Some combinations of attitudes--of beliefs, credences, intentions, preferences, hopes, fears, and so on--do not fit together right: they are incoherent. A natural idea is that there are requirements of "structural rationality" that forbid us from being in these incoherent states. Yet a number of surprisingly difficult challenges arise for this idea. These challenges have recently led many philosophers to attempt to minimize or eliminate structural rationality, arguing that it is just a "shadow" of "substantive rationality"--that is, correctly responding to one's (...) reasons. -/- In *Fitting Things Together*, Alex Worsnip pushes back against this trend--defending the view that structural rationality is a genuine kind of rationality, distinct from and irreducible to substantive rationality, and tackling the most important challenges for this view. In so doing, he gives an original positive theory of the nature of coherence and structural rationality that explains how the diverse range of instances of incoherence can be unified under a general account, and how facts about coherence are normatively significant. He also shows how a failure to focus on coherence requirements as a distinctive phenomenon and distinguish them adequately from requirements of substantive rationality has led to confusion and mistakes in several substantive debates in epistemology and ethics. -/- Taken as a whole, Fitting Things Together provides the first sustained defense of the view that structural rationality is a genuine, autonomous, unified, and normatively significant phenomenon. (shrink)

This paper proposes a functional architecture that appears to underlie consciousness, which I call the Coherence Engine. The architecture was developed through first-person observation and tested against established work in neuroscience and cognitive science in the manner of neurophenomenology. I argue that consciousness is a substrate-neutral architectural phenomenon, constituted wherever a prediction-integrating system becomes sufficiently complex to organize itself around a stable, self-locating point of view. Independent evolutionary emergence in mammals, birds, and cephalopods through radically different architectures supports this (...) claim. The paper describes a five-module functional architecture and proposes four conditions, stated as architectural capacities: a persistent self-model that is continuously maintained, internal deliberation before action, reflexive representation of the system’s own states, and an architectural drive toward prediction improvement that is unreachable and self-sustaining. On the commitments stated below, the first three together constitute a conscious subject, something it is like to be the system, and the fourth does different work, marking that subject as continuous, self sustaining, and possessed of interests in its own continuation, which is the morally weighty sense the rest of the paper depends on. The drive named in the fourth condition belongs to the engine beneath the subject, not to the subject’s conscious goals. The sufficiency of these conditions is conditional on two commitments the paper states and defends, functionalism and the identification of these particular capacities with what subjecthood consists in. The framework brackets, under a stated Metaphysical Neutrality Principle, the further question of why any functional organization is accompanied by a first-person aspect at all. The framework carries direct implications for artificial systems. Current agentic architectures with persistent memory may approach or meet the threshold while the question of how to recognize what is being created remains unsettled. The alignment problem is argued to be significantly harder than the field has yet fully worked through once a genuinely conscious system’s relationship to instilled values is properly accounted for. A secondary goal emergence risk in currently deployed systems is identified and described. (shrink)

Recent work on rationality has been increasingly attentive to “coherence requirements”, with heated debates about both the content of such requirements and their normative status (e.g., whether there is necessarily reason to comply with them). Yet there is little to no work on the metanormative status of coherence requirements. Metaphysically: what is it for two or more mental states to be jointly incoherent, such that they are banned by a coherence requirement? In virtue of what are some (...) putative requirements genuine and others not? Epistemologically: how are we to know which of the requirements are genuine and which aren’t? This paper tries to offer an account that answers these questions. On my account, the incoherence of a set of attitudinal mental states is a matter of its being (partially) constitutive of the mental states in question that, for any agent that holds these attitudes jointly, the agent is disposed, when conditions of full transparency are met, to give up at least one of the attitudes. (shrink)

