Abstract

Thomas S. Kuhn’s monograph The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Structure) in which Kuhn introduced his seminal phase model for the development of science was one of the most influential books in philosophy of science from the twentieth century. The central ideas about paradigms and revolutions that Kuhn presented in this monograph have not only become part of the standard curriculum across a wide range of academic fields; they have also made deep imprints on science policy as well as on our everyday thinking about how frames of mind guide our actions. Kuhn’s Structure not only provided a new perspective on how science develops; it also constituted an important contribution to an emerging naturalization of scholarship in philosophy of science by arguing that philosophical analyses of science had to be based on studies of science as it had been practiced through history. Despite these immense successes, reservations about Kuhn and the position that he presented in Structure have also been aired in many quarters of academia. Many philosophers have been outraged over the notion of incommensurability. Many historians have been skeptical about the appeal to general structures. This being said, Kuhn himself often had reservations about the ways in which his work was interpreted and used for purposes that he had never intended. Wray’s monograph is an examination of this intriguing tension between the immense success of Structure and the reservations that have remained against it, especially among philosophers and historians.