Modality and axiomatic theories of truth II: Kripke-Feferman

Review of Symbolic Logic 7 (2):299-318 (2014)
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Abstract

In this second and last paper of the two part investigation on "Modality and Axiomatic Theories of Truth" we apply a general strategy for constructing modal theories over axiomatic theories of truth to the theory Kripke-Feferman. This general strategy was developed in the first part of our investigation. Applying the strategy to Kripke-Feferman leads to the theory Modal Kripke-Feferman which we discuss from the three perspectives that we had already considered in the first paper, where we discussed the theory Modal Friedman-Sheard. That is, we first show that Modal Kripke-Feferman preserves theoremhood modulo translation with respect to modal operator logic. Second, we develop a modal semantics fitting the newly developed theory. Third, we investigate whether the modal predicate of Modal Kripke-Feferman can be understood along the lines of a proposal of Kripke, namely as a truth predicate modified by a modal operator.

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Johannes Stern
University of Bristol

Citations of this work

Naïve Truth and the Evidential Conditional.Andrea Iacona & Lorenzo Rossi - 2024 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 53 (2):559-584.
Modal Definability in Kripke’s Theory of Truth.James Walsh - 2026 - Review of Symbolic Logic 19 (2):269-290.
Adequate Conditionals and Kripke’s Theory of Truth.Johannes Stern - 2025 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 54 (2):451-491.
Self-referential probability.Catrin Campbell-Moore - 2016 - Dissertation, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München

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References found in this work

Axiomatic Theories of Truth.Volker Halbach - 2010 - Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
Reflecting on incompleteness.Solomon Feferman - 1991 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 56 (1):1-49.
Axiomatic theories of truth.Volker Halbach - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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