds provided by Broome’s inconsistency argument. (shrink)

Existence comparativism holds that it can sometimes be better or worse, for a given person, that that person exist rather than not. The dominant argument in the literature on this issue is the Metaphysical Argument, which purports to show that existence comparativism is metaphysically incoherent. The argument of this chapter is that the Metaphysical Argument fails. Even if existence cannot be personally better than non-existence, the Metaphysical Argument cannot be the reason for this, since the argument (...) proves too much. Denying its first premise means holding that personal betterness comparisons between a fixed pair of possible worlds are contingent; some recent work has taken this course. Denying the second premise means holding that A can be better for S than B even when S does not exist. This chapter presents the case for denying the second premise. Contrary to something of a consensus in the literature, this is not absurd in general metaphysical terms. And there is a particular analysis of personal betterness comparisons that explains in more detail how one outcome can be better than another for an individual who does not exist. The chapter therefore concludes that existence comparativism, whether true or false, is metaphysically coherent. (shrink)

Richard Swinburne presents a substantially rewritten and updated edition of his most celebrated book. No other work has made a more powerful case for the probability of the existence of God. Swinburne gives a rigorous and penetrating analysis of the most important arguments for theism: the cosmological argument; arguments from the existence of laws of nature and the 'fine-tuning' of the universe; from the occurrence of consciousness and moral awareness; and from miracles and religious experience. He claims that (...) while none of these arguments are deductively valid, they do give inductive support to theism and that, even when the argument from evil is weighed against them, taken together they offer good grounds to support the probability that there is a God. The overall structure of the discussion and its conclusion have been retained for this new edition, but much has been changed in order to strengthen the argumentation and to take account of Swinburne's subsequent work on the nature of consciousness and the problem of evil, and of the latest philosophical and scientific writing, especially in respect of the laws of nature and the argument from fine-tuning. This is now the definitive version of a classic in the philosophy of religion. (shrink)

Humanely raised farm animals have lives worth living, and their existence is contingent upon human actions. Do these facts render the act of humanely slaughtering such animals permissible? I identify two ethical principles that may seem to connect these facts to the permissibility of humane animal slaughter. The first principle, inspired by the non-identity problem, exonerates some actions that maximize an individual’s well-being, but it is often inapplicable to animal slaughter. The second principle, which exonerates actions that are part (...) of a practice that makes the animal better off, does apply to animal slaughter; but this principle is false. (shrink)

The author explores whether Spinoza can consistently maintain two doctrines which he espouses in his Ethics. The first doctrine is the equivalence between perfection, reality, being, and essence. The second doctrine is the Metaphysical Difference between that in which essence and existence are identical (God) and those things for which essence and existence are distinct (everything but God). The article is structured as follows. First, the author shows that these two key doctrines apparently clash. Second, she shows two (...) ways in which this clash can be avoided. The first way consists in drawing a line between mere being and existence. This reading of Spinoza has sometimes been called “Platonist” in the secondary literature. The second way consists in denying that the Metaphysical Difference cuts reality at its joints. Instead, the Metaphysical Difference, on this reading, differentiates between appearances (those things in which essence and existence come apart) and reality (that thing in which they are one). This reading of Spinoza has sometimes been called Eleatic in the secondary literature. The author concludes by suggesting that, if the Spinozist rejects both the Eleatic and the Platonist approach, she is obliged to find another way to salvage her system. (shrink)

In Chap. 8 we saw that two basic kinds of quantification were natural in first-order modal logics: possibilist and actualist. Possibilist quantifiers range over what might exist. This corresponds semantically to constant domain models where the common domain is, intuitively, the set of things that could exist. We also saw that in the possibilist approach we could introduce an existence primitive (Sect. 8.9) and relativize quantifiers to it, permitting the possibilist approach to paraphrase the actualist version.

