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A regress argument for restrictive incompatibilism
Philosophical Studies 103 (2):201 - 215 (2001)
Abstract
Plausibly, no agent ever performs an action without some desire to perform that action. If so, a regress argument shows that, given incompatibilism, we are only rarely free. The argument sidesteps recent objections to this thesis.Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
Close calls and the confident agent: Free will, deliberation, and alternative possibilities.Eddy Nahmias - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (3):627-667.
And So On. Two Theories of Regress Arguments in Philosophy.Jan Willem Wieland - 2012 - Dissertation,
Are We Rarely Free? A Response to Restrictivism.Pettit Gordon - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 107 (3):219-237.
References found in this work
When the will is free.John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza - 1992 - Philosophical Perspectives 6:423-51.
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