Newcomb’s Paradox Realized with Backward Causation

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (1):67-87 (1998)
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Abstract

In order to refute the widely held belief that the game known as ‘Newcomb's paradox’ is physically nonsensical and impossible to imagine (e.g. because it involves backward causation), I tell a story in which the game is realized in a classical, deterministic universe in a physically plausible way. The predictor is a collection of beings which are by many orders of magnitude smaller than the player and which can, with their exquisite measurement techniques, observe the particles in the player's body so accurately that they can predict his choice (in much the same way as we can predict the motion of celestial bodies). I argue that the player, by choosing whether to take only one box or both boxes, influences whether or not, in the past, the predictor put a million pounds into the second box. Yet, I establish that no causal paradox can arise in this set-up.

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References found in this work

Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Foundations of Language 13 (1):145-151.
Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Philosophy of Science 42 (3):341-344.
Causes and Conditions.J. L. Mackie - 1965 - American Philosophical Quarterly 2 (4):245 - 264.
Causation.David Lewis - 1986 - In Philosophical Papers, Volume II. New York, US: OUP Usa. pp. 159-213.
Newcomb’s problem and two principles of choice.Robert Nozick - 1970 - In Carl G. Hempel, Donald Davidson & Nicholas Rescher, Essays in honor of Carl G. Hempel. Dordrecht,: D. Reidel. pp. 114–46.

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