Abstract

Fragmentalism is a relatively recent and striking addition to the debate between tensed and tenseless theories of time. First introduced by Fine in “Tense and Reality,” it presents a rare instance of both a theoretically intriguing and novel theory of time. My aim is to consider if and in what sense fragmentalism can join its tensed compatriots in accounting for genuine temporal passage. There are three parts to my analysis of temporal passage in fragmentalism's fragmented world. I begin by defending fragmentalism against claims that it presents a hopelessly muddled conception of reality. With a coherent conceptual picture of the basics of fragmentalism in place, I turn to the passage of time and argue that fragmentalism provides an ill‐suited environment for the mind‐independent passage of time. I conclude that, although fragmentalism is not necessarily in itself an incoherent view, it lacks the advantages of orthodox A‐theoretic tensed accounts.