Knowing the intuition and knowing the counterfactual

Philosophical Studies 145 (3):435 - 443 (2009)
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Abstract

I criticize Timothy Williamson's characterization of thought experiments on which the central judgments are judgments of contingent counterfactuals. The fragility of these counterfactuals makes them too easily false, and too difficult to know

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10.1007/s11098-009-9403-9

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Jonathan Ichikawa
University of British Columbia

Citations of this work

Quantifiers, Knowledge, and Counterfactuals.Jonathan Ichikawa - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (2):287 - 313.
Thought experiments in current metaphilosophical debates.Daniel Cohnitz & Sören Häggqvist - 2018 - In Michael T. Stuart, Yiftach Fehige & James Robert Brown, The Routledge Companion to Thought Experiments. London: Routledge. pp. 406-424.

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References found in this work

The Philosophy of Philosophy.Timothy Williamson - 2008 - Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
Frege's conception of numbers as objects.Crispin Wright - 1983 - Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press.
Intuition and the Autonomy of Philosophy.George Bealer - 1998 - In Michael R. DePaul & William Ramsey, Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and its Role in Philosophical Inquiry. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. pp. 201-240.
Frege’s Conception of Numbers as Objects.Crispin Wright - 1983 - Critical Philosophy 1 (1):97.
Experimental philosophy and philosophical intuition.Ernest Sosa - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 132 (1):99-107.

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