Looks as powers

Philosophical Issues 13 (1):221-52 (2003)
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Abstract

Although they may differ on the reason why, many philosophers hold that it is a priori that an object is red if and only if it is such as to look red to normal observers in normal conditions.

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2004

DOI

10.1111/1533-6077.00013

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Philip Pettit
Australian National University

Citations of this work

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References found in this work

Brainstorms.Daniel C. Dennett - 1978 - MIT Press.
On a confusion about a function of consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.

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