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Moral uncertainty and maximizing expected truthlikeness
Abstract
Harry Lloyd argues for a new solution to the problem of rationally choosing under moral uncertainty—what he calls *My Preferred Theory*. I show that my preferred theory is in fact the moral theory with the greatest expected truthlikeness.Author's Profile
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