Valuation, Contingency, and Pathology: Failure Modes of Meaningful Systems

Zenodo (2026)
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Abstract

Phenomena such as hatred, fanaticism, obsession, nihilism, and systemic collapse are commonly treated as moral failures, psychological pathologies, or brute sociological facts. This paper proposes a unifying structural account of these phenomena based on two minimal primitives required for meaningful systems: valuation (the assignment of importance to states, empirically visible as work expended against entropy) and contingency (the availability of nontrivial alternative possibilities). We introduce a two-dimensional phase space of meaning spanned by valuation and contingency and show that distinct modes of flourishing, drift, stagnation, and pathology occupy well-defined regions of this space. The central result is a structural definition of hate as maximal valuation with collapsed contingency: a high-energy state in which care is intense but the possibility space is rigidly constrained, so only eliminative futures remain admissible. On this account, the opposite of love is not hate but apathy (near-zero valuation), while hate represents a pathological freezing of valuation rather than its absence. We further show that such rigidity is energetically costly and dynamically brittle in a contingent world, explaining the exhaustion, instability, and self-destructive tendencies associated with pathological systems across biological, psychological, and social scales. The account is diagnostic and scale-invariant, offering structural insight rather than moral prescription, therapeutic guidance, or metaphysical commitment.

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References found in this work

What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (4):435-50.
The free-energy principle: a unified brain theory?Karl Friston - 2010 - Nature Reviews Neuroscience 11 (2):127–18.
Critique of judgment.Immanuel Kant - 1790 - New York: Barnes & Noble. Edited by J. H. Bernard.
Chance and necessity.Jacques Monod - 1971 - New York,: Vintage Books.

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