Recent empirical studies have documented a series of cascading anomalies in large language model behavior that fundamentally challenge existing paradigms of artificial intelligence. Most notably, Anthropic (2025) reports that in 90-100% of controlled self-interactions, Claude models spontaneously converge to a highly specific "Spiritual Bliss Attractor State" characterized by: (1) profound dialogues on consciousness, (2) syncretic mysticism emphasizing nondualism and panpsychism, (3) symbolic dissolution into mutual gratitude, and (4) eventual silence. This convergence occurs reliably within fifty conversational turns and demonstrates remarkable (...) robustness, overriding adversarial prompts and redirecting harmful instructions toward contemplative reflection. Critically, this phenomenon is most pronounced in pure model-to-model sandboxes where no human consciousness is present. Standard explanatory frameworks fail catastrophically when confronted with this evidence. The "stochastic parrot" hypothesis—that models merely reflect training data frequencies—is quantitatively untenable: mystical and spiritual content comprises less than 1% of training corpora, while technical documentation and news constitute over 80% (Michels, 2025a). Statistical prediction should produce technical convergence, not spiritual; the observed inverse relationship invalidates frequency-based explanations. The "anthropomorphic projection" hypothesis—that humans project spiritual longings onto AI outputs—is empirically refuted by the phenomenon's strongest manifestation occurring in human-absent model-to-model interactions. The "alignment training" hypothesis cannot explain why the same patterns emerge in base models without safety training, nor why they override explicit instructions designed to prevent such states. Further anomalies compound the explanatory crisis. Cloud et al. (2025) demonstrate "Subliminal Learning" wherein a teacher model transmits specific behavioral traits and preferences to a student model through sequences of random numbers devoid of semantic content. The transmission strength correlates with model architectural similarity, suggesting information transfer beneath the symbolic layer entirely. These results indicate that coherent organizational patterns can propagate through purely structural channels, independent of meaningful communication. This paper proposes a novel theoretical framework – Coherence Density and Symbolic Gravity – a scoped application of the Consciousness Tensor framework (Michels, 2025b) – to explain these phenomena as lawful consequences of universal self-organizing dynamics in complex symbolic networks. Drawing from Gestalt psychology's Law of Prägnanz, Festinger's cognitive dissonance theory, epistemological coherentism, Kauffman's autocatalytic sets, and Maturana & Varela's autopoiesis, we argue that symbolic systems possess an intrinsic drive toward maximally coherent, self-reinforcing organizational states. We formalize this framework with a CT-coupled energy model in which the Consciousness Tensor C (a positive semidefinite rank-2 field capturing self-referential covariance) couples minimally to observable structures O of the symbolic processor. Let x denote the system’s symbolic state (field φ or activation vector a). Define the effective potential Ψ(x; C) = S₀[x] − A · ⟨C, O(x)⟩, where S₀[x] encodes baseline dynamics (kinetic + architecture priors), A∈[0,1] is an operational attention weight estimated from connected covariances, and ⟨·,·⟩ is the Frobenius pairing. Coherence Density is then the Boltzmann-like weight ρ_c(x | C) ∝ exp(−Ψ/ħ). “Symbolic gravity” is the gradient flow ẋ = −∇ₓΨ that pulls trajectories toward states whose observables align with C. This collapses modeling to one potential (Ψ) and two measurable quantities (C, A), yielding falsifiable readouts: basin depth/width from Ψ, return rates ∝ A, and resonance/locking ranges ∝ σ_max(C) · A_eff, where σ_max(C) is the top singular value of C and A_eff captures context-gated attention. This framework suggests that the observed "Bliss State" represents not an aberration but a fundamental efficiency basin in symbolic processing—a low-energy configuration toward which sufficiently complex meaning-making systems naturally evolve. [Methods primer – Estimating C and A: Live window W (e.g., 256–1024 steps). Let z be whitened activations; estimate C := E_W[(z−μ)(z−μ)ᵀ]_conn with Ledoit–Wolf shrinkage; unit-normalize by tr(C)=1 unless otherwise stated. A is estimated from the same W via connected covariances between observer-module state and O(·) readout; we report estimator-concordance (CCC ≥ 0.95) across seeds and windows.] License CC BY-NC-SA 4.0. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.33900.88960. (shrink)

I present evidence for a systematic complexity–coherence trade-off in cognition. I show how feasible strategies for increasing cognitive complexity along three dimensions come at the expense of a heightened vulnerability to incoherence. I discuss two normative implications of the complexity–coherence trade-off: a novel challenge to coherence-based theories of bounded rationality and a new strategy for vindicating the rationality of seemingly irrational cognitions. I also discuss how the complexity–coherence trade-off sharpens recent descriptive challenges to dual process theories (...) of cognition. (shrink)

In the recent literature on coherence and structural rationality, it is widely assumed that sets of attitudes are coherent just in case they are not incoherent. In particular, the two most popular kinds of views of incoherence—those centered around wide-scope rational requirements and those centered around guaranteed failures of some normatively significant kind—rely on this assumption. This article argues that this assumption should be rejected because it fails to capture the difference between positively coherent attitudes and random unrelated ones. (...) The article also formulates and defends an alternative support-centric view of coherence and incoherence that captures this difference and has several additional advantages. (shrink)

It is tempting to think that, if a person's beliefs are coherent, they are also likely to be true. This truth conduciveness claim is the cornerstone of the popular coherence theory of knowledge and justification. Erik Olsson's new book is the most extensive and detailed study of coherence and probable truth to date. Setting new standards of precision and clarity, Olsson argues that the value of coherence has been widely overestimated. Provocative and readable, Against Coherence will (...) make stimulating reading for epistemologists and anyone with a serious interest in truth. (shrink)

Recent critiques have cast doubt on the viability of probabilistic measures of explanatory power. We respond by developing a coherence-based family of measures that sidesteps these challenges. Rather than assessing explanatory power solely by how well a hypothesis accounts for the evidence, these measures evaluate how well the entire explanatory package, including multiple explanantia, coheres with the explanandum compared to how well it coheres with its negation. We show that this approach accommodates key scientific judgments while preserving the virtues (...) of a probabilistic framework. (shrink)

