Abstract

Albert and Callender have challenged the received view that theories like classical electrodynamics and non-relativistic quantum mechanics are time-reversal invariant. They claim that time reversal should correspond to the mere reversal of the temporal order of the instantaneous states without any accompanying change of the instantaneous state itself, as in the standard view. Given this, they claim that these theories are not time-reversal invariant. The view of Albert and Callender has been much criticized, with many philosophers arguing that time reversal may correspond to more than the reversal of the temporal order. This article will not so much engage with that aspect of the debate, but rather deflate the disagreement by exploiting the ontological underdetermination. Namely, it will be argued that with a suitable choice of ontology, these theories are in fact time-reversal invariant in the sense of Albert and Callender, in agreement with the standard view.