Abstract

In this dissertation I defend a particular naturalistic view in meta-ethics which is a kind of meta-ethical soft realism. The main features of such a view are as follows. ;On my view, moral properties are to be understood as dispositional properties which supervene upon the natural properties of the objects or states of affairs on the one hand, and on the psychological properties of the human subjects on the other. Such a dispositional account of moral properties emphasizes both the subjective and objective aspects of our moral life. ;On such a view, moral properties are not identical with natural properties. Rather, moral properties strongly supervene upon natural properties with metaphysical necessity, while weakly supervening upon natural properties with conceptual necessity. I show that such a naturalistic view , is a distinct type of ethical naturalism from the first type of ethical naturalism , according to which moral terms are synonymous with natural terms and hence the moral and natural properties which these terms respectively designate are identical. ;I critically examine the anti-realist positions of Blackburn and Mackie, as well as the non-naturalistic realist position of Moore, with a view to establishing such a particular naturalistic view of meta-ethics which is a kind of soft realism