It seems obvious that I could have failed to exist. My parents could easily never have met, in which case I should never have been conceived and born. The like applies to everyone. More generally, it seems plausible that whatever exists in space and time could have failed to exist. Events could have taken an utterly different course. Our existence, like most other aspects of our lives, appears frighteningly contingent. It is therefore surprising that there is a proof of (...) my necessary existence, a proof that generalizes to everything whatsoever. I will explain the proof and discuss what to make of it. A first reaction is that a ‘proof’ of such an outrageous conclusion must contain some dreadful fallacy. Yet the proof does not collapse under scrutiny. Further reflection suggests that, suitably interpreted, it may be sound. So interpreted, the conclusion is not outrageous, although it may not be the view you first thought of. (shrink)

This paper has a negative and a positive claim. The negative claim is that the Frege-Russell account of existence as a higher-order predicate is mistaken and should be abandoned, even with respect to general statements of existence such as “Flying mammals exist” (where statements of this sort are supposed to be best accommodated by the account). The Frege-Russell view seems to be supported by two ideas. First, the idea that existence is entirely expressed by the existential quantifier (...) of standard predicate logic. Second, the idea that the existential quantifier is a higher-order predicate, a predicate of predicates, not of individuals. I think that both ideas are wrong but will focus on the latter. By construing prima facie first-order statements such as “Flying Mammals exist” as higher-order predications such as “The Fregean Concept Flying Mammal maps at least one individual onto the True”, the Frege-Russell view commits one - merely on the basis of the meaning it assigns to the existence predicate – to abstract objects such as concepts (Gottlob Frege), or propositional functions (Bertrand Russell), or classes (Rudolf Carnap), or properties, kinds, and so on. This cannot be right, I think. The positive claim of the present paper is that, at least in the context of first-order discourse, the existence predicate is just what it seems to be: a bona fide first-order predicate (pace Kant, Hume, Frege, Russell and others). Three important ideas about existence are shared with the Frege-Russell conception of existence, though. (1) Being and existence are one and the same thing: there is no difference between “Unicorns are not”, or “There are no unicorns”, and “Unicorns do not exist”, or “There exist no unicorns”. (2) To be is to be the value of a bound variable, to belong to a domain of quantification (Willard Quine). (3) Anti-Meinongianism, the idea that there are no non-existent objects (Russell). However, we diverge from the Frege-Russell tradition with respect to the following claim. (4) The best concept of existence, in the sense of the one that is best understood and best enables us to formulate ontological disputes, is a purely logical first-level concept defined in terms of existential quantification and identity. First-order statements of existence and non-existence like “Flying Mammals exist” and “Unicorns do not exist” are accordingly taken at face value and analyzed in terms of a logical first-order predicate of existence, the predicate “is (identical to) something”. Reasons are given to prefer this notion of existence to other first-order non-logical notions that have been proposed in the literature, notions characterized in terms of predicates such as “is in space-time”, “is concrete”, “is causally efficacious”, “is actual”, “is real”, etc. (shrink)

This book is both an introduction to and a research work on Meinongianism. “Meinongianism” is taken here, in accordance with the common philosophical jargon, as a general label for a set of theories of existence – probably the most basic notion of ontology. As an introduction, the book provides the first comprehensive survey and guide to Meinongianism and non-standard theories of existence in all their main forms. As a research work, the book exposes and develops the most up-to-date (...) Meinongian theory (called modal Meinongianism), applies it to specific fields, and discusses its open problems. Part I of the book provides a historical introduction to, and critical discussion of, the dominant philosophical view of existence: the “Kantian-Fregean-Quinean” perspective. Part II is the full-fledged introduction to the Meinongian theories of existence as a real property of individuals: after starting with the so-called naïve Meinongian conception and its problems, it provides a self-contained presentation of the main neo-Meinongian proposals, and a detailed discussion of their strengths and weaknesses. Part III develops a specific neo-Meinongian theory of existence employing a model-theoretic semantic framework. It discusses its application to the ontology and semantics of fictional objects, and its open problems. The methodology of the book follows the most recent trends in analytic ontology. In particular, the meta-ontological point of view is largely privileged. (shrink)