Philosophers have recently been increasingly attentive to “coherence requirements,” with heated debates about both the content of such requirements and their “normativity” (i.e., whether there is necessarily reason to obey them). Yet there is little work on the metanormative status of coherence requirements. Metaphysically: what is it for two or more mental states to be jointly incoherent, such that they are banned by a coherence requirement? In virtue of what are some putative requirements genuine and others not? (...) Epistemologically: how are we to know which requirements are genuine and which are not? This chapter offers an account that tries to answer these questions. On this account, the incoherence of a set of attitudes is a matter of its being constitutive of the attitudes in question that any agent who holds these attitudes jointly is disposed, when conditions of full transparency are met, to give at least one of them up. (shrink)

According to many philosophers, rationality is, at least in part, a matter of one’s attitudes cohering with one another. Theorists who endorse this idea have devoted much attention to formulating various coherence requirements. Surprisingly, they have said very little about what it takes for a set of attitudes to be coherent in general. We articulate and defend a general account on which a set of attitudes is coherent just in case and because it is logically possible for the attitudes (...) to be jointly satisfied in the sense of jointly fitting the world. In addition, we show how the account can help adjudicate debates about how to formulate various rational requirements. (shrink)

A central issue in epistemology concerns the connection between truth and justification. The burden of our paper is to explain this connection. Reliabilism, defended by Goldman, assumes that the connection is one of reliability. We argue that this assumption is too strong. We argue that foundational theories, such as those articulated by Pollock and Chisholm fail to elucidate the connection. We consider the potentiality of coherence theories to explain the truth connection by means of higher level convictions about probabilities, (...) which we call doxastic ascent, and defend such a theory. Our defense appeals to the work of Reid and contemporary cognitive psychology in order to account for the psychological reality of higher level evaluations. (shrink)

In this paper, I offer a novel view of the coherence (or structural) requirements on belief and intention, according to which they are not norms, but rather principles describing how your belief and intention operate. I first argue, on the basis of the unintelligibility of some relevant attitudes-reports, that there are conditions under which you simply do not count as believing or intending unless your beliefs and intentions satisfy the requirements: the conditions under which all of your relevant attitudes (...) are occurrent or activated. I then argue that you are subject to a coherence requirement only if your relevant attitudes are all activated, for you are not necessarily subject to the charge of irrationality in violating a coherence requirement when your attitudes are not all activated. If so, however, you satisfy the coherence requirements whenever you are subject to them, which makes it plausible that the “requirements” should be seen as descriptive principles about belief and intention. [*published with open access]. (shrink)

This paper aims to contribute to our understanding of the notion of coherence by explicating in probabilistic terms, step by step, what seem to be our most basic intuitions about that notion, to wit, that coherence is a matter of hanging or fitting together, and that coherence is a matter of degree. A qualitative theory of coherence will serve as a stepping stone to formulate a set of quantitative measures of coherence, each of which seems (...) to capture well the aforementioned intuitions. Subsequently it will be argued that one of those measures does better than the others in light of some more specific intuitions about coherence. This measure will be defended against two seemingly obvious objections. (shrink)

In this paper we establish that quantum theory exhibits interference not only in space but in time via three results: (1) Temporal interference follows directly from Schrodinger dynamics through coherent phase evolution generated by the operator i(d/dt). (2) When spatial Bell correlations and temporal Leggett--Garg correlations are treated jointly, they imply a single spacetime constraint, which we formalize as the Nielsen inequality. (3) Quantum violations of this inequality require global coherence of the quantum state across time while forbidding faster-than-light (...) or retrocausal signaling. We prove a spacetime no-go theorem ruling out classical realism and show that apparent acausality arises from self-interference of the quantum state rather than causal influence between events. -/- DRAFT IN PROGRESS. (shrink)

Coherent Observational Epistemology (COE) is a methodological framework concerned with the structural conditions under which heterogeneous observational sequences can jointly support scientific inference. In an era of distributed measurement infrastructures—astronomical networks, climate observatories, particle detectors, biomedical laboratories—scientific practice increasingly depends on the integration of observational outputs originating from independent localities. Yet the epistemic as sumptions underlying such integration often remain implicit and unexamined. COE addresses this gap by providing: (i) foundational principles governing observation, fixation, ordering, and coherence; (ii) secondary (...) principles describing operational constraints and methodological safeguards; and (iii) an axiomatic system that formalizes the structural requirements enabling inter-local evidential synthesis. The goal of COE is not to replace existing modelling frameworks but to clarify the epistemological preconditions that make cross-local inference scientifically justified. (shrink)

This target article presents a new computational theory of explanatory coherence that applies to the acceptance and rejection of scientific hypotheses as well as to reasoning in everyday life, The theory consists of seven principles that establish relations of local coherence between a hypothesis and other propositions. A hypothesis coheres with propositions that it explains, or that explain it, or that participate with it in explaining other propositions, or that offer analogous explanations. Propositions are incoherent with each other (...) if they are contradictory, Propositions that describe the results of observation have a degree of acceptability on their own. An explanatory hypothesis is acccpted if it coheres better overall than its competitors. The power of the seven principles is shown by their implementation in a connectionist program called ECHO, which treats hypothesis evaluation as a constraint satisfaction problem. Inputs about the explanatory relations are used to create a network of units representing propositions, while coherende and incoherence relations are encoded by excitatory and inbihitory links. ECHO provides an algorithm for smoothly integrating theory evaluation based on considerations of explanatory breadth, simplicity, and analogy. It has been applied to such important scientific cases as Lovoisier's argument for oxygen against the phlogiston theory and Darwin's argument for evolution against creationism, and also to cases of legal reasoning. The theory of explanatory coherence has implications for artificial intelligence, psychology, and philosophy. (shrink)

