Abstract

This chapter offers the core of the argument against _experientialist rationalism_—the view that intuitions are a special form of experience that provide a priori evidence. The target of this chapter is _strong experientialist rationalism_, which holds that, _ceteris paribus_, a subject with the intuition that _p_ has _p_ as evidence by virtue of having that intuition. The central problem with strong experientialist rationalism is that it fails to account for _blind irrationality_—cases in which a subject's thoughts are irrational, even though he has no intuition to the effect that he is proceeding irrationally. The argument is generalized beyond strong experientialist rationalism; it also tells against Huemer's “phenomenal conservativism,” Harman's “general foundations theory,” and Foley's “subjective foundationalism.” All these views, like strong experientialist rationalism, fail to respect the objectivity of rational inquiry.