This paper critically examines the conceptual and ethical challenges in framing human-animal relationships through the lens of rights and justice. Arguing that both "human" and "animal" lack universal, non-reductive definitions, the paper interrogates the viability of animal rights frameworks, highlighting parallels with the limitations of human rights. It traces religious and philosophical perspectives that cast animals as a "quasi-self" in relation to humans, underscoring how anthropocentric paradigms shape both empathy and dominance. Through a biopolitical analysis inspired by Agamben’s Homo Sacer (...) and State of Exception, this study critiques contemporary approaches, including utilitarianism, capabilities theory, and speciesism, for failing to address systemic inequities underpinning human-animal dynamics. Examining practices such as domestication, companionship, and industrial exploitation, the paper situates these relationships within the broader ethics of capitalism and commodification. It concludes by reimagining the human-animal relationship as a negotiation of existence that resists universalizing categories, advocating for ethical frameworks grounded in lived experience and relationality over abstract rights discourse. (shrink)

According to many, necessary existence either is or follows from a perfection. There is something to this. Part of what makes or follows from something’s being impressive is its ontological durability: it has a strong grip on existence. But a necessarily existent being does not just have a strong grip on existence, but a grip that cannot be loosened! So it looks like necessary existence either is, or follows from, a perfection. In this paper, I argue (...) otherwise and so argue that necessary existence neither is, nor follows from, a perfection. And if this is so, then not only is the relationship between necessary existence and perfection not what many take it to be, but work on God (or a good deal of it) needs to be reconceived. (shrink)

This article examines the concepts of existence and knowledge as developed by the Islamic thinker Al-Ghazali (d. 1111). Al-Ghazali’s metaphysical framework is built upon the distinction between necessary and contingent existence, positioning God as the necessary being while categorizing all created beings as contingent. He elaborated on the hierarchical structure of existence and used this classification as a foundational reference in interpreting religious texts. In terms of epistemology, Al-Ghazali adopted a balanced approach between intuition (kashf) and reason. (...) At the core of his epistemology lies the concept of ma’rifatullah, or the knowledge of God. Al-Ghazali maintained that there is no conflict between science and religion, advocating for the correct interpretation of religious texts to ensure harmony with established scientific facts. This study analyzes Al-Ghazali’s perspectives on existence and knowledge within the framework of classical Islamic thought and contemporary debates. His approaches provide significant references in the fields of metaphysics and epistemology while offering a reconciliatory perspective on the relationship between religion and science. Ultimately, Al-Ghazali’s views establish a theoretical foundation capable of bridging diverse disciplines concerning concepts of knowledge and existence. (shrink)

To try to reveal, in a short essay, the various facets of limit-situations and their consequences for human existence is a misplaced idea. Instead, we intend to explore, based on some indications provided by Karl Jaspers, some moments that constitute them. We chose to approach the theme from five perspectives: the limit, the meaning, the nothingness, the suffering and the finitude. In suffering, we will undertake a brief textual critique of passages from two central works by Karl Jaspers: Psychologie (...) der Weltanschauungen, from 1919, and Philosophie, from 1932. In doing this, we will be able to notice a change in the way suffering is presented. Although subtle, this change leads us not only to specify the role of limit-situations in the Jaspersian philosophy of existence, but also to uncover a tension between limit-situations and experiences linked with them. (shrink)