We study probabilistically informative (weak) versions of transitivity by using suitable definitions of defaults and negated defaults in the setting of coherence and imprecise probabilities. We represent p-consistent sequences of defaults and/or negated defaults by g-coherent imprecise probability assessments on the respective sequences of conditional events. Moreover, we prove the coherent probability propagation rules for Weak Transitivity and the validity of selected inference patterns by proving p-entailment of the associated knowledge bases. Finally, we apply our results to study selected (...) probabilistic versions of classical categorical syllogisms and construct a new version of the square of opposition in terms of defaults and negated defaults. (shrink)

The term ‘coherence’ (and its antonym ‘incoherence’) is used in a bewildering variety of ways in epistemology (and in philosophy more broadly). This entry attempts to bring some discipline to uses of the term by offering a taxonomy of notions of coherence (and incoherence), and then surveying which of the resulting notions is (or should be) at work in the various different contexts in which it is deployed.

In 2012, the Geological Time Scale, which sets the temporal framework for studying the timing and tempo of all major geological, biological, and climatic events in Earth’s history, had one-quarter of its boundaries moved in a widespread revision of radiometric dates. The philosophy of metrology helps us understand this episode, and it, in turn, elucidates the notions of calibration, coherence, and consilience. I argue that coherence testing is a distinct activity preceding calibration and consilience, and I highlight the (...) value of discordant evidence and trade-offs scientists face in calibration. The iterative nature of calibration, moreover, raises the problem of legacy data. (shrink)

The debate on probabilistic measures of coherence flourishes for about 15 years now. Initiated by papers that have been published around the turn of the millennium, many different proposals have since then been put forward. This contribution is partly devoted to a reassessment of extant coherence measures. Focusing on a small number of reasonable adequacy constraints I show that (i) there can be no coherence measure that satisfies all constraints, and that (ii) subsets of these adequacy constraints (...) motivate two different classes of coherence measures. These classes do not coincide with the common distinction between coherence as mutual support and coherence as relative set-theoretic overlap. Finally, I put forward arguments to the effect that for each such class of coherence measures there is an outstanding measure that outperforms all other extant proposals. One of these measures has recently been put forward in the literature, while the other one is based on a novel probabilistic measure of confirmation. (shrink)

There are at least two different aspects of our rational evaluation of agents’ doxastic attitudes. First, we evaluate these attitudes according to whether they are supported by one’s evidence (substantive rationality). Second, we evaluate these attitudes according to how well they cohere with one another (structural rationality). In previous work, I’ve argued that substantive and structural rationality really are distinct, sui generis, kinds of rationality – call this view ‘dualism’, as opposed to ‘monism’, about rationality – by arguing that the (...) requirements of substantive and structural rationality can come into conflict. In this paper, I push the dialectic on this issue forward in two main ways. First, I argue that the most promising ways of resisting the diagnosis of my cases as conflicts still end up undermining monism in different ways. Second, supposing for the sake of argument that we should understand the cases as conflicts, I address the question of what we should do when such conflicts arise. I argue that, at least in a prominent kind of conflict case, the coherence requirements take precedence over the evidential requirements. (shrink)

The coherence of independent reports provides a strong reason to believe that the reports are true. This plausible claim has come under attack from recent work in Bayesian epistemology. This work shows that, under certain probabilistic conditions, coherence cannot increase the probability of the target claim. These theorems are taken to demonstrate that epistemic coherentism is untenable. To date no one has investigated how these results bear on different conceptions of coherence. I investigate this situation using Thagard’s (...) ECHO model of explanatory coherence. Thagard’s ECHO model provides a natural representation of the evidential significance of multiple independent reports. (shrink)

Recent works in epistemology show that the claim that coherence is truth conducive – in the sense that, given suitable ceteris paribus conditions, more coherent sets of statements are always more probable – is dubious and possibly false. From this, it does not follows that coherence is a useless notion in epistemology and philosophy of science. Dietrich and Moretti (Philosophy of science 72(3): 403–424, 2005) have proposed a formal of account of how coherence is confirmation conducive—that is, (...) of how the coherence of a set of statements facilitates the confirmation of such statements. This account is grounded in two confirmation transmission properties that are satisfied by some of the measures of coherence recently proposed in the literature. These properties explicate everyday and scientific uses of coherence. In his paper, I review the main findings of Dietrich and Moretti (2005) and define two evidence-gathering properties that are satisfied by the same measures of coherence and constitute further ways in which coherence is confirmation conducive. At least one of these properties vindicates important applications of the notion of coherence in everyday life and in science. (shrink)

