Abstract

Implicit metaphilosophy refers to metaphilosophical statements that are not accompanied by the awareness that they are contributing to metaphilosophical debates. In the history of philosophy, there are numerous judgments about philosophy, its structure, its methods, etc., which are often made only in passing. In accordance with the perspectivist method, Camus’s philosophically preconditioned statement—burdened by his standpoint and focus on the absurd—about the fundamental question of philosophy is first deconstructed. Subsequently, the problematic classification of Husserl’s concept of attitude and the law of perspectival reciprocity, which was ignored by Carnap, are addressed. It will be shown that the conceptions of philosophy and the claims made by Camus, Husserl, and Carnap do not correspond to the generality of the concept of philosophy, but that they can nevertheless be regarded as valid contributions to metaphilosophical debates.