How Not to Derive Essentialism from the Theory of Reference

Journal of Philosophy 76 (12):703-725 (1979)
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Abstract

A thorough critique (extracted from the author’s 1979 doctoral dissertation) of Kripke’s purported derivation, in footnote 56 of his philosophical masterpiece /Naming and Necessity/, of nontrivial modal essentialism from the theory of rigid designation.

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0022362X

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10.2307/2025854

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Photo of Nathan Salmón
Nathan Salmón
University of California, Santa Barbara

Citations of this work

The Logic of What Might Have Been.Nathan Salmon - 1989 - Philosophical Review 98 (1):3-34.
Essential Properties and Individual Essences.Sonia Roca-Royes - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (1):65-77.
Modal Paradox: Parts and Counterparts, Points and Counterpoints.Nathan Salmon - 1986 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 11 (1):75-120.

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References found in this work

Some remarks on essentialism.Richard L. Cartwright - 1968 - Journal of Philosophy 65 (20):615-626.
Chandler on Contingent Identity.John L. King - 1978 - Analysis 38 (3):135 - 136.

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