A reply to Cling’s “The epistemic regress problem”

Philosophical Studies 159 (2):263-276 (2012)
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Abstract

Andrew Cling presents a new version of the epistemic regress problem, and argues that intuitionist foundationalism, social contextualism, holistic coherentism, and infinitism fail to solve it. Cling’s discussion is quite instructive, and deserving of careful consideration. But, I argue, Cling’s discussion is not in all respects decisive. I argue that Cling’s dilemma argument against holistic coherentism fails.

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William Roche
Texas Christian University

Citations of this work

The Unity of Grounding.Selim Berker - 2017 - Mind 127 (507):729-777.
Fading Foundations: Probability and the Regress Problem.Jeanne Peijnenburg - 2017 - Cham, Switzerland: Springer. Edited by Jeanne Peijnenburg.
Coherentism via Graphs.Selim Berker - 2015 - Philosophical Issues 25 (1):322-352.
On the Truth-Conduciveness of Coherence.William Roche - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (3):647-665.

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References found in this work

Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.John R. Searle - 1983 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
The structure of empirical knowledge.Laurence BonJour - 1985 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics.David Owen Brink - 1989 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Theory of knowledge.Keith Lehrer - 2000 - Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press.
Theory of Knowledge.Keith Lehrer - 1990 - Boulder, Colo.: Routledge.

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