Normative Bedrock: Response-Dependence, Rationality, and Reasons

Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press (2012)
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Abstract

Joshua Gert offers an original account of normative facts and properties, those which have implications for how we ought to behave. He argues that our ability to think and talk about normative notions such as reasons and benefits is dependent on how we respond to the world around us, including how we respond to the actions of other people

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Author's Profile

Joshua Gert
College of William and Mary

Citations of this work

Reasons, Competition, and Latitude.Justin Snedegar - 2021 - In Russ Shafer-Landau, Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 16. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
To Know Beauty Exactly: The Aims of Eros and Aesthetic Judgment.Errol Lord - 2026 - British Journal of Aesthetics 66 (2):447-458.
Metaethics and the Functions of Moral Language.Amie L. Thomasson - 2026 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 113 (1):74-87.
Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 16.Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.) - 2021 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Minimalism's continued creep: Subject matter.Joshua Gert - 2025 - Analytic Philosophy 66 (2):130-144.

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References found in this work

Y.Bernd Moeller & Bruno Jahn - 2005 - In Bernd Moeller & Bruno Jahn, Deutsche Biographische Enzyklopädie der Theologie und der Kirchen (DBETh). Berlin, New York: De Gruyter Saur. pp. 1437-1438.
Harm (See Benefits and Harms).Henk ten Have & Maria do Céu Patrão Neves - 2021 - In Henk ten Have & Maria do Céu Patrão Neves, Dictionary of Global Bioethics. Cham: Springer Verlag. pp. 589-589.

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