The philosophical contemplation of “first philosophy” is as old as Western philosophy itself, and yet “first philosophy” is often eschewed in contemporary philosophical thought. This is because attempts at arriving at a first philosophy have often been steeped in metaphysical thinking that aims at non-finite foundations as the constitutive ground of human reality. However, in our contemporary world in which metaphysical postulates render themselves increasingly outmoded and immaterial, can we still speak of first philosophy today? This is to ask whether (...) or not it may be possible to formulate a first philosophy based on strictly finite principles. This article seeks to demonstrate that the concept of finite “existence” can be read as first philosophy in the contemporary thought of Jean-Luc Nancy (1940–2021). Firstly, a conceptual analysis on the concepts of “being” and “existence” will be carried out with the express purpose of trying to ascertain the meaningful difference between these two concepts in Nancy’s thought, if indeed such a difference exists at all. From this conceptual analysis, it will be demonstrated that Nancy consistently and effectively elevates the concept of finite existence to philosophical primacy above that of non-finite being and, as a result, brings to light the possibility of (re)thinking existence as first philosophy in Nancy’s thought. (shrink)

This paper argues that Kierkegaard uses “spatiation”—a typographical mode of emphasis—to conceptualise human existence and simultaneously call into question the givenness or stability of a concept of existence. In Concluding Unscientific Postscript, spatiation serves as a potent visual of the problem of existence. By conceptualising existence as spatiating, Climacus at once emphasises and dissolves his concept to encourage thinking about what it means to exist without resolving the difficulties of actual existence. While largely overlooked in (...) Kierkegaard scholarship, taking into account spatiation thus offers insights into Kierkegaard’s influential foregrounding of existence and his existentially oriented approach to philosophising that seeks to engage his readers as existing and embodied individuals. (shrink)

This article reconstructs and defends Husserl's argument for the indubitability of the existence of the world as grounded in ultimate principles. Responding to criticisms about the feasibility of a Husserlian‐informed metaphysical cosmology, it offers a systematic account that explores the question of the world's existence at three distinct levels (factual‐empirical, eidetic, and transcendental), leading to a threefold characterization of the world. First, the obviousness of the world's existence serves as our point of departure. The analysis then moves (...) from a conception of the world as (i) an ontic factum and pregiven ground of all theoretical and practical endeavors in the natural attitude, to a priori ontological considerations of (ii) the essence of “world in general.” However, the insufficiency of both factual‐empirical and a priori investigations necessitates a further displacement of the analysis into the transcendental field of pure phenomena. In accordance with the fundamental principle of synthesis, the world is thus reconceived of as (iii) a phenomenological factum. In this context, the clarification of the existence of the world as both an irrational and a “rational” fact provides all the elements necessary to demonstrate the relative apodicticity and empirical indubitability of the world. This justifies our doxic certainty of the world's existence. (shrink)

On the one hand, according to Meinongianism, there are two types of objects: those that exist and those that do not (which subsist). Moreover, among the objects that subsist, there is a special class of entities that are ‘beyond being’ (Nichtsein), such as impossible objects and fictional objects. On the other hand, according to necessitism, there are two types of objects: those that S-exist and those that L-exist. Furthermore, there is a third category of objects that do not L-exist, as (...) their intended terms fail to refer—such as impossible objects and fictional objects.In this discussion, I will argue that the dispute between the Meinongianist and the Necessitist regarding the significance of existence is merely verbal and that both frameworks ultimately endorse a three-category ontology. (shrink)

Natural languages generally distinguishes among different existence predicates for different types of entities, such as English 'exist', 'occur', and 'obtain'. The paper gives an in-depth discussion and analysis of a range of existence predicates in natural language within the general project of descriptive metaphysics, or more specifically ‘natural language ontology’.

