Abstract

The perspectivist critique makes it clear that the example theories and statements from implicit and explicit metaphilosophy do not satisfy the generality of the concept of philosophy and metaphilosophy. Conclusions must therefore be drawn for the understanding of metaphilosophy. First, the main problem of metaphilosophy is recapitulated, namely the philosophical bias of metaphilosophical views—the metaphilosophy qua post-philosophy. Subsequently, it is shown that metaphilosophy is a discipline in the making, which, despite this problem, exhibits features of unity. These are the domain of inquiry, about which there is broad consensus, the already established discourse formations, and the classification of metaphilosophy. With this differentiated understanding of metaphilosophy, which sufficiently takes the main problem into account, and by drawing on the idea of a discourse oriented toward interperspectivity from the outset, which proposes an orientation toward both universality and inclusion, both metaphilosophical and philosophical practice can be guided.