On Fine’s fragmentalism

Philosophical Studies 172 (12):3119-3133 (2015)
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Abstract

Fragmentalism is the view that reality is not a metaphysically unified place, but fragmented in a certain sense, and constituted by incompatible facts across such fragments. It was introduced by Kit Fine in a discussion of tense realist theories of time. Here I discuss the conceptual foundations of fragmentalism, identify several open questions in Fine’s characterization of the view, and propose an understanding of fragmentalism that addresses these open questions

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Martin A. Lipman
Leiden University

Citations of this work

Fragmenting the Paradox of Material Constitution.Nikk Effingham - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
Perspectival Quantum Realism.Dennis Dieks - 2022 - Foundations of Physics 52 (4):1-20.
Fragmentalism: Putting All the Pieces Together.Claudio Calosi, Samuele Iaquinto & Roberto Loss - 2026 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 104:501-520.
A Passage Theory of Time.Martin A. Lipman - 2018 - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 11:95-122.
Is the World a Heap of Quantum Fragments?Samuele Iaquinto & Claudio Calosi - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178:2009-2019.

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References found in this work

Writing the Book of the World.Theodore Sider - 2011 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Guide to Ground.Kit Fine - 2012 - In Fabrice Correia & Benjamin Schnieder, Metaphysical grounding: understanding the structure of reality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 37--80.
Supervenience and mind: selected philosophical essays.Jaegwon Kim - 1993 - New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.
Word and Object.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1960 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 17 (2):278-279.

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