Minds, Machines and Gödel

Abstract

Gödel's theorem seems to me to prove that Mechanism is false, that is, that minds cannot be explained as machines. So also has it seemed to many other people: almost every mathematical logician I have put the matter to has confessed to similar thoughts, but has felt reluctant to commit himself definitely until he could see the whole argument set out, with all objections fully stated and properly met.1 This I attempt to do.

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Citations of this work

Against the singularity hypothesis.David Thorstad - 2025 - Philosophical Studies 182 (7):1627-1651.
What can we know about unanswerable questions?Thomas Raleigh - 2025 - Philosophical Quarterly 75 (1):213-227.
Turing’s Philosophy of AI.Sebastian Sunday-Grève - 2025 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 56:513-529.

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