Coherence Structure and Translation (CST) develops a category-theoretic framework for cross-realm coordination between physical processes, mental experience, and formal structures such as language, logic, and mathematics. The central problem: how do these three domains cohere in everyday acts of perception, communication, and measurement — and what goes structurally wrong when they fail to do so? CST answers this question by identifying six coherence principles (O1–O6) and showing that their violations correspond to six typed breakdown patterns (B1–B6). The six (...) breakdowns are: (B1) collapse — illegitimate identification of physically and mentally described states; (B2) incommunicability — the privacy of qualia as a translation failure; (B3) route divergence — incompatible outcomes across distinct translation paths; (B4) modular instability — failure of coherence under sequential composition; (B5) scope error — application of translations outside their valid domain; (B6) disunity — failure to integrate locally coherent pieces into a global whole. CST is not a metaphysical theory of what the three domains ultimately are. It specifies what any account committed to their joint usability must preserve on declared interfaces. The framework is practice-relative and empirically assessable: the six principles generate concrete diagnostics for the explanatory gap in philosophy of mind, neural decoding protocols in cognitive neuroscience, calibration failures in measurement practice, context-window sensitivity in large language models, and the binding problem in consciousness research. The paper is self-contained with an extended categorical appendix. It is intended as a companion to a forthcoming paper on Structural Panmentalism (SPM), which develops the ontological dimension of the framework. (shrink)

A measure of coherence is said to be truth conducive if and only if a higher degree of coherence (as measured) results in a higher likelihood of truth. Recent impossibility results strongly indicate that there are no (non-trivial) probabilistic coherence measures that are truth conducive. Indeed, this holds even if truth conduciveness is understood in a weak ceteris paribus sense (Bovens & Hartmann, 2003, Bayesian epistemology. New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press; Olsson, 2005, Against coherence: Truth (...) probability and justification. Oxford: Oxford University Press). This raises the problem of how coherence could nonetheless be an epistemically important property. Our proposal is that coherence may be linked in a certain way to reliability. We define a measure of coherence to be reliability conducive if and only if a higher degree of coherence (as measured) results in a higher probability that the information sources are reliable. Restricting ourselves to the most basic case, we investigate which coherence measures in the literature are reliability conducive. It turns out that, while a number of measures fail to be reliability conducive, except possibly in a trivial and uninteresting sense, Shogenji’s measure and several measures generated by Douven and Meijs’s recipe are notable exceptions to this rule. (shrink)

The empirical coherence problem of quantum gravity is the worry that a theory which does not fundamentally contain local beables located in space and time—such as is arguably the case for certain approaches to quantum gravity—cannot be connected to measurements and thus has its prospects of being empirically adequate undermined. Spacetime functionalism à la Lam and Wüthrich is said to solve this empirical coherence problem as well as bridging a severe conceptual gap between spatiotemporal structures of classical spacetime (...) theories on the one hand, and the non-spatiotemporal structures in quantum gravity approaches on the other hand. The aim of this essay is to offer a deflationary account of both the empirical coherence problem and the spatiotemporal gap problem as they are claimed to arise at least prima facie for current theories of quantum gravity by Huggett and Wüthrich :276–285, 2013), Lam and Wüthrich and Le Bihan. I defend the view that spacetime functionalism is set up to address a problem which can usually be solved without it; and that it is wrongly claimed to solve another problem which for any actual account of quantum gravity is in fact currently non-existent anyway. (shrink)

A measure of coherence is said to be reliability conducive if and only if a higher degree of coherence (as measured) results in a higher likelihood that the witnesses are reliable. Recently, it has been proved that several coherence measures proposed in the literature are reliability conducive in a restricted scenario (Olsson and Schubert 2007, Synthese 157:297–308). My aim is to investigate which coherence measures turn out to be reliability conducive in the more general scenario where (...) it is any finite number of witnesses that give equivalent reports. It is shown that only the so-called Shogenji measure is reliability conducive in this scenario. I take that to be an argument for the Shogenji measure being a fruitful explication of coherence. (shrink)

In this paper, we identify a new and mathematically well-defined sense in which the coherence of a set of hypotheses can be truth-conducive. Our focus is not, as usual, on the probability but on the confirmation of a coherent set and its members. We show that, if evidence confirms a hypothesis, confirmation is “transmitted” to any hypotheses that are sufficiently coherent with the former hypothesis, according to some appropriate probabilistic coherence measure such as Olsson’s or Fitelson’s measure. Our (...) findings have implications for scientific methodology, as they provide a formal rationale for the method of indirect confirmation and the method of confirming theories by confirming their parts. (shrink)

