Defending Davidson’s Anti-skepticism Argument: A Reply to Otavio Bueno

Philosophy Study 7 (11) (2017)
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Abstract

In the article of Bueno titled “Davidson and Skepticism: How Not to Respond to the Skeptic,” he intends to demonstrate that although Davidson’s theory of Coherence holds many attractions, it does not entail a response to any kinds of skepticism including Global, Lottery, and Pyrrhonian. In this study, the goal is to criticize the work of Prof. Bueno in connection with two criticisms raised by him over Davidson’s anti-skeptical strategy. Further, by giving some reasons in favor of Davidson’s anti-skepticism argument, it will be shown that neither the above stated criticisms nor the global skepticism response could undermine the validity of anti-skepticism argument.

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References found in this work

Inquiries Into Truth And Interpretation.Donald Davidson - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Thought and talk.Donald Davidson - 1975 - In Samuel D. Guttenplan, Mind and language. Oxford [Eng.]: Clarendon Press. pp. 1975--7.
A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge.Donald Davidson - 2000 - In Sven Bernecker & Fred I. Dretske, Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary Epistemology. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.

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