Two arguments for the etiological theory over the modal theory of biological function

Synthese 194 (4) (2017)
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Abstract

This paper contains a positive development and a negative argument. It develops a theory of function loss and shows how this undermines an objection raised against the etiological theory of function in support of the modal theory of function. Then it raises two internal problems for the modal theory of function

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original Leahy, Brian; Huber, Maximilian (2014) "Two arguments for the etiological theory over the modal theory of biological function". Synthese 194(4):1169-1187

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Author Profiles

Maximilian Huber
University of Geneva
Brian Leahy
Harvard University

Citations of this work

The Dilemma of Ahistorical Teleosemantics.Fabian Hundertmark - 2024 - Philosophy of Science 91 (1):58-71.
Note on the Individuation of Biological Traits.Mihnea Capraru - 2018 - Journal of Philosophy 115 (4):215-221.

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References found in this work

Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 36 (3):602-605.
Philosophical Guide to Conditionals.Jonathan Bennett - 2003 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
A counterexample to modus ponens.Vann McGee - 1985 - Journal of Philosophy 82 (9):462-471.

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