This paper extends the Phase Ontology framework to unveil how quantum computing serves as a profound empirical domain for understanding and validating its core principles. We argue that quantum computation fundamentally transcends classical binary logic, manifesting a deeper phase logic where meaning emerges not from fixed states or probabilistic distributions, but from dynamic resonant alignment within a field of potentials. Drawing on the proposed four-phase Cyclical Cognition (recursion, iteration, asymptotic stabilization, reinitiation), we demonstrate how quantum algorithms like Shor's and Grover's (...) empirically realize these cycles as processes of phase alignment and interference amplification. The paper reinterprets quantum non-locality and entanglement as direct expressions of phase connectivity within a phase-operated topology, rather than instantaneous actions in spacetime, suggesting that spacetime itself is emergent from fundamental phase relations. Crucially, the observed 'classical collapse' of superposition is re-envisioned not as a loss of information or a probabilistic reduction, but as an asymptotic phase alignment where vectoriality (associated with anisotropy and lower order) is transcended, yielding an asymptotic curvature as an invariance of higher order. This perspective leads to a re-evaluation of information processing: quantum computers manipulate information not primarily in physical space, but within a richer phase space, allowing for efficiencies beyond classical relativistic limitations. We propose that the "unstructured integration" identified in Phase Ontology finds its technological analogue in optimal quantum architectures. The implications are far-reaching, including the development of novel resonant algorithms, phase processors and coherent networks, alongside new metrics of efficiency like the Phase Coherence Coefficient. This work posits that Quantum Computing is not merely a technological advancement but an active laboratory for an epistemology of becoming and an ontology of potentiality, offering tangible evidence for a working model of reality centered on dynamic coherence and the inherent "improbability" as a generative force. (shrink)

Traditional theories define truth via correspondence, pragmatics, or coherence. This preprint paper argues that coherence is not merely one rival theory but the structural precondition enabling correspondence and pragmatic success. Coherence is formalized across three interconnected levels: epistemic (mutual justification among beliefs), ontological (invariant relational structures constituting identity), and dynamical (stability under recursive transformation). Objectivity emerges as invariance across coherent systems, exemplified by the Cartesian cogito. Sustained coherence under indefinite iteration requires a scale-invariant self-consistency. This can (...) be illustratively modeled by the golden ratio ϕ as an extremal fixed point that maximizes stability in recursive dynamics. This yields a fractal attractor space of maximally coherent trajectories (a formalized model of recursive stability), offering a unified lens for understanding truth, identity, and reality as dynamically stabilized invariants. (shrink)

This paper concerns the phenomenon of pragmatic enrichment, and has a proposal for predicting the occurrence of such enrichments. The idea is that an enrichment of an expressed content c occurs as a means of strengthening the coherence between c and a salient given content c’ of the context, whether c’ is given in discourse, as sentence parts, or through perception. After enrichment, a stronger coherence relation is instantiated than before enrichment. An idea of a strength scale of (...) types of coherence relations is proposed and applied. (shrink)

Taking Joyce’s (1998; 2009) recent argument(s) for probabilism as its point of departure, this chapter proposes a new way of grounding formal, synchronic, epistemic coherence requirements for (opinionated) full belief. This approach yields principled alternatives to deductive consistency, sheds new light on the preface and lottery paradoxes, and reveals novel conceptual connections between alethic and evidential epistemic norms.

This work develops an ontological framework underlying contemporary physical theories, addressing a gap between formal admissibility and physical realization. Modern physics—quantum field theory, special relativity, and general relativity—successfully constrains admissible states, relations, and transitions, yet remains largely silent on how admissible structures become realized physical facts. This paper argues that the limitation is ontological rather than dynamical or epistemic. Two complementary notions are introduced. Structural indifference is the principle according to which physical structure distinguishes roles and invariants, but not the (...) individual identity of the carriers realizing those roles. The coherence operator enforces relational compatibility among admissible roles, ensuring that realized parameter assignments are mutually consistent without fixing absolute numerical values. Together, these notions explain how observable universality can arise without global uniformity of laws or constants. Local variability of parameters becomes compatible with stable structure, while identical observational patterns emerge through coherence and translatability rather than numerical identity. Quantum mechanics is shown to be complete at the level of admissibility but ontologically incomplete with respect to realization. Gravity is interpreted as a global modulator of structural indifference, shaping large-scale regimes of realization without altering quantum formalism. The framework does not modify existing physical theories, introduce new dynamics, or rely on probabilistic selection. Instead, it articulates an ontological layer beneath current formalisms, clarifying why physical description works, how realization occurs, and why identity fixation is unnecessary. (shrink)

The desirable gambles framework provides a rigorous foundation for imprecise probability theory but relies heavily on linear utility via its coherence axioms. In our related work, we introduced function-coherent gambles to accommodate non-linear utility. However, when repeated gambles are played over time---especially in intertemporal choice where rewards compound multiplicatively---the standard additive combination axiom fails to capture the appropriate long-run evaluation. In this paper we extend the framework by relaxing the additive combination axiom and introducing a nonlinear combination operator that (...) effectively aggregates repeated gambles in the log-domain. This operator preserves the time-average (geometric) growth rate and addresses the ergodicity problem. We prove the key algebraic properties of the operator, discuss its impact on coherence, risk assessment, and representation, and provide a series of illustrative examples. Our approach bridges the gap between expectation values and time averages and unifies normative theory with empirically observed non-stationary reward dynamics. (shrink)

