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Respect for the dead and dying
Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 9 (4):409-416 (1984)
Abstract
Against the thesis that permanently unconscious persons cannot be harmed, and thus are not owed moral deference, it is argued that even the dead can be harmed and are owed moral respect, so a fortiori those dubiously or not quite dead deserve some moral deference. Keywords: former person, right, euthanasia, comatose, personhood CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this?Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
Whose will is it, anyway? A discussion of advance directives, personal identity, and consensus in medical ethics.Mark G. Kuczewski - 1994 - Bioethics 8 (1):27–48.
Whose Will is It, Anyway? A Discussion of Advance Directives, Personal Identity, and Consensus in Medical Ethics.Mark G. Kuczewski - 2007 - Bioethics 8 (1):27-48.
Bibliography.John Kleinig - 1993 - In [Book review] valuing life. Princeton University Press. pp. 257-276.
From Frustrated Desire to Posthumous Harm.David Boonin - 2019 - In Dead Wrong: The Ethics of Posthumous Harm. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 111-162.
References found in this work
P.Werner Ziegenfuss & Gertrud Jung - 1978 - In Werner Ziegenfuss & Gertrud Jung, L - Z. Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter. pp. 244-318.
Euthanasia and the insentient patient.Gary Jones - 1980 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 5 (4):333-339.
Death and benefit in the permanently unconscious patient: A justification of euthanasia.Ellen Kappy Suckiel - 1978 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 3 (1):38-52.
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