Should One Be A Left or A Right Sellarsian?

Metaphilosophy 47 (2):251-263 (2016)
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Abstract

The followers of Wilfrid Sellars are often divided into “right” and “left” Sellarsians, according to whether they believe, in Mark Lance's words, that “linguistic roles constitutive of meaning and captured by dot quoted words are ‘normative all the way down.’” The present article anatomizes this division and argues that it is not easy to give it a nontrivial sense. In particular, the article argues that it is not really possible to construe it as a controversy related to ontology, and goes on to argue that it is also not easy to construe it as one concerning the translatability of the normative idiom into the non-normative one. The conclusion is that the only coherent interpretation of this disagreement is as a disagreement about the possibility and desirability of assuming a standpoint “inside” our linguistic practices.

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Citations of this work

Wilfrid Sellars.Willem deVries - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Whence Correctness?Jaroslav Peregrin - forthcoming - Topoi:1-6.
Wilfrid Sellars.Jay Rosenberg - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Knowledge orders problem in epistemology.Aleksey Kardash - 2025 - Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of Belarus. Humanitarian Series 70 (1):28-39.

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References found in this work

Word and Object.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1960 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 17 (2):278-279.
Making it Explicit.Isaac Levi & Robert B. Brandom - 1994 - Journal of Philosophy 93 (3):145.
Philosophy and the scientific image of man.Wilfrid Sellars - 1962 - In Robert Garland Colodny, Frontiers of science and philosophy. [Pittsburgh]: University of Pittsburgh Press. pp. 35-78.

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