Memes, Misinformation, and Political Meaning

Southern Journal of Philosophy 60 (1):38-56 (2022)
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Abstract

Are most people sincere when they share misinformation and conspiracies online? This question, while natural and important, is difficult to answer for obvious reasons. But it also applies poorly to one of the main vehicles for misinformation—memes. And it can be ambiguous; as a result, we should be mindful of two distinctions. First, a distinction between belief and a related propositional attitude, commitment. And second, the distinction between the propositional content of an attitude and what I will call its political meaning. I will suggest that these distinctions not only can help us understand how we communicate online, but they also suggest a lesson about what we should be focusing on when fighting misinformation.

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Michael Lynch
University of Connecticut

References found in this work

Impassioned Belief.Michael Ridge - 2014 - New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Alief and Belief.Tamar Gendler - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (10):634-663.
Why do humans reason? Arguments for an argumentative theory.Dan Sperber - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (2):57.

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