Abstract

This article proposes an interpretation of Friedrich Nietzsche's thought in which morality is understood as a "semiotics of affects"—that is, as a symbolic expression of specific pulsional configurations historically consolidated into values. Based on the genealogical method developed by Nietzsche, the investigation interprets moral values not through their normative validity, but through their origin, function, and effects on forms of life. The analysis follows a conceptual-philosophical approach centered on key texts such as On the Genealogy of Morality, Beyond Good and Evil, and Twilight of the Idols, along with relevant commentaries. The hypothesis is that morality operates as a symptom of affective organization, expressed in practices of obedience, memory, and guilt, which culminate in the emergence of the "moral individual." The typology of master morality and slave morality serves as a diagnostic tool for assessing the ways in which different forms of life affirm or negate vital potency. The article aims to emphasize that Nietzsche does not aim to establish a new morality, but interprets morality as a symbolic language of affections and a historical practice of organizing life.