Error theory and reasons for belief

In Andrew Reisner & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen, Reasons for Belief. New York: Cambridge University Press (2011)
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Jonas Olson
Stockholm University

Citations of this work

Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence.Jonas Olson - 2014 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Metaepistemology.J. Adam Carter & Ernest Sosa - 2022 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Epistemic instrumentalism, permissibility, and reasons for belief.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2018 - In Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting, Normativity: Epistemic and Practical. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 260-280.

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