Hypocrisy and Moral Authority

Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 12 (2):191-222 (2017)
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Abstract

Hypocrites invite moral opprobrium, and charges of hypocrisy are a significant and widespread feature of our moral lives. Yet it remains unclear what hypocrites have in common, or what is distinctively bad about them. We propose that hypocrites are persons who have undermined their claim to moral authority. Since this self-undermining can occur in a number of ways, our account construes hypocrisy as multiply realizable. As we explain, a person’s moral authority refers to a kind of standing that they occupy within a particular moral community. This status is both socially important and normatively precarious. Hence, moral agents are right to be vigilant when it comes to hypocrisy, and are often justified in their outrage when they detect it. We further argue that our view can preserve what is attractive in rival accounts, while avoiding their associated problems.

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Author Profiles

Jessica Isserow
University of Notre Dame
Colin Klein
Australian National University

Citations of this work

Let's See You Do Better: An Essay on the Standing to Criticize.Patrick Todd - 2024 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 10.
Hypocritical Blame as Dishonest Signalling.Adam Piovarchy - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
The Commitment Account of Hypocrisy.Benjamin Rossi - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (3):553-567.

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References found in this work

Unprincipled virtue: an inquiry into moral agency.Nomy Arpaly - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Two faces of responsibility.Gary Watson - 1996 - Philosophical Topics 24 (2):227–48.
Hypocrisy, Moral Address, and the Equal Standing of Persons.R. Jay Wallace - 2010 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 38 (4):307-341.

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