Abstract

This paper argues that the concept of an absolute—understood as an ultimate, self-sufficient, non-relational foundation of truth, knowledge, or reality—cannot be sustained even in principle. The failure is not empirical and does not depend on human cognitive limits. It is structural: the absolute is asked to be both fully independent of all relations and simultaneously capable of grounding truth, justification, or meaning. These demands are incompatible. The argument proceeds in three steps. First, it states minimal conditions under which the notion of truth retains an epistemic function: recognizability in principle, relationality, and distinguishability from error or fiction. Second, it shows that an absolute, defined as non-relational and criterion-free, cannot satisfy these conditions without ceasing to be absolute. Third, it demonstrates that any attempt to rescue absolute closure generates an infinite hierarchy of meta-levels: each claim of finality produces a further claim that must itself be included and justified. This yields a general theorem: no system can be both absolute and epistemically true. The paper concludes with practical implications for domains that repeatedly reintroduce absolutes in new forms, including artificial intelligence, “theory of everything” projects, and solipsistic epistemologies. Formal details and responses to common objections are provided in appendices.