Argument-Forms which Turn Invalid over Infinite Domains: Physicalism as Supertask?

Contemporary Pragmatism 5 (1):1-11 (2008)
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Abstract

Argument-forms exist which are valid over finite but not infinite domains. Despite understanding of this by formal logicians, philosophers can be observed treating as valid arguments which are in fact invalid over infinite domains. In support of this claim I will first present an argument against the classical pragmatist theory of truth by Mark Johnston. Then, more ambitiously, I will suggest the fallacy lurks in certain arguments for physicalism taken for granted by many philosophers today.

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Cathy Legg
Deakin University

Citations of this work

Charles Peirce's Limit Concept of Truth.Catherine Legg - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (3):204-213.
Prospects for Peircean Truth.Andrew Howat - 2014 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (3-4):365-387.
Peirce's Conception of Metaphysics.Joshua Black - 2017 - Dissertation, University of Sheffield

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References found in this work

Two Dogmas of Empiricism.W. Quine - 1951 - [Longmans, Green].
Reason, Truth and History.Hilary Putnam - 1981 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Two Dogmas of Empiricism.Willard V. O. Quine - 1951 - Philosophical Review 60 (1):20–43.

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