The second volume in a trilogy advancing a systematic philosophical theology, this book explores the realities of human existence articulated by religion. Religion, writes Robert Cummings Neville, articulates existential predicaments and provides venues for ecstatic fulfillment. Like its companion volumes treating ultimacy and religion, Existence advances a systematic philosophical theology to address first-order questions found in the array of Axial Age religions. Issues arising in the major religious traditions are explored through a complex array of philosophical approaches. This (...) second volume shows religion to be the engagement of ultimate realities common to all human beings. Neville finds five problematics relative to ultimate boundary conditions of the human world: the contingency of existence, living under obligation, the quest for wholeness, engagement with others, and the meaning or value in life. Common to all human beings and hence “religion,” the engagement with realities is also historically and culturally bound, becoming simultaneously socially constructed “religions.” Readers will find Neville’s philosophical theology both bold and enlightening, running counter to dominant intellectual trends while richly informed by a long and fruitful engagement with theology, philosophy, and religion, East and West. Robert Cummings Neville is Professor of Philosophy, Religion, and Theology and Dean Emeritus of the School of Theology at Boston University. He is the author of many books, including Realism in Religion: A Pragmatist’s Perspective; Ritual and Deference: Extending Chinese Philosophy in a Comparative Context; and Ultimates: Philosophical Theology, Volume One, all published by SUNY Press. (shrink)

In ‘Geschlecht: Sexual Difference, Ontological Difference’, Derrida develops a reading of Heidegger’s ‘neutral’ term ‘Dasein’ that highlights its openness to a conception of sexual difference that is not yet binary. I explore this theme in relation to two further lines of thought. The first draws Heidegger’s remarks on Dasein’s factually concrete existence into correspondence with the European humanist tradition and the implications this reveals concerning a still binary determination of sex difference in Heidegger’s conception of existence in its (...) sexual being. The second engages with Derrida’s own affirmation of a beyond binary conception of existence in its sexual being, a conception elaborated in this article in terms of singular sexual styles that are strictly irreducible to the organic bodily characteristics and behaviour of a living human being. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:364 BOOK REVIEWS opening of natural law into the Christian economy of salvation for which May argues. It should be noted that May displays an admirable openness to further development along these lines with his appreciation of some of the questions raised by Aurelio Ansaldo (see pp. 97-98, n. 135). In spite of some limitations, this is a significant work well-deserving of consideration by any student of moral theology. (...) It highlights the ongoing contribution of an authentic and well-grounded Thomism to current efforts toward the renewal of moral theology-a contribution also recommended by the Second Vatican Council (cf. Optatum Totius, n.16). The Catholic University of America Washington, D.C. JOHN S. GRABOWSKI From Existence to God; A Contemporary Philosophical Argument. By BARRY MILLER. London and New York: Routledge, 1992. Pp. x +206. $42.50 (cloth). Can the existence of God be proved from the existence of any con· crete individual thing? Many religious thinkers-theists as well as atheists-might regard this as a vain project. The criticisms of Hume and Kant, as well as a certain suspicion of the validity of the principles of sufficient reason and intelligibility, appear to have demolished all grounds for such an argument. Many find no contradiction in affirming the existence of the whole universe while denying the existence of God. Barry Miller, on the contrary, does find a contradiction in affirming the existence of even one concrete individual unless the existence of God is also affirmed. His book is a sustained and intriguing attempt to show that contradiction. His argument is based not on the principles of sufficient reason or intelligibility, but strictly on the principle of non· contradiction (172-4). The concrete individual which serves as his starting point and remains his faithful companion throughout the book is a particular existing dog named " Fido," and the way to the existence of God begins with the simple question: " How ever can it be that Fido does exist? " Miller's first task is to establish that his question is not gratuitous by showing that Fido's existence is not a " brute fact" requiring no explanation. The argument given in chapters two and three shows that Fido's existence is very puzzling indeed, requiring conditions that are "apparently impossible to satisfy" (10). The argument begins with BOOK REVIEWS 365 the Fregean position that ontological categories are to he assigned in accordance with linguistic categories. (While Miller admits that this Fregean view is not the only legitimate one, he does not think that this limits the effectiveness of his argument [10, 87-88.]) Since the name "Fido" in the linguistic expression " Fido exists " is a complete expression, while the predicate " exists " is not (15, 23), Fido's existence is understood as " exemplifying two ontological categories, viz., a complete entity (Fido) and an incomplete entity (Fido's existence)" (Prop. 1.1, p. 10). It is then argued that "Fido's existing must he constructible conceptually from Fido and his existence" (Prop. 1.2, p. 10). This conceptual construction would he impossible, however, "if Fido were inconceivable except in terms of Fido's existing." The fact is, however, that Fido is inconceivable except in terms of Fido's existing : "Fido could neither he referred to nor conceived of before he existed" (Prop. 1.3, p. 11). Indeed, prior to its existing, "no concrete individual could be conceived of by anyone or in any way " (42). One is thus left with a dilemma that requires one conceptually to construct Fido's existing from Fido and Fido's existence, but prevents one from doing so since Fido is only conceivable in terms of Fido's existing. In chapter four and its appendix, Miller presents detailed arguments in response to C. J. F. Williams, B. Russell, W. V. Quine, and others to show that existence is a real property. He then goes on in chapter five to review the dilemma and to offer his solution. Fido's existing must he conceptually constructible from two ontological categories, "Fido" and "Fido's existence." But "Fido's existing" cannot he constructed from them since one of them, "Fido's existence," is not a complete entity and the other one... (shrink)

