Newcomb's paradox

Theory and Decision 16 (3):217-223 (1984)
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Abstract

This note proposes a new solution to the problem based on the information states available to the two opponents. The demon or predictor has two possible states on which to choose his course of action. These states are his predictions of the agents choice. The agent has only one state on which to make his choice. It is shown that unless the reward is small, the agent should make his choice probabilistically, using the same odds as the demon's chances of correct prediction.

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Rational Decision and Causality.Ellery Eells - 1982 - Cambridge University Press.

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