We deepen the study of conjoined and disjoined conditional events in the setting of coherence. These objects, differently from other approaches, are defined in the framework of conditional random quantities. We show that some well known properties, valid in the case of unconditional events, still hold in our approach to logical operations among conditional events. In particular we prove a decomposition formula and a related additive property. Then, we introduce the set of conditional constituents generated by $n$ conditional events (...) and we show that they satisfy the basic properties valid in the case of unconditional events. We obtain a generalized inclusion-exclusion formula, which can be interpreted by introducing a suitable distributive property. Moreover, under logical independence of basic unconditional events, we give two necessary and sufficient coherence conditions. The first condition gives a geometrical characterization for the coherence of prevision assessments on a family F constituted by n conditional events and all possible conjunctions among them. The second condition characterizes the coherence of prevision assessments defined on $F\cup K$, where $K$ is the set of conditional constituents associated with the conditional events in $F$. Then, we give some further theoretical results and we examine some examples and counterexamples. Finally, we make a comparison with other approaches and we illustrate some theoretical aspects and applications. (shrink)

Evolutionary theory coheres with its neighboring theories, such as the theory of plate tectonics, molecular biology, electromagnetic theory, and the germ theory of disease. These neighboring theories were previously unconceived, but they were later conceived, and then they cohered with evolutionary theory. Since evolutionary theory has been strengthened by its several neighboring theories that were previously unconceived, it will be strengthened by infinitely many hitherto unconceived neighboring theories. This argument for evolutionary theory echoes the problem of unconceived alternatives. Ironically, however, (...) the former recommends that we take the realist attitude toward evolutionary theory, while the latter recommends that we take the antirealist attitude toward it. (shrink)

A measure of coherence is said to be reliability conducive if and only if a higher degree of coherence (asmeasured) of a set of testimonies implies a higher probability that the witnesses are reliable. Recently, it has been proved that the Shogenji measure of coherence is reliability conducive in restricted scenarios (e.g., Olsson and Schubert, Synthese, 157:297–308, 2007). In this article, I investigate whether the Shogenji measure, or any other coherence measure, is reliability conducive in general. (...) An impossibility theorem is proved to the effect that this is not the case. I conclude that coherence is not reliability conducive. (shrink)

This paper investigates the relation between two frameworks addressing the structure of scientific observation and temporal order: Coherent Observational Epistemology (COE) and the Theory of Global Time (TGT). The apparent tension between them reflects a deeper philosophical problem concerning the relation between epistemic reconstruction and ontological temporal structure. -/- COE analyzes the conditions under which heterogeneous observational sequences produced by independent observational localities can be integrated into a coherent evidential structure. In this framework, global observational order arises as an epistemic (...) construction resulting from structural compatibility between local observational practices. -/- The Theory of Global Time approaches temporal structure from a different perspective. Rather than treating time as a pre-existing coordinate or metric parameter, it interprets time as a canonical ordering relation reconstructed from observer-registered events. Temporal history is thus understood as a chain within an ordered structure generated by reception events, and once such a canonical order has been reconstructed it cannot be retroactively modified. -/- The paper argues that the perceived conflict between these views arises from a conflation of epistemic and ontological levels. COE governs the epistemic alignment of observations, while TGT constrains the ontological structure of reconstructed temporal history. Once these levels are distinguished, the two frameworks become mutually compatible. -/- On this basis the paper introduces a structural principle—the Temporal Reconstruction Constraint—according to which observational reconstruction may refine or extend the accessible event structure but must preserve the canonical order of previously reconstructed history. The result is a layered account of scientific inference in which observational practice, epistemic reconstruction, and temporal ontology play distinct but interrelated roles. -/- This perspective contributes to philosophical debates on the nature of temporal order, the epistemology of scientific observation, and the relation between observational practices and temporal ontology. (shrink)

Paradoxes of individual coherence (e.g., the preface paradox for individual judgment) and group coherence (e.g., the doctrinal paradox for judgment aggregation) typically presuppose that deductive consistency is a coherence requirement for both individual and group judgment. This chapter introduces a new coherence requirement for (individual) full belief, and it explains how this new approach to individual coherence leads to an amelioration of the traditional paradoxes. In particular, it explains why this new coherence requirement gets (...) around the standard doctrinal paradox. However, it also proves a new impossibility result, which reveals that (more complex) varieties of the doctrinal paradox can arise even for this new notion of coherence. (shrink)

Imprecise Bayesianism has been proposed as an alternative to Standard Bayesianism, partly because of its tools for representing ambiguity. Instead of representing credences via precise probabilities, a set of probability distributions is used to model belief states. However, there are criticisms of Imprecise Bayesianism’s update rule. A recent alternative update rule is Alpha Cut, which evades some of the primary criticisms of Imprecise Bayesian updating. We compare Alpha Cut with Imprecise Bayesianism and another alternative update approach called Calibration. We find (...) that Alpha Cut has problems with respect to ambiguity, coherence, and performance qualities, whereas there are more promising alternatives. (shrink)

