When Contrast Becomes Fact: Commitment and the Relational Ontology of Event Density

Abstract

This paper steps beneath the machinery of the Event Density (ED) framework to ask what kind of thing ED is. The answer offered is that ED is a contrast-first ontology: its primitive is neither the event (a thing) nor the relation (a between), but contrast — a difference, a gradient, a participation pattern — from which events and relations co-arise. The old dichotomy that forces a choice between substance ontology and pure relationalism is treated as a false binary, and dissolved. The central claim concerns determinateness. Any relational ontology owes an account of how the relational flux yields particular facts, and ED supplies one its tradition lacks: commitment (primitive P11), the substrate's irreversible event in which one contrast is actualized as fact — a substrate-level analogue of quantum collapse. From contrast-first plus commitment, a single principle follows — determinacy is relational at every scale — which recasts ED's "value-inherited" stance as principled rather than apologetic: in a relational world, holistic quantities such as the physical constants are not the kind of thing a substrate can produce in isolation. The paper names its open debts plainly (the arrow of time is posited, not derived; the exact universality of charge is reconciled only by an open topological-charge hypothesis) and situates ED against Whitehead's process metaphysics, Rovelli's relational quantum mechanics, and the structural realism of Ladyman and French. It derives no physical constant; its aim is to state, clearly and defensibly, the ontology ED has been using all along.

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2026-06-09

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