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Impassioned Belief
New York, NY: Oxford University Press (2014)
Abstract
Michael Ridge presents an original expressivist theory of normative judgments--Ecumenical Expressivism--which offers distinctive treatments of key problems in metaethics, semantics, and practical reasoning. He argues that normative judgments are hybrid states partly constituted by ordinary beliefs and partly constituted by desire-like states.Author's Profile
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Review of Michael Ridge Impassioned Belief.Andrew Alwood - 2014 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2014.
Review: Michael Ridge, Impassioned Belief. [REVIEW]Review by: Kevin Toh - 2016 - Ethics 126 (2):526-530.
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Citations of this work
Practical reason.R. Jay Wallace & Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2024 - The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The Conflict of Evidence and Coherence.Alex Worsnip - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (1):3-44.
Structural Rationality.Benjamin Kiesewetter & Alex Worsnip - 2023 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
On Scepticism About Ought Simpliciter.James L. D. Brown - 2024 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 102 (2):497-511.
Defining Normativity.Stephen Finlay - 2019 - In Toh Kevin, Plunkett David & Shapiro Scott, Dimensions of Normativity: New Essays on Metaethics and Jurisprudence. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 62-104.
References found in this work
The problem with the Frege–Geach problem.Nate Charlow - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (3):635-665.
Metaethics, teleosemantics and the function of moral judgements.Neil Sinclair - 2012 - Biology and Philosophy 27 (5):639-662.
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