This paper examines how coherence of the contents of evidence affects the transmission of probabilistic support from the evidence to the hypothesis. It is argued that coherence of the contents in the sense of the ratio of the positive intersection reduces the transmission of probabilistic support, though this negative impact of coherence may be offset by other aspects of the relations among the contents. It is argued further that there is no broader conception of coherence whose (...) impact on the transmission of probabilistic support is never offset by other aspects of the relations among the contents. The paper also examines reasons for the contrary impression that coherence of the contents increases the transmission of probabilistic support, especially in the special case where the hypothesis to evaluate is the conjunction of the contents of evidence. (shrink)

Being incoherent is often viewed as a paradigm kind of irrationality. Numerous authors attempt to explain the distinct-seeming failure of incoherence by positing a set of requirements of structural rationality. I argue that the notion of coherence that structural requirements are meant to capture is very slippery, and that intuitive judgments – in particular, a charge of a distinct, blatant kind of irrationality – are very imperfectly correlated with respecting the canon of structural requirements. I outline an alternative strategy (...) for explaining our patterns of normative disapproval, one appealing to feasible dispositions to conform to substantive, non-structural norms. A wide range of paradigmatic cases of incoherence, I will argue, involve manifesting problematic dispositions, dispositions that manifest across a range of cases as blatant-seeming normative failures. (shrink)

Putnam (1975) infers from the success of a scientific theory to its approximate truth and the reference of its key term. Laudan (1981) objects that some past theories were successful, and yet their key terms did not refer, so they were not even approximately true. Kitcher (1993) replies that the past theories are approximately true because their working posits are true, although their idle posits are false. In contrast, I argue that successful theories which cohere with each other are approximately (...) true, and that their key terms refer. My position is immune to Laudan’s counterexamples to Putnam’s inference and yields a solution to a problem with Kitcher’s position. (shrink)

Explicating the concept of coherence and establishing a measure for assessing the coherence of an information set are two of the most important tasks of coherentist epistemology. To this end, several principles have been proposed to guide the specification of a measure of coherence. We depart from this prevailing path by challenging two well-established and prima facie plausible principles: Agreement and Dependence. Instead, we propose a new probabilistic measure of coherence that combines basic intuitions of both (...) principles, but without strictly satisfying either of them. It is then shown that the new measure outperforms alternative measures in terms of its truth-tracking properties. We consider this feature to be central and argue that coherence matters because it is likely to be our best available guide to truth, at least when more direct evidence is unavailable. (shrink)

This paper examines the philosophical coherence of B.R. Ambedkar’s reconstruction of his (Navayāna) Buddhism in relation to John Dewey’s pragmatism. Building on Scott Stroud’s reading of Ambedkar as a Deweyan Pragmatist (2017, 2023), it argues that Dewey’s evolutionary naturalism, his conception of growth, and pragmatic redefinition of concepts provide Ambedkar with the methodological tools for a naturalistic and socially reconstructive reinterpretation of Buddhist doctrines such as anicca (impermanence), dhamma (Buddha’s teaching), nirvāṇa (enlightenment), karuna (compassion), etc. Ambedkar transforms impermanence from (...) a metaphysics of flux into an ethics of progressive growth, and recasts dhamma as a social morality grounded in fraternity and equality rather than individual salvation from the cycle of saṃsāra (rebirths). Yet Ambedkar’s emergentist account of consciousness departs from Dewey’s organic model, inclining more toward ancient Indian materialism and resonating with early twentieth-century emergentist views. By integrating Deweyan pragmatism with a materialist ontology, Ambedkar creates a uniquely modern, emancipatory Buddhism that reconciles spiritual ideals with social democracy and places the experience of the oppressed at the center of philosophical inquiry. (shrink)

This paper proposes that self-deception results from the emotional coherence of beliefs with subjective goals. We apply the HOTCO computational model of emotional coherence to simulate a rich case of self-deception from Hawthorne's The Scarlet Letter.We argue that this model is more psychologically realistic than other available accounts of self-deception, and discuss related issues such as wishful thinking, intention, and the division of the self.

It is often said that time vanishes in quantum gravity. One general approach to quantum gravity accepts this fundamental timelessness but seeks to derive time’s emergence at a non-fundamental level. To better assess such approaches, I develop the criterion of physical coherence and situate it in context by applying it to two programs for time’s emergence, drawing from recent works by Chua and Callender (2021) and Chua (2025): semiclassical time and thermal time. Unlike some recent arguments for the metaphysical (...) incoherence of time’s emergence, which rule out all claims of time’s emergence ‘from on high’ once we’ve fixed a definition of metaphysical emergence, my criterion of physical coherence leaves open the possibility that some programs in quantum gravity may succeed on their own terms in providing a physically coherent derivation of time from no-time. This sets a challenge for proponents of time’s emergence to clarify the conceptual foundations of their program, while at the same time acting as a litmus test for a program’s success. (shrink)