Abstract

In “A Defense of Structure in Structure of Scientific Revolutions,” Prof. K. Brad Wray discusses the critical interpretation introduced by Lorraine Daston on the importance of Kuhn for historians of science, and specifically the usefulness of the Kuhnian notion of structure. According to Daston, the notion of structure in SSR became important due to the popularity of the term in social sciences when Kuhn wrote the book. Daston argues that the very idea of a structure has been abandoned both in history and social sciences, and therefore its use in SSR has become unacceptable. In this comment, I intend to vindicate the notion of structure in Kuhn’s work through a discussion with objectives analogous to Wray’s, but with differences in method and scope. First, I shall examine some implicit assumptions in Wray’s discussion. Secondly, I shall attempt to situate the discussion of Kuhn’s notion of structure in the historiographical realm, and not only within philosophy.