The moral-principle objection to human embryonic stem cell research

Metaphilosophy 38 (2-3):190–206 (2007)
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Abstract

Opponents of human embryonic stem cell (hESC) research claim that such research is incompatible with the moral principle that it is always wrong intentionally to end a human life. In this essay, I discuss how that principle might be revised so that it is subject to as few difficulties as possible. I then argue that even the most defensible version of the principle is compatible with the moral permissibility of hESC research.

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References found in this work

Material Beings.Peter van Inwagen - 1990 - Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Practical Ethics.Peter Singer - 1979 - New York: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Susan J. Armstrong & Richard George Botzler.
Material Beings.Peter Van Inwagen - 1990 - Philosophy 67 (259):126-127.
The Human Animal: Personal Identity Without Psychology.Eric Todd Olson - 1997 - New York, US: Oxford University Press.

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