Abstract

In this chapter, the author delves into the complex topic of robot rights, outlining the book’s central theme and primary argument. The discussion begins with an examination of two prominent sceptical viewpoints on robot rights, attributed to scholars A. Birhane, J. van Dijk, and L. Floridi. Birhane and van Dijk champion human exceptionalism, emphasising human uniqueness and superiority, thus casting doubt on the necessity for robot rights. In contrast, Floridi’s mindless morality concept contests the idea of robots having moral agency, questioning the legitimacy of granting them rights. The author argues that these sceptical perspectives are ultimately unconvincing. To facilitate a more insightful and nuanced dialogue on robot rights, it is crucial to remain open-minded when contemplating the ethical considerations and potential ramifications of general artificial intelligence and superintelligence. By reorienting the conversation, the author invites readers to reassess preconceived beliefs about robots’ roles, responsibilities, and the evolving dynamics between humans and advanced technologies.