In ‘Geschlecht: Sexual Difference, Ontological Difference’, Derrida develops a reading of Heidegger’s ‘neutral’ term ‘Dasein’ that highlights its openness to a conception of sexual difference that is not yet binary. I explore this theme in relation to two further lines of thought. The first draws Heidegger’s remarks on Dasein’s factually concrete existence into correspondence with the European humanist tradition and the implications this reveals concerning a still binary determination of sex difference in Heidegger’s conception of existence in its (...) sexual being. The second engages with Derrida’s own affirmation of a beyond binary conception of existence in its sexual being, a conception elaborated in this article in terms of singular sexual styles that are strictly irreducible to the organic bodily characteristics and behaviour of a living human being. (shrink)

Existence monism is defended against priority monism. Schaffer's arguments for priority monism and against pluralism are reviewed, such as the argument from gunk. The whole does not require parts. Ontological vagueness is impossible. If ordinary objects are in the right ontology then they are vague. So ordinary objects are not included in the right ontology; and hence thought and talk about them cannot be accommodated via fully ontological vindication. Partially ontological vindication is not viable. Semantical theorizing outside the ontology (...) room and semantical theorizing in the doorway. Existence monism is theoretically preferable to priority monism. (shrink)

Antonio Caso rejects the effort of biologists to reduce life to the organic world, a sphere of existence that is defined by economy and egoism, best summarized in the formula: _Life = Minimum Effort_ x _Maximum Gain_. The problem is that this cannot explain what he calls “disinterested activity,” such as play, art, and self-sacrifice. His primary example of disinterested or selfless activity is the life of Jesus, which Caso also believes is the height of human dignity. In other (...) words, Caso not only argues that there is more than one order of life or existence; he also argues that selfless activity is ultimately what distinguishes _human_ life, whose best expression is found in the essence of Christianity: to give oneself to others “without fear of exhaustion.” To be human is to be willing to sacrifice oneself, best expressed in the following formula: _Sacrifice = Maximum Effort_ x _Minimum Gain_. (shrink)

Society is composed of individuals. The practical individual as a social entity is the premise and starting point of history; the individual also depends on society, while society is the foundation for the existence and development of individual.

