Response-Dependent Value

In The Value of Living Well. New York, US: Oup Usa. pp. 239-261 (2013)
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Abstract

This chapter explains how the account of norms for success in practical reason underwrite a conception of the metaphysics of value properties as _response-dependent_, along the lines suggested by John McDowell and David Wiggins. It considers the relation between reasons, ends, and values, and consider how response-dependent views of value properties have been developed by McDowell, Wiggins, and others before setting out a schema for understanding value as response-dependent given the account of practical rationality offered in this book.

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Mark LeBar
Florida State University

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