The article is devoted to the well-known dispute between R. Carnap and W.V.O. Quine on the meaning of statements with names of abstractions, which also revealed their disagreements on the more general question of the nature of the dependence of ontology on the choice of language of knowledge. According to Quine, the choice of language carries with it certain ontological commitments – judgments of existence that must be true for anyone who appropriately uses the language in question. The language (...) of abstractions (using appropriate names and indications) is widely used not only in philosophy and everyday communication, but also in the sciences, including natural sciences. The names of abstractions (or, alternatively, quantification by corresponding entities) cannot be completely excluded from science, as Carnap, in particular, points out. He also considers it wrong to attribute to a scientist with empiricist views the belief in the existence of something that he, as an empiricist, is not ready to consider existing. In his view, the choice of language (framework) does not carry any ontological obligations: it determines what should be the correct answer to the so-called internal questions of the theory but does not affect metaphysical questions. Carnap interprets meaningful statements about abstractions as analytical truths, while Quine believes that most references to abstractions are removable from the language of science, and those that are not removable create additional ontological obligations, which, however, for some reason say nothing about reality itself. But why this is so, if the theory implicating them claims to describe reality, is not clear. This debate about the role of judgments about abstractions in scientific knowledge gave rise to a whole branch of metaphysical and ontological research, best known as metaontology. The main parties in this dispute are realists, who interpret irreducible abstractions as part of reality and denotations of certain names, and anti-realists, who, as a rule, deny the connection of statements with such names with reality, treating them as pseudo-statements or something similar. The solution to the problem, which is proposed in this article, consists in abandoning the belief, widespread both in philosophy and in everyday thought, which can be generally called “The theory of reference” and which consists in the fact that the contribution of names and certain other types of expressions to communication is their denotations. If we assume that names have no denotations at all and their semantic contribution to statements is only their senses or something similar, then the names of abstractions in this respect will be no different from other types of names. In this case, it would be no need to either assume that they designate some “Platonic” entities in order for some statements with them being true, nor interpret these judgments as pseudo-statements or as truths of some special kind that are not related to reality. The interpretation of statements with such names and their evaluation will not pose any special problem for the empiricist with this approach. (shrink)

A phenomenon of death in the interpretation of existential thinking is observed in this scientific article; especially the approaches of M.Heidegger and L.Tolstoy which demonstrate what influence of death perception on the human’s choice of the own modus vivendi is; besides the interdisciplinarity in the sense of the correlation between philosoph-ical and literature points of view was stressed. Key words: true and untrue existence, death, being-to-death, publicity.

What is death? How is it related to the existence of living things? Is it possible for something to continue its existence while dead? In this chapter I will attempt to answer these questions. I will begin by arguing that death is the loss of life. I will then consider whether living things could cease to exist without dying, and whether they could die yet continue existing. Finally, I will discuss some ways my conclusions bear on creatures like (...) you and me. (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss, as carried out by Gaven Kerr, a reconstruction of Aquinas’s argument for the existence of God from his work De Ente et Essentia. My analysis leads to complementing Kerr’s proposal with the following elements: (i) a summarization of the presented argument in a more formal manner; (ii) a specification of the main presuppositions of the Thomistic conception of existence; (iii) a drawing of attention to the fact that the essence–esse composition is a borderline (...) case of the array of potency–act compositions; (iv) a distinguishing of the empirical (connected with the problem of the regress) and speculative (deprived of such a problem) interpretations or versions of Aquinas’s argument; (v) a clarification of what is the Divine exception from the essence–esse composition; (vi) a distinguishing of the three models of participation and a defence of the moderate model. I regard the following two issues to be of key importance for the argument under discussion: the relation between the Aristotelian compositional model and the Platonic model of participation as well as the defence of the Thomistic conception of the essence–esse composition. (shrink)

Este artigo apresenta a visão de existência em Ortega y Gasset. No autor, é possível perceber uma efetiva contribuição à concepção de existência. Para ele, o homem, ao passar a existir, partilha de uma determinada forma de viver e de pensar num dado momento histórico. Em seu livro Meditación de la técnica, Ortega apresenta a vida humana como radical a cada um e construída por pura escolha. Ao decidir viver, o homem vai adaptando a realidade a si, construindo pela imaginação (...) realidades distintas das que estão postas. Isso somente é possível porque ele pode por alguns instantes ensimesmar-se, ou seja, manter contato direto com sua interioridade. Contudo, o homem está envolvido pelas suas circunstâncias as quais lhe afetam constantemente. Para o autor, quando a vida humana fica atrelada ao mundo circunstancial perde seu caráter radical, deixa de ser do indivíduo e passa a ser